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ABSTRACT 
This study sought to capture how science teachers view scientific 
knowledge from a philosophical-epistemological perspective. The 
philosophical themes investigated were scientific method, criteria of 
demarcation, patterns of scientific change and problems related with 
the construction of reality. Furthermore, an attempt was made to 
investigate the relation teachers' 	 views on these matters both to 
certain curricular issues (the question of integration and the meaning 
of the terms "content" and "process") and to some pedagogical issues 
(assumptions about learning, instruction and aspects of classroom 
activities). 
For this purpose, a framework was proposed for the analysis of the 
relevant issues. 	 This framework consists of a number of distinctions. 
These distinctions were organised employing the technique of systemic 
network analysis, so as to lay the basis not only for the construction 
of the research instrument but also for the analysis of the empirical 
evidence. The epistemological systems taken into account in the 
a-priori analysis are: inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism (Popper, 
Lakatos), contextualism (Kuhn) and relativism (Feyerabend). At the 
ontological level, the contrast is mainly focused on the differences 
between idealism and realism (pragmatism is also included). 
Three stages can be distinguished in the analysis of the data. The 
first stage is a systematic description of the data and shows that the 
dominant pattern in teachers' philosophical and epistemological views 
. tends to be close to contextualism. It indicates that teachers tend to 
prefer the introduction of integrated science curricula, and in terms 
of pedagogy, to stress pupils' ability to think in abstract terms, as 
well as to emphasise a teacher-centred approach. In the second stage, a 
classification of responses into distinct categories (i.e. inductivism, 
relativism, 	 etc.) 	 was made on the basis of each individual following 
consistently a particular path of the network. 
	 The outcome suggests 
that indeed the Kuhnian system of thought is favoured consistently more 
than any other system. The third stage is an analysis of the 
correlations of teachers' views within and across the three components 
(philosophical, curricular and pedagogical). On the basis of this 
analysis, a tentative conclusion is that there are two relatively 
autonomous regions of "educational theory" as held by teachers, namely 
epistemological and pedagogical views on the one hand and ontological 
and curricular views on the other. 
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I. 	 INTRODUCTION. 
1.1 	 Rationale and delineation of the questions. 
. which is to say that even in the handling of practical things, 
be they agriculture, mechanics or the governing of a city, a kind 
of philOsoOhy is required. 
U. ECCO (The name of the Rose). 
For one to assert that even practical activities need a philosophy is 
a truism for some, whilst for others, it sounds like, i.f not a paradox, 
a form of eccentricity or self-indulgence. 
Nevertheless this thesis sets out to investigate science teachers' 
beliefs about issues concerning the philosophical-epistemological basis 
of science teaching and its relation to certain curricular and 
pedagogical issues. 
In an attempt to meet such misgivings (and even if doing so resembles 
a petition to the impossible), one has to confront three questions: 
-is it legitimate, and if so is it helpful to question not only the 
kind of science to be taught in schools (content), but also the way 
science is taught (pedagogy) in the light of a philosophical analysis 
of scientific knowledge? 
-have the analyses of scientific knowledge, 	 along philosophical 
and/or sociological 	 lines made within these respective fields, been 
applied or can they be applied by educators? 
-why are teachers views on the relevant issues of any significance? 
In so far as the first question is concerned, there would seem to be 
a considerable number of questions about science which are pertinent to 
science teaching. 	 For instance, are notions like truth, objectivity, 
rationality, reality (and real) worth dealing with in the context of 
science education? Is there only one scientific method, or many? What 
is its/their relationship with the above mentioned notions (if any)? Is 
there (or should there be) any distinction between theory and 
observation? Why and in what sense? Is the body of scientific knowledge 
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different from other sorts of knowledge? If so, how? Is it because 
scientific knowledge has special claims on notions like truth and/or 
objectivity? Why could scientific knowledge be seen as having these 
special claims? Is it because it reflects reality? Or, 	 is scientific 
knowledge just a construct (social or personal) no different from any 
other system of organised thought (eg. novels, myths)? In either case, 
is it meaningful to search for criteria of demarcating scentific 
knowledge from other forms of knowledge or from knowledge which poses 
as scientific? Could one define such criteria? Is there a definite 
pattern of scientific change? Should this change be considered as 
growth or progress? And, is this growth (if any) cumulative or what 
else? Finally, how are all these questions interwoven, and what are the 
different philosophical systems which emerge from different answers to 
them? 
Clearly, it is one thing to state such questions, but it is something 
else to discuss them and yet another to justify their relevance to 
science education. The last point is the object of the following 
section, while the subsequent chapters II and III will focus on a 
discussion of the questions themselves. 
It is argued here, that these questions are relevant to the teaching 
of science because philosophical considerations have several 
implications for a number of practically significant issues in science 
education. 	 In other words, despite the fact that the whole enterprise 
of philosophy of science cannot be regarded as finished or certain, 
nevertheless it can cast light on and be useful if not to science 
proper then surely to science education. 
In this vein, Robinson Ell argues that teachers' conception of the 
"nature of science" is an important force in shaping classroom 
behaviour. In his paper he gives a number of examples to substantiate 
his position. One can get an impression of the degree of significance 
of philosophical considerations for the teaching of science by sampling 
one. To the question "what is a gene?" does the teacher's explanation 
reflect the construct 'gene' or does his language reify the construct 
and makes it into an entity? (i.e. is gene given instrumental or 
existential 	 status)? Furthermore, in relating UNA to inheritance does 
the verbal discourse include construction of a physical model that 
15 
accounted for certain experimental data? Does it include the generative 
qualities of such models in the sciences that have made the DNA model 
productive of hypotheses that could not have been formulated in the 
absence of the model?" Or, does teacher's consideration treats DNA as a 
factual entity? 
If however, Robinson has been the pioneer in the field, it is 
Scheffler who has produced the most convincing argument for the 
relevance of philosophical-epistemological considerations to science 
teaching. The thrust of this argument is that the educator taking on 
the responsibility of educational transmission, assumes the obligation 
of evaluating whatever there is in that tradition he chooses to 
perp-etuate. 	 "For the educator is constantly in the position, not only 
of representing and advancing specialised exemplifications of thought, 
but also of explaining and interpreting such exemplifications to the 
novice" [2]. In this transitional role, philosophy of science is of 
primary importance. To this, one could counter-argue that philosophy of 
science does not provide the teacher with firmly established views but 
rather with an array of sometimes incompatible positions. However, in 
Scheffler's words "this array, although it does not fix his direction, 
liberates him from the dogmatism of ignorance, gives him a realistic 
apprehension of alternatives and outlines relevant considerations that 
have been elaborated in the history of the problem" (Scheffler, p.216). 
Turning now to the second question originally posed, the various 
philosophical and sociological schools of thought look at the same 
sorts of problems from different angles, because of their different 
presuppositions and preoccupations. 	 It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that they will yield different and sometimes contradictory 
answers, in addition to offering different methodological frameworks 
for analysing the same problems. This being explicable, does not cancel 
either the inevitable fragmentation or the frustration experienced by 
an educator when seeking for help. On the other hand, it should be 
admitted that as Scheffler argues, educational research focuses mainly 
on what is called educational philosophy, making scant use of the 
philosophies of the relevant subject (i.e. 	 science) 	 in a systematic 
way, even when, as a growing body of literature concerning the 
importance of children's prior knowledge to science teaching indicates, 
epistemological assumptions are often used as starting points. 
16 
Robinson (3], commenting in 1969 on this situation argues that " 
science education lacked well-developed philosophical starting points 
and has tended to be contradictory, 	 fragmented and unpatterned 
teaching and learning studies have appropriated 'methods' of science, 
scientific 'principles', science concepts etc. as unexamined starting 
points". Six years later Smolic: and Nunan (4], reviewing Robinson's 
ideas, appear to share his worries: "A possible explanation for this 
neglect of philosophical starting points can be offered. Science 
educators may be simply naive and unaware of diverse view points, or 
alternatively through their own scientific education, embrace the 
values of a particular model to which they have become committed". 
Considerable empirical work has been done on teachers' views about 
philosophical 	 issues (57. However, the main reason why the present 
survey was thought worth undertaking, is that previous studies have 
been constructed as to take into account generally only one or two 
philosophical traditions and very often tend to lack the articulation 
of the philosophical with the curricular and the pedagogical element. A 
more detailed overview and critique of the relevant literature is 
presented in chapter VI. 
As already stated this thesis represents an attempt to address the 
problem 	 through 	 an 	 analysis 	 of 	 scientific 	 knowledge 	 along 
philosophical-epistemological lines and to discuss the outcome of such 
an analysis in relation to certain curricular and pedagogical issues. 
Furthermore, an exploration of teachers' relevant views and their 
correlation with teachers' curricular and "pedagogical" assumptions 
will be investigated in order to pinpoint contingent areas of 
educational "theory", as held by teachers. 
Teachers' assumptions concerning the philosophical dimensions of 
scientific knowledge and its relationship to science curriculum and 
pedagogy cannot be assumed to be clear-cut and absolutely coherent 
stances. Since even professional philosophers dispute each other's 
coherence of viewpoint, it is not unreasonable to assume that teachers' 
views are not absolutely consistent. This assumption however, is not 
particularly problematic as it is testable, i.e. the instrument 
	 (which 
can be used as a tool to map science teachers' philosophical, curricular 
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and pedagogical views) can assist in the detection of contingent 
tensions (within each and across these domains). 
Finally, a discussion about curricular and pedagogical views in the 
light of prevailing philosophical stances will be presented, thereby 
serving to establish a tentative image of part of the educational 
"theory" which a certain group of science teachers hold. 
There is one point which needs clarification here. Using the term 
"theory" in this context it is not to say that theory and practice can 
be dichotomised into separate and distinct categories [6]. On the 
contrary, I would suggest that this study should be followed by further 
work in which the congruence of the practice with the "theory" 
established would be investigated. 
In the present work, teachers' responses will be compared with a 
number of philosophical and other stances considered to be of 
contemporary importance, no one philosophical, curricular or 
pedagogical stance being considered to be the "correct" one. This is 
not to assert that there is no "correct" stance but that so far as 
identifying teachers' positions is concerned, it is necessary to 
withhold judgement about their validity. 
There potentially exist further kinds of use of the instrument 
developed in the study which extend beyond its present purposes. For 
instance, it could serve as a source of information for curriculum 
designers and developers. In this respect, Havelock (7), in discussing 
models of curriculum innovation, has argued for the need of the 
innovating centre to know the dispositions of teachers. Others 	 (e.g. 
Stenhouse [8]), disputing the value of centre-oriented innovation, have 
pointed to the failure of the central group on some occasions to take 
into account teachers' 	 views. 	 Obviously, an instrument capable of 
recording aspects of teachers' views could be of help in removing this 
sort of tension. 
Furthermore, the application of the instrument could be seen as one 
possible prerequisite for helping to establish interdepartamental 
liaison, as for instance Hart, Boath and Turner [9], as well as Selkirk 
[10] suggest is essential for science and mathematics departments. The 
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basis for this claim is that knowledge of others' philosophical 
assumptions regarding scientific knowledge, as well as their views on 
certain pedagogical issues, and the science school curricula could 
only help. However, the point here, is not to explore all potentially 
useful areas for application of the instrument. It is intended merely 
to paint out that there are some other areas too, where the application 
of the instrument could be of help. 
Construction of the research instru5ent. 
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I.2 
	
The overall research plan. 
Having outlined in the previous section the main aims of the 
study, the stages in the process of implementing these as well 	 as 
the overall structure of the thesis will be presented ne::t 
(including their diagrammatic representations). 
Mn a-priori conceptual zapping of the relevant 
13511E5. 
Metnodoloaical considerations (systemic 
network analysis technique). 
Empirical element: 
a. review of relevant studies 
b. application of the research instrument 
Analysis and discussion of the results. 
Conclusions, limitations, suggestions for 
further research. 
DIAGRAM DIA: The stages of the research. 
An a-priori analysis of scientific knowledge along philosophical 
-epistemological 	 lines as well as a discussion of certain curricular 
issues (i.e. the question of integrated science and the meaning of 
content and process in science) and pedagogical issues (i.e. general 
assumptions about learning, instruction and classroom activities) 
constitute the first stage. 
It should be noted here that the balance concerning the discussion 
between on the one hand the philosophical-epistemological issues and 
the curricular and pedagogical ones on the other, is itentionall. 
given the general orientation of this study, not even. 
The second stage deals with the methodological approach, more 
specifically the systemic network analysis technique in relation to 
general methodological considerations and theory of knowledge. The 
construction of the research instrument (which is based on the two 
previous stages) constitutes the third stage. The fourth stage consists 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS. 
A study of correlations 
between the emerging patterns. 
SECTION VIII.3 
        
        
  
DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS. 
A systematic presentation 
of the empirical evidence. 
   
PATTERNS ANALYSIS. 
An analysis of the emerging 
patterns on the basis of the 
a-priori analysis. 
 
      
       
  
10  ON 	 VIII.1 	 10  ON 	 VIII.2 
 
        
1  
INTRODUCTION. 
Rationale of the study and 
delineation of the main questions 
of both the background analysis 
and of the empirical research. 
CHAPTER 	 I 
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CURRICULAR AND PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES IN SCIENCE 
EDUCATION. 
An analysis of certain curricular 
and pedagogical issues relevant to the 
teaching of science. 
CHAPTER 
	 I 
ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE FROM AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
AND PHILOSOPHICAL STANDPOINT. 
In this chapter the intention is twofold: a. To develop 
the basis of a philosophical model for science teaching; 
b. To generate a set of statement representing positions 
across the spectrum. 
CHAPTER 	 III.  
SYSTEMIC NETWORK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE. 
a. The background and an exposition 
of this technique. 
	
'Pi b. A presentation of the network 
employed in this study. 
CHAPTER 	 IV. 
METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES. 
The application of systemic network 
analysis in developing the instrument in 
relation to general methodological 
assumptions. 
CHAPTER 	 V. 
A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE. 	 THE INSTRUMENT. 
An attempt to locate this piece of 	 a. The content and the structure-format 
research in terms of the work done 	 the instrument. 
previously in the field. 	 b. Limitations of the instrument. 
CHAPTER VI. 	 CHAPTER VII. 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. 
CHAPTER 	 IX. 
DIAGRAM D1.2: The structure of the thesis. 
of a review of the existing studies in the area, with emphasis on 
their relevance to the empirical element of this research. Finally, 
the analysis and interpretation of the results and a discussion of 
the conclusions are dealt with. 
Diagram D1.2 presents both the focus of each chapter of the thesis 
and the way these chapters are articulated. Viewed together they 
provide an indication of the flow of the overall argument. 
In as far as the research instrument is concerned (in accordance 
with the a—priori analysis on which its construction is based —
chapters II and III) consists conceptually of three components 
(philosophical—epistemological, curricular and pedagogical). Each of 
these components contains several "themes". In the following table 
71.1 the composition of each component is shown, while the full text 
of the instrument is provided by Appendix 1. 
A. Philosophical-epistemological component 
1. Scientific methodology. 
2. Criteria of demarcation. 
3. Pattern(s) of scientific change. 
4. The status of scientific knowledge. 
5. The issue of reality. 
E. Curricular component. 
1. The meaning of content and process in science teaching. 
L. The question ofteaching integrated science. 
C. Pedagogical component. 
1. Assumptions about learning. 
2. Assumptions about instruction. 
3. Assumptions about classroom activities. 
TABLE 11.1: The composition of the components. 
Finally, with regard to the empirical element, the instrument has 
been administered to 54 practising teachers and 41 student teachers 
(PGCE students). The analysis of the responses aims at discerning 
both teachers' views on each of the above themes as well as 
relationships between their views on different themes. 
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II. CURRICULAR AND PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES: A brief overview of 
certain features of the educational landscape. 
As far as the curricular and pedagogical issues are concerned, there 
are a considerable number of issues which one could look at in a 
multiplicity of ways. 
The foci of this chapter are restricted to certain aspects of the 
debates concerning the curriculum for sciences (the question of 
"integrated science" and the relevant one concerning how the terms 
content and process are conceived) and pedagogy (assumptions about 
learning, 	 instruction, classroom activities). The intention is not to 
contribute to these debates, but is rather to organise the discussion 
on the basis of certain distinctions making explicit their 
philosophical-epistemological concequences. The subsequent construction 
of the systemic networks for these areas will be based on these 
distinctions. 
Therefore the relation between the systemic networks (which serve as 
basis for the construction of the research instrument - chapter IV) and 
the theoretical analysis is here less prominent than the corresponding 
relation in the philosophical component (chapter III) in two senses: 
-firstly, the basic distinctions here are only a small selection of 
the possible ones (the philosophical component is more complete). 
-secondly, these distinctions are not frame in terms of different 
coherent theoretical systems - rather they reflect them in a more 
personal way. 
However, the theoretical arguments give these distinctions some 
general support, at least as far as their relevance is concerned. 
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II.1 	 CURRICULAR ISSUES: The question of science integration. 
With regard to the question of integration one can distinguish 
between integration across the curriculum (i.e. "integrated" type 
curricula in Bernstein's terminology [l]) and integration within 
science (for instance the Scottish integrated science course [2]). The 
first position entails a radical re-orientation of the traditionally 
taught science curricula, having been thus the focus of the curricular 
debates in periods of intense innovation. As it is evidenced however by 
Brown I.:3, in terms of justificatory arguments, the latter form of 
integration is a reflection of the former (integration across the 
curriculum. 
It may seem that generally speaking, there are three perspectives 
which inform the relevant arguments: 
-the first looks at the question from a philosophical standpoint 
(i.e. forms of knowledge); 
-for the second sociological considerations are of crucial 
importance (e.g. frame of hierarchies). 
-practical considerations. 
Interestingly, as Brown suggests [4] the first and second of the above 
perspectives are often treated as antithetical. 
In terms of the first perspective, one could discern two main camps. 
On the one hand, it is Hirst [5] who argue that "all knowledge is 
differentiated into a limited number of logically distinct forms or 
disciplines". Furthermore, "these logical forms are characterised by 
both concepts of distinct type and distinct procedures, which they use 
to underpin their knowledge claims" [a]. Following a similar line 
Phenix considers that education is the process of "engendering 
essential meanings" [7]. Thus, according to this view, a mapping of 
realms (and sub-realms) of meanings is an indispensable element of any 
attempt to develop curricula. Furthermore "each realm of meaning and 
its constituent subrealms may be described by reference to its typical 
methods, leading ideas and characteristic structures. These features 
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may be exhibited both in their uniqueness for each realm or subrealm 
and in their relationships and continuities with the other types of 
meaning" [8]. 
Clearly then, the logic of the arguments put forward by Hirst and 
Phenix implies that there are compelling reasons, i.e. different 
conceptual frameworks and procedures (methodology) which call for the 
teaching of specialised subjects. It should be noted that according to 
these views the specialised subjects do not neccessarily have to be the 
traditionally taught disciplines (e.g. Physics, Chemistry, Biology). 
For instance Hirst [9] is attacking rather than defending traditional 
school subjects. Phenix [10] however says "that the curriculum should 
consist entirely of knowledge which comes from the disciplines, for 
the reason that the disciplines reveal knowledge in its teachable 
forms". 
In contrast, Schwab [11] argues that scientific knowledge is 
fundamentally of a revisionary character such that the conceptual 
framework of science is constantly altered. Furthermore, this 
conceptual framework (in his terminology "substantive structure of the 
discipline") is not inherent in the subject matter, but it is imposed 
by the practitioners. 
The implications of Schwab's thesis can be construed in two distinct 
ways. 
a. It could be argued that despite the fact that differences in the 
substantive structure of a scientific discipline are not built into the 
various subjects, nevertheless the practitioners consensus to impose 
such boundaries is beneficial to the process of initiating novices into 
the respective areas. Then, it follows that the scientific curriculum 
should be organised in the basis of specialised subjects. 
b. From different epistemological and ideological premises one can 
argue that these externally imposed boundaries are detrimental to the 
educational processes and therefore the teaching of integrated science 
should be preferred. 
A version of the Kuhnian system serves as the epistemological basis 
of the first interpretation (see section 111.4), while for the 
justification of the second interpretation one should introduce the 
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sociological perspective. Bernstein [12] introduced the notions of 
frame and classification as an analytical tool. In this context the 
curriculum is conceived as a socially determined structure rather than 
as only the result of an epistemic analysis. 
This conception of the curriculum is very helpful and the role of 
social forces cannot be disputed. The issue however here roughly 
speaking, is to what extent one can stretch the argument so far as to 
assert that all forms of knowledge are socially constructed, and are 
therefore a mere convention. 	 If one accepts this premise, then what 
follows is that since all knowledge is socially constructed different 
social groups 
	 (e.g. 	 social classes) possess and appreciate different 
sorts of knowledge (M. Young, [137). Subsequently Young, using Berger 
and Luckmann's [14] notion of reality as a social construction 
maintains that these different sorts of knowledge correspond to 
different views of reality. 
Thus, according to Young's position, social criteria should be 
employed for the selection and organisation of knowledge which will be 
offered in schools, if one wants to avoid the imposition of irrelevant 
knowledge to pupils of disadvantaged social groups. 
The counterpart of this position at the epistemological level 	 is 
relativism: the criteria of what counts as knowledge have only a social 
(or historical) dimension which changes as society changes. It may be 
further noted that Berger and Luckmann [15] on whose work this argument 
draws, distinguish (qualifying their theory) between society as 
objective reality and society as subjective reality, the latter 
referring exclusively to "ideology". Thus, if one wants to argue as M. 
Young without retaining the above distinction one has to argue not only 
for relativism in epistemological 	 level but also for one or another 
form of idealism at the ontological level (see section 111.6). 
One should not however treat Bernstein's and Young's positions as 
identical. 	 It is true that both start from similar concerns i.e. power 
distribution within schools and educational equality. It is also true 
that they both consider integration across the curriculum and within 
science instrumental for such purposes. The philosophical underpinning 
of their positions is what makes them fundamentally different. 
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Bernstein suggests that the introduction of an integrated curriculum 
is a means serving to disturb the traditional authority structure [16]. 
In a specialised subject curriculum the established hierarchy of power 
is isolated into the individual science departments. The integrated 
curriculum Bernstein suggests is to undermine this structure. This will 
initiate new relationships not only between teachers but also between 
staff-pupils and pupils themselves. The situation then in which 'less 
able pupils" do not perform (or even do not have access) to high status 
subjects will change and all pupils will have a common work task. The 
implementation of such an educational policy will eventually result in 
a less rigid structure, which makes the integrated code potentially a 
code which does not obstruct attempts to reform education. However, 
this should seen this in the light of Bernstein assertion that 
education cannot compensate for society [177. His point is that the 
ability of certain individuals, groups, classes to impose their 
"definitions" is based on power inequalities and should be seen in 
terms of social structures than merely the way in which we perceive 
social relations [18]. 
	 It is clear therefore that no connection with 
idealism can be possibly established. 
Adversaries of the introduction of an integrated curriculum took the 
opportinity to argue that such a curriculum will bring about 
deterioration of academic standards. It should be noted however, that 
empirical evidence 	 (but by no means conclusive) seem to suggest that 
insofar as the science course is designed for mixed ability classes 
following a common curriculum, no evidence of lower academic standards 
has been found (Welch, [19]). 
Finally, the question of integration can be seen in terms of 
practical constraints (e.g. resources, availability of teachers, 
apparatus etc.). At this level "an integrated scheme demanding a 
maximum allocation of one fifth of the timetable would do much to 
overcome those practical problems" (Schools' council, [2()]). 
Furthermore, at a superficial, at least, level integrated curricula can 
provide a way of avoiding unneccessary dublication of teaching that is 
common to the various disciplines (Whitfield, C21)). 
Summarising the above discussion, table T2.1 below indicate the 
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points on which arguments either for specialisation or integration are 
based. 
Arguments for teaching science in schools in the form of separate subjects can be based 
on: 
1. differences in content between subjects; 
2. differences in processes used by subjects; 
3. reasons of practical convenience. 
4. the need to maintain high academic standards; 
Arguments for teaching science in schools in the form of an integrated subjects can be 
based on: 
1. science basic unity of concepts; 
2. science basic unity of methods; 
3. reasons of practical convenience; 
4. the need to make school science relevant to the pupils. 
TABLE T2.1: Arguments for specialised subjects and for integrated 
science. 
In the following table 12.2 possible alternatives of meanings 
attached to the terms content and process in science are suggested (see 
also chapter III). 
The meaning of content in science education could be either of: 
a. scientific theories and laws; 
b. experimental and/or observational data; 
c. techniqes of experimentation. 
The meaning of process in science education could be either of: 
a. scientific methods (how to be scientific). 
b. how to handle experimental or observational data. 
c. how to devise experiments. 
TABLE T2.2: Meaning of content and process in science education. 
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11.2 	 Pedagogical assumptions: Learning, instruction, 
classroom activities. 
The number of possible pedagogical questions is very extensive. Here, 
the interest to limited in three areas: 
	
assumptions on learning, 
assumptions on instruction and certain aspects of classroom activities. 
Even the use of terms like learning, instruction or practical 
activities needs further clarification. Thus, by assumptions on 
learning, in this thesis, the aim, the prerequisite in order for 
effective learning to take place as well as a way of checking the 
extent to which successful learning has been achieved is discussed. 
What is meant by the term instruction are the assumptions about the way 
teachers organise their lessons (objectives model vs. more 
interventionist practice), the way knowledge is presented to the pupils 
(small steps or the whole idea in the beginning), what aspects of 
motivation are considered to be crucial (e.g. emotional involvement, 
role of feedback or the active participation of students) 
	 and finally 
how the role of reinforcement is conceived in this frame. Finally, as 
far as the classroom activities are concerned, some of the elements in 
terms of control of knowledge transactions as well as what are thought 
to be the traits of a "successful" teacher are discussed. 
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11.2.1 	 Assumptions about Learning. 
Theories of learning constitute the most structured theme of the 
pedagogical component. In this discussion it will be attempted to 
relate the above mentioned three questions concerning learning to 
behaviourism, "cognitivism" (Piagetian school or "interactionism") and 
constructivism. The choice of these systems is due not only to the fact 
that they are well established within psychology of learning (and 
therefore more probable to have influenced teachers' thinking) but also 
because being general permits one to trace their philosophical 
leanings. 	 It should be noted however that since as stated already the 
object of this chapter is not a full representation of these systems, 
the labelling is simply conventional and should not taken be literally. 
The main conceptual characteristic of behaviourism, is the argument 
concerning the "eliminability of mental terms" (and their reference, of 
course) "from causal accounts" [1]. It should be stressed however, that 
strictly speaking, behaviourism is not one doctrine. There are said to 
be at least three significantly different versions: 
1. Logical behaviourism, 
2. Methodological behaviourism, 
3. Radical behaviourism [2]. 
Their differences lie not in that they differ fundamentally with 
regard to the above mentioned central tenet of behaviourism, but it is 
rather a matter of different emphasis. Thus, logical behaviourism 
maintains that "all mental predicates can be translated, analysed or 
replaced by behavioural and environmental terms, without any loss to 
designate whatever is psychologically real" [3]. Indeed Skinner affirms 
that he is "a radical behaviourist simply in the sense that I find no 
place in the formulation of psychological explanations for anything 
which is mental" P17. 
Methodological behaviourism is a theory about the methodological 
constraints properly imposed on the explanatory powers of empirical 
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psychology. In so far as the methodology is concerned, Skinner insists 
that behaviourism needs not and does not ignore the mental [5]. Radical 
behaviourism which perhaps is the one stream which draws more upon 
philosophy, argues that "explanation in terms of cognitive variables 
are entirely vacuous and mental phenomena are fictions" [6]. If one 
follows behaviourists who oppose the explanatory use of mental 
phenomena just because they cannot be observed, then the link of this 
stream (radical behaviourism) with logical positivism can be easily 
established. 
Clearly therefore, for behaviourists the aim of learning should be 
the acquisition of knowledge in the sense of the recipient being able 
to demonstrate a change in behavioural terms by showing the relevant 
skills (not necessarily practical). On this basis, one has to infer 
that the assessment of learning outcome should be judged on this basis. 
As far as the prerequisite for successful learning is concerned, taking 
into account behaviourists' insistence that "each step in the learning 
process should be short and should grow out of prevviousl3 learnt 
behaviour" [7] their stress on the role of the immediate prior 
knowledge (knowledge in this case should be construed in the 
behaviourists' sense, i.e. change of behaviour) can be established. 
The other two systems, i.e. cognitivism and contructivism differ from 
behaviourism in that they emphasise the 'causal efficacy of internal 
mental states" CS]. There are however differences between these 
systems, taken to be represented by Piaget and Kelly respectively. As 
Bliss argues, whereas Piaget focuses on the mechanism of acquisition of 
knowledge common to all individuals, Kelly looks at knowledge 
construction at a level that would generate different results from 
person to person [9]. Furthermore, Kelly [10] stresses the conscious 
self-regulation by the individual during the process of knowledge 
construction, while Piaget thinks the very opposite. Piaget states: 
	 in 
any case the 'lived' (or conscious) can only have a very minor role in 
the construction of cognitive structures ... Not until he becomes old 
enough to reflect on his own habits and patterns of thought and actions 
does the subject become aware of structure as such" [11]. 
This difference in emphasis between the Piagetian and constructivist 
traditions is made clearer when considering how the epistemic subject 
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is conceived within them. Piaget summarising his epistemological views 
notes: "that [system] draws attention to the activity of the subject 
without being idealist; that equally bases itself on the object, which 
it considers as a limit (therefore existing independently of us but 
never completely reached); and that above all sees knowledge as a 
continuous construction" [12]. 
Conversely Kelly, as Fransella and Bannister argue, accepts that "the 
model underlying construct psychology is explicitly the idea of 	 'every 
man his own scientist'". Thus, this theory holds that to study a person 
is to study the "grammar" of his unique "rationality" [13]. It seems 
therefore that one can infer that constructivists stress the self 
perception of needs as a prerequisite of learning and consequently that 
the individual learner should be fudged according to what he/she 
perceives to be the outcome of the learning process. 
Insights regarding the epistemological associations of constructivism 
can be acquired by taking into account not only the theoretical 
premises of Kelly but also at looking in the way his work is reflected 
by a recently growing body of research within science education e.g. 
Driver and Erickson [14], Pope and Gilbert [15]. A combination of 
relativism in so far as the status of scientific knowledge is 
concerned, with methodological inductivism, which is not inconsistent 
with idealistic ontological tendencies seems to be the features of the 
relevant works. 
Inferences about the pedagogical implications are more difficult in 
the case of "cognitivism". Piaget's interest was the relationship 
between epistemology and the psychological formation of ideas and for 
this reason "almost all [of] Piaget's investigation stem from some 
philosophical 	 issue about the structure of knowledge and not, as is 
commonly believed, from a psychological concern about children" (Bliss, 
[16]). Thus, as Bliss argues, to translate Piaget's work into 
educational applications one has to move from the level of analysing 
the epistemic subject to the level of focusing at the child [17]. 
Such a transition is not facilitated by the fact that arguments put 
forward by "cognitivism" are not only much more sophisticated and 
diversified but also because Piaget's work is interpreted very often as 
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"nothing more than a stage naming exercise illustrated by a few rather 
simplified examples' [181. 
It seems that if ones takes into account Piaoet's distinction between 
physical and logico-mathematical activity, crucial for the latter is 
the ability of the individual to think in abstract terms. Furth writes 
"Piaget 
	 also 	 uses 	 the 	 term 	 'reflecting' 	 abstraction 	 (for 
logico-mathematical 	 [activities]) 	 since he considers this abstraction 
in a manner of an internal feedback. ... The abstraction, as feedback, 
is an internal regulation mechanism; and as an internal enrichment, it 
becomes the principal source of growth of the operative structure. This 
growth takes the form of an internal increase where on a higher plane 
later structures subsumes or 'reflect' earlier structures" [19]. 
If then one accepts the main distinctions, the features of each 
system in terms of aims, prerequisite and assessment of learning can be 
summarised as follows: 
"Behaviourism". 
1. The basic goal or aim of teaching should be that pupils acquire the 
knowledge and skills of the subject. 
2. To know whether pupils have learned or not, it is important to find 
out whether they themselves consider that they have learned or not. 
3. It is essential to effective learning that account has been taken of 
pupils' ability to think at a sufficient level of abstraction. 
B. "Cognitivism". 
1. The basic goal or aim of teaching should be that pupils develop a 
rational understanding of the subject. 
2. To know whether pupils have learned or not, it is important to check 
what they can or cannot be seen to do. 
3. It is essential to effective learning that account has been taken of 
pupils' perception of their own needs. 
C. "Constructivism". 
1. The basic goal or aim of teaching should be that pupils form their 
own individual view of the subject. 
2. To know whether pupils have learned or not, it is important to 
discover whether they have the expected concepts or not. 
3. It is essential to effective learning that account has been taken of 
pupils' immediate prior knowledge. 
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11.2.2 	 Assumptions about Instruction. 
According to Bruner, assumptions about instruction, could be seen as 
a "theory", in the sense of setting the rules "concerning the most 
effective way of achieving knowledge or skills" [20]. Accepting this, 
one has also to accept its normative-prescriptive character. 	 In this 
view, this is an important element which differentiates this set of 
assumptions from what is usually termed theories of 	 learning and 
development, the latter being descriptive or explanatory rather than 
prescriptive. 
The implication of such a position is that a "theory' of instruction 
concerned with "how what one wishes to teach can best be learned" [21], 
by being more practice-oriented, 
	
is of more immediate relevance to 
classroom teachers. 
Taking into account these two characteristics of theories of 
instruction a further distinction can be drawn. It could be argued that 
the various elements constituting a theory of instruction should be 
seen as more autonomous and that one can discuss them per se and in 
connection with the classroom practice rather than seeking to establish 
complex ramification, as it is the case, for instance, for the 
epistemological questions. Clearly, this is not to say that the 
question of internal consistency of a theory of instruction is 
irrelevant or that it must not be "congruent with those theories of 
learning and development to which it subscribes" [22]. 
Bruner further asserts that a theory of instruction should have four 
main dimensions. In short these dimensions concern: 
(a) predispositions, (b) the way knowledge to be presented to the 
learner 	 is structured, 	 as well as (c) the sequence of the knowledge, 
and finally, (d) the "pacing of rewards and punishments in the process 
of learning and teaching" (reinforcement) [23]. 
A somewhat similar, although much narrower set is employed here, the 
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elements of which roughly correspond to Bruner's dimensions, namely: 
(a) motivation, (b) general orientation of lessons, (c) pacing of 
knowledge and (d) the role of reinforcement. 
With regard to the first element three not mutually exclusive stances 
can be established: 
-Firstly, the theories of motivation for which active participation 
is the key element. 	 This idea of the child as an active agent is 
prominent in both the Piagetian tradition and constructivism (e.g. 
Kelly) C247. 
-Secondly those theories which support that motivation is enhanced 
whenever an emotional involvement on the part of pupils is achieved 
(e.g. affiliation, like the teacher and desire for approval) [25]. 
-Finaly, the behaviourist stream of theories according to which 
instrumental to motivation is the obtaining of information about how 
successfully 	 one 	 is 	 performing 	 (feedback). 	 Furthermore, 
	
the 
motivational effects very much depend on the length of the time spent 
to notify the outcome of the assessment to the pupil. The longer the 
time the less probable a favourable impact is attained [263. 
In so far as the general orientation of lessons is concerned the main 
distinction is between those who espouse a strictly "objectives" 
oriented conduct of lessons and others who believe in a more flexible 
approach, which gives the teacher the ability to respond or intervene 
according to the needs of the moment. Very briefly, the supporters of 
the former model argue that it provides a focus for the diverse 
teaching activities [27], in addition to being essential 4or purposes 
of evaluation and assessment [287. Opponents of this approach 
counter-argue that by filtering school knowledge through an analysis of 
objectives, it is bound to end up in defining unacceptable solution -
particularly if "knowledge" is treated as problematic rather than given 
[29]. 
The pacing of knowledge is the third element to be considered. 
Skinner suggests a linear teaching programme of which the knowledge 
steps should be short so as to result a slow build-up in the level of 
difficulty [30]. 	 Gestalt psychologists on the other hand advocate the 
presentation of large chunks of knowledge (the whole idea before the 
elaboration of the details). The justification of such an approach is 
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based on the argument that if one takes parts of the content to be 
taught out of context, this may lead in rendering the material 
meaningless [31]. 
The notion of reinforcement is central to theories in the 
behaviourist tradition. In its simplest form reinforcement is conceived 
as positive (reward or praise) and negative (blame). According to these 
theories, 	 if pupils' efforts are rewarded (or punished) with something 
they like (or do not like) to receive (establishment of the 
stimulus-response link), this is more likely to generate in them an 
intentional behavioural pattern [32]. Therefore, a schedule of 
reinforcement is indispensable, in this view, for successful learning 
to take place. Other theories criticise this emphasis on the 
stimulus-response link because this link which assigns to reinforcement 
a central place, cannot but eventually lead to uniformity and 
trivilisation of teaching [33]. 
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11.2.3 
	 Assumptions about classroom activities. 
What the term classroom activities is taken to mean here, are those 
elements of the classroom interaction system which are instrumental to 
the transmission-interpretation of knowledge. The distinction proposed 
by Barnes [34] for this purpose, is the basis for developing this 
theme. According to this distinction one can discern two extreme types 
of teacher: the "transmission" and the "interpretation" teacher. The 
transmission teacher "believes knowledge to exist in the form of public 
disciplines", values the performance of pupils in terms of the criteria 
laid down within the discipline, perceives "teachers' task to be the 
evaluation of learners' performance" and perceives the "learner as an 
uninformed acolyte for whom access to knowledge will be difficult" 
[35]. On the other hand the interpretation teacher believes "knowledge 
to exist in knower's ability to organize thought and action", considers 
both teacher and learner to be the source of the criteria of 
performance, stresses teacher's task to set up a dialogue through which 
the learner can reshape his knowledge, and finally perceives the 
"learner as already possessing systematic and relevant knowledge" [36]. 
Barnes' intention was to put forward a hypothesis for the 
construction of a communication model encompassing a whole range of 
aspects of classroom interaction. Here, the target is narrower and 
given that some of the elements of this system (e.g. an epistemic 
analysis of scientific knowledge, certain aspects of science 
curriculum, 	 etc.) are discussed elsewhere, this framework is modified. 
For this reason two additional elements are introduced concerning the 
transmissive-interpretative function of the teacher, so as to demarcate 
clearly the questions under consideration: the questions are seen in 
the light of teachers' functions with regard to the control of 
knowledge transactions in classrooms and complementarily teachers' own 
perception of the characteristics underlying their roles in the 
classroom. 
Thus, if teachers believe that crucial to classroom activities are 
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clear explanations to which pupils should carefully attend, instead of 
pupils' investigating problems of their own choice, or if teachers 
emphasise a reconstruction of scientific knowledge within a carefully 
guided path, then the teachers lean towards the transmission model, in 
terms of the first of the above mentioned elements. Of course, 	 if 
teachers think the pupils' investigations and active discussions to be 
of primary importance, then one has indications that elements of the 
"interpretative" model in Barnes' terminology are present. These two 
approaches concerning teachers' activities in relation to the way 
knowledge is conceived can also be seen (apart from their 
transmissional or interpretative function) along the distinction 
between teacher or pupil-centred orientation respectively. 
With regard to the characteristics of a successful teacher as 
conceived by teachers themselves, the last distinction can be usefully 
employed. Thus, one can argue that the important elements are teachers' 
mastery of subject or the extent to which effective teaching techniques 
are applied 	 (the interpretation of the term teaching techniques be 
open). Alternatively, the emphasis can be placed on the ability of the 
teacher to understand pupils' thinking well and his/her commitment to 
respect pupils' own decisions about their learning. 
To conclude, it can be proposed tentatively that the pupil-centred 
approaches fit better with a "constructivist" theory about learning, 
while for one to establish possible associations between the 
approaches which stress other aspects (e.g. teachers' ability for clear 
explanation etc.), further information about the way instruction is 
conceived (e.g. pacing of knowledge, how reinforcement is conceived 
etc. - section 11.2.2) is needed. 
If this hypothesis is reasonable then one can further suggest a link 
among philosophical assumptions, assumptions about classroom activities 
and instruction, through the already argued philosophical 	 implications 
of the assumptions about learning. 
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III. 	 A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 
III.I 	 INTRODUCTION. 
This part of the thesis analyses a number of different 
epistemological and philosophical positions. The immediate intended 
outcome is to oenerate from this analysis, sets of statements, which 
can be considered to encapsulate each of the philosophical positions 
under discussion. 
Underlying this purpose is that of arriving at a rationale for the 
structure of an instrument intended to discriminate between different 
philosophical stances of some complexity. Thus, although the analysis 
does not pretend to be a contribution to the philosophy of science, it 
is hoped that it may contribute to clarifying the nature of questions 
about the philosophy of science as it applies to science education. 
For the present purpose, then, the philosophical systems under 
consideration are distinguished into three levels: 
-
level III: broad systems of thought in philosophy of science 
(epistemology) 	 namely, 	 inductivism, 	 hypothetico-deductivism, 
contetualism (two versions) and relativism. 
-level II: philosophical positions having special relevance to 
philosophy of science i.e. scientific realism, pragmatism (including 
instrumentalism) and logical positivism. 
-level 	 general philosophical systems, underpinning any other 
philosophical (and epistemological) stance, which include realism, 
scepticism, idealism (as well as some of its versions - e.g. solipsism, 
phenomenalism). 
The discussion is initially organised at level III and focuses on the 
following themes: 
a. scientific method, 
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b. criteria of demarcation, 
c. pattern of scientific growth, 
d. status of scientific knowledge, 
as they are underpinned by the distinction (or, its absence) between 
theory and observation. 
	
It is however, not enough to treat each 
independently, since each shares certain features with others, any one 
position being a configuration of stances concerning deeper or wider 
issues. For this reason, at the end of the chapter the analysis is 
developed at levels II and I, attempting to synthesise the previous 
discussion. At these levels, the issue which is discussed is mainly how 
reality is conceived within the various systems. 
As to why the distinction of the systems under discussion into three 
levels is considered relevant, one can argue that strictly speaking 
epistemology as the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of 
knowledge. As Harre [1] put it, in epistemological investigations one 
reflects "on the standards to which genuine knowledge should conform". 
And it is accepted across the spectrum that the principle of internal 
consistency is fundamental to such investigations [2]. However, 
epistemological considerations are based and depend on one's 
ontological 
	 beliefs. 	 Therefore, one can in principle draw a line 
between epistemological issues (level III) on the one hand and basic 
philosohical problems (level I) on the other. That is, the "logic" for 
their demarcation is that antitheses can be solved concerning problems 
on lenel 	 III by revealing inconsistencies; on the other hand the 
fundamental questions on level I (and partly on level II) 
	
are more a 
matter of cosmological beliefs rather than points related to 
consistency. 
This programme may seem an impossible combination. This is why the 
 
following qualifications should be taken into account: 
1. This thesis is not dealing with the philosophy or practice of 
science, per se. The focus is, obviously, on the teaching of science. 
Therefore, what is argued should be seen in this light, that is from a 
pedagogical perspective. 
2. The view taken is not that ontological considerations are 
conditions necessary for the construction of a satisfactory analytical 
tool for studying science education, given the notorious difficulties 
whichsuch considerations involve. They are, however, almost 
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indispensable when one wants to put the discussion in a wider (beyond 
the "technical") context for purposes of interpretation and conceptual 
communication between different epistemological positions or even 
pedagogic stances. Thus one's own position related to, say, the status 
of scientific knowledge could be contrasted with the consequences of 
one's fundamental beliefs concerning the existence of theoretical and 
observational 	 entities, 	 on which any claim referring to the former is 
founded. 
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111.2 	 INDUCTIVISM: A traditional position. 
Dealing for the purposes of this thesis, with a philosophical 
position like inductivism, the intention is to identify and critically 
discuss its main general characteristics. 
The difficulty of encompassing the subtleties and the details of 
individual philosophers' arguments in one frame so as to convey the 
general features of a certain philosophical system (e.g. inductivism) 
to which they belong, has been already stated. A degree of 
simplification is therefore inevitable. This general problem is even 
more acute in the case of inductivism. The reason for this lies simply 
in the sheer number of great names associated usually with this school 
of thought - names like those of Bacon, Lock, Mill [1] to mention but a 
few, referring exclusively to the English tradition. 
Thus, trying to give a working account, the discussion will be 
organized along the following themes: 
-the basic tenets of inductivism as emerging mainly from current 
debates, 
-empiricism; the philosophical system which could be seen as akin to 
inductivism, 
-a critique of the arguments which sustain the basic tenets of 
inductivism, 
-discussion of what the basic tenets of inductivism entail regarding 
other issues of interest within the philosophy of science, namely 
criteria of demarcation, patterns of scientific growth, status of 
scientific knowledge and finally, the existence of theoretical and 
observational entities. 
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111.2.1 	 The basic tenets. 
The first basic tenet refers to inductive reasoning. As Losee [2) 
states, inductivism is the point of view which stresses the importance 
of inductive reasoning to science. According to Ayer [3]: 
"inductive reasoning is taken to cover all the cases in which we pass 
from a particular statement of fact, or set of particular statements of 
fact, to a factual conclusion they do not formally entail." 
A statement to the effect that "they do not formally entail", is 
obviously in accordance with the canons of formal logic. To be fair, 
one should emphasise that inductive reasoning entails that a large 
number of observations be made under a wide variety of circumstances, 
before concluding (generalising). Consider for instance, the logical 
schema (being trivial for the sake of clarity): 
From :Most of the books on science are boring (A). 
And :This book is a book on science (B). 
Inference :This book is boring (C). 
Statement (C) does not necessarily follow from statements (A) and 	 (B). 
For instance, asserting (A) and (B) as true and (C) as false, does not 
necessarily involve a contradiction, because this book may turn out to 
be one of the minority of books on science which are not boring. 
It seems helpful 	 to clarify the meaning of the inductive schema in 
the light of the important distinction made by Herschel [4] between the 
"context of discovery" and the "context of justification". The "context 
of discovery" refers to the'inclusion of a "logic of discovery" in the 
scientific method. According to this view, it is the "logic of 
discovery", which provides devices to assist the scientists in the 
discovery of new theories [5]. 
Losee [6], in presenting Herschel's notion of the "context of 
discovery", distinguishes three steps in the process of discovery: 
	 The 
subdivision of complex phenomena into their constituent parts, followed 
by focusing attention on their properties, which are crucial for the 
explanation of the phenomena in question, is the first step. The second 
step is the formulation of "laws of nature" which are based on the 
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The context of justification as Hacking [9] explains it, "is the 
questions regarding the soundness of the intellectual end product. 	 Is 
it reasonable, supported by evidence, confirmed by experiment?" 
Looking back to the meaning of the "context of justification" 
according to Herschel, one can see his emphasis on agreement with 
observation , as the most important criterion of acceptability of 
scientific laws and theories [10]. 
Summarising the above, the inductivist position entails a clear cut 
distinction between discovery and justification. In the context of the 
former, scientific enquiry is a matter of generalisation from facts 
(that is, the results of observation and experiments) [11]. This does 
not necessarily imply an active interest on the part of inductivists in 
the context of discovery. On the contrary, many of them (and 
particularly those who espouse logical positivism - an extreme version 
of inductivism [12] - whilst holding that the context of discovery is a 
legitimate object of investigations in other fields, e.g. psychology, 
or sociology of knowledge), stress that it does not (in both a 
descriptive and prescriptive sense) fall within the interests of 
philosophy of science. On the other hand, with regard to the context of 
justification, this position maintains that a scientific law or theory 
is sound only if the evidence in its favour conforms to the inductive 
schema. 	 It should be stressed that one of the important aspects of the 
inductive schema is the principle of verification ("supported by 
evidence, confirmed by experiment" [13]). 
Another main tenet of inductivism is the dichotomy between facts 
(observations and experiments) and theory. In a sense, this follows 
from the very substance of the inductive schema. This is due to the 
fact that scientific laws or theories are, as already stated, 
generalisations of facts. 	 It is not therefore unreasonable to argue 
that this presupposes a distinction between facts and theories. 
Otherwise, one would not be able to strictly isolate facts, before 
attempting any generalisation leading to theories. 
Stating this view in a more "technical" way, the terms contained in 
every scientific statement or expression could be either observational 
(0-terms), or theoretical (T-terms) [14]. Thus, one can speak about the 
agreement 
difference 
concomitant variations 
residues 
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proper analysis of the phenomena, as in the first step. There are two 
distinct paths leading to the discovery of the "laws of nature", from 
the phenomena. 
The first path is by application of a specific inductive schema. For 
example from the data: 
F 
1 	 10 
2 	 20 
3 	 30 
4 	 40 
the scientist could conclude that the ratio F/x is constant. 
Formulating hypotheses is the second path to the discovery of 
scientific laws. However, Herschel stressed that this latter path 
cannot be reduced to the application of fixed rules. Furthermore, the 
discovery of the "laws of nature" is only the first stage of the 
scientific enterprise. 
Its second stage is the integration of these laws into theories, 
which constitutes the third and last step of the process of discovery. 
"This consists of either further inductive generalisation or the 
creation of bold hypotheses that establish an interrelation of 
previously unconnected laws" [7]. 
Herschel's view of the context of discovery may be represented 
diagrammatically (taken from Losee [9]) as follows: 
Theories 
induction 	 hypothesis 
DIAGRAM D3.1: Herchel's pattern of discovery. 
'LONDINA 
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distinction between 0-terms and T-terms. A concrete example is 
the 0-term: "... is cold" 
as opposed to 
the T-term: "... is an electron". 
It seems that the three principles of inductivism, to which Harre is 
referring, transmit the essence of what has been said up to now on 
inductivism. These principles are as follows: 
-The principle of accumulation: "scientific knowledge is a 
conjunction of well attested facts" and it "grows through the addition 
of further well attested facts". 
-The principle of induction: 	 "there is a form of inference of 
scientific laws and theories from accumulated simple facts, so that 
from true statements describing observations and the results of 
experiments, true scientific laws and theories may be inferred". 
-The principle of instance confirmation: 	 one's "belief in the 
degree of plausibility of a [scientific] law or theory, is proportional 
to the number of instances that have been observed in the phenomenon 
described in the law" (or theory) or, that have been observed to verify 
the law (or theory) [15]. 
Despite the fact that these three principles are very comprehensible, 
a significant point, which could be made considering the inductive 
schema and the distinction between theory and observation, would appear 
to be missing. 
Thus, the inductive schema postulates something more concerning the 
nature of the difference between theory and observation 	 (or, T-terms 
and 0-terms) beyond ascertaining the very existence of this difference. 
That is, since the facts form the only secure basis for a scientific 
theory, they should in some sense occupy a higher status vis-a-vis 
theories. 
Newton-Smith commenting on this, remarks that one can grasp the 
meaning of "... is cold", on the basis of one's perceptual experience, 
"with a high degree of justified confidence and without the help of any 
scientific theory" [16]. By contrast, one does not sense the presence 
of electrons in the way one senses that something is cold. Besides, to 
learn what is meant by the term electron, "one has to have at least a 
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partial mastery of a complex scientific theory" [17]. This constitutes 
an intuitive characterisation of the difference between theory and 
observation (or, more precisely between T-terms and 0-terms), which has 
a semantic and an epistemological aspect. 
Now, if one wants to defend (and inductivists undoubtedly do) 
	 the 
position that the theory/observation distinction represents a 
difference in kind and not a difference in degree, 	 (observations being 
privileged), then, one has to defend the view that observations are 
either semantically privileged, or epistemologically privileged, or 
both. 
What does this mean? It signifies that the propositions one needs to 
sustain in order to defend the privileged position of observations 
could be stated as follows: 
"if 0-terms (observations) are semantically privileged in the sense 
that their meaning could be conveyed through their connection with 
experience, it was thought that their meaning would remain constant 
through theory change" [18] (the semantical aspect of the distinction). 
And 
"0-terms are not fallible as T-terms and therefore, they do constitute 
a completely secure basis, on which to build scientific laws and 
theories" [19] 	 (the epistemological aspect of the distinction) [see 
note (a) on 111.2]. 
Both statements (particularly the second) are connected with aspects 
of another distinction (human mental constructs versus the external 
world), concerning the very nature of observations and their 
perception, and consequently, the claims for knowledge based on them. 
This distinction arose from the development of empiricism; 
	 for this 
reason, empiricism will now be discussed historically. 
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111.2.2 	 The historical predecessors: Empiricism. 
The origins of inductivism can be traced back to Babylonians. Harre, 
(contrasting Greek and Babylonian astronomy) writes: 
"For the Babylonians the tables of ephemerides were constructed by the 
use of numerical rules derived as inductive laws... In this sort of 
science we have theory only in the sense of an explanation of the 
phenomena" [21]. 
It was however the empiricists, particularly Locke and Hume, who 
articulated a philosophical position concerning knowledge claims, for 
which the distinction between the constructs of our mental activities 
and the external world was essential. 
Their positions are of great interest in the context of the 
philosophical system under discussion, however their treatment will be 
extremely brief and fragmentary. They are of interest not only because 
current epistemological debates concerning the observation/theory 
distinction echo their own aforementioned distinction, but also because 
central to their arguments, is the issue of whether the entities 
which they called the external world - exist independently of human 
mental constructs, or not. It is the old (from Platonic times) 
realist-idealist dispute. 
Locke [22], who, having defined an "idea" as "whatsoever is the 
object of understanding when a man thinks", asked how our minds are 
conquered by ideas which constitute all the materials of reason or 
knowledge" and answered that they all come from experience. "In that 
all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives 
itself" [23]. And what is the source of experience? It is the 	 'real 
world', 	 "the world external to our minds consisting of entities which 
have an existence independent of any mental goings on" [24]. 
For Locke therefore, it is an epistemological gap which separates the 
real external world, which exists independently of human thoughts and 
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constitutes the basis for them and the realm of ideas, that establishes 
our experience. It is what Kant called "transcendental realism" [25]. 
Hume, in "A treatise of human nature" [26], giving the term "idea" a 
meaning similar to the contemporary one of concept [27], maintained 
that all our ideas derive from sense data, which he calls impressions. 
This is a position similar to that of Locke, in terms of the "ideas 
external world entities" distinction. 
What must be stressed in considering the empiricists in relation to 
inductivism, is that they do not necessarily share every feature of it. 
This is because of what is conceived to be an analogy in their position 
regarding the significance of the theory-observation and ideas-external 
world distinctions, respectively, that an association can be 
established. 
In this light, Ogborn's reading of Bacon is most interesting. As he 
argues, Bacon - an empiricist (empiricism being distinct from 
inductivism) - wrote explicitly against inductivism: "...induction 
which proceeds by simple enumeration is childish"; and "...to conclude 
upon a bare enumeration of particulars (as the logician does) without 
instance contradictory, is a vicious conclusion..." [28]. A seed of 
falsificationism [29] is quite obvious. So Ogborn's contention that 
"Baconian induction is a philosophical myth" [30] seems to be 
justifiable. Taking this into account, the need for careful analysis 
and avoidance of indiscriminate use of labels in educational research 
becomes more apparent [see note (b) on 111.2]. 
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111.2.3 	 A critique : The seductiveness of intuition. 
In this section the intention is to critically discuss the two basic 
tenets of inductivism, namely the contentions that: 
-the inductive schema of reasoning should be followed in science; 
-there is a sharp distinction between observation (facts) - theory; 
observations being privileged vis-a-vis theories. 
Regarding the first of these points, it is clear that this cannot be 
justified by appealing to formal logic. On the other hand, since 
inductivists argue about the future or the unexperienced parts of the 
past or present on the basis of experience, it is not unreasonable to 
ask in accordance with their own standpoint, how the principle of 
induction can be derived from experience. 
It was Hume [31], who first posed this problem of induction, that is, 
whether we are entitled to infer unobserved cases from observed cases, 
however many. His answer was negative. Any argument purporting to 
justify induction on the basis of experience, "is circular, because it 
employs the very kind of inductive argument, the validity of which is 
supposed to be in need of justification" [32] as the following example 
shows: 
Premise: The principle of induction has worked successfully in many 
instances. 
Conclusion: The principle of induction always works. 
Therefore, as Russel put it "we can never use experience to prove the 
inductive principle without begging the question" [33]. 
Possible responses to this critique could be either in the form of a 
retreat to scepticism [see note (c) on 111.2], or the total rejection 
of inductivism as a form of reasoning appropriate for science (e.g. 
Popper, [35]). 
However, a third response seems to be possible in defending 
inductivism, although this results in the presentation of a weaker 
version of it, by introducing the notion of probability in some sense. 
Let us imagine someone without any knowledge of science. Clearly, 
such a person expects that the sun will rise tomorrow, or that when 
throwing something off the roof it will fall. However, as Russell C36] 
states, if the principles of induction are unsound, he (or she) has no 
reason to hold that these events are forthcoming or even very probable 
[see note (d) on 111.2]. Obviously, it is rather difficult to deny that 
arguments like these, however trivial they may appear, have 
considerable intuitive force. Needless to say inductivism (which 
otherwise is weak, e.g. from the perspective of formal logic) draws all 
its strength from these intuitively powerful arguments. 
Nevertheless, defending inductivism along these lines (by introducing 
the notion of probability and appealing to intuition), one has to 
presuppose the theory-observation distinction, at least in so far as 
the introduction of probability is concerned. 
At this point, Newton-Smith's distinction between the semantic and 
epistemological aspects of the second main tenet of inductivism 
(theory-observation dichotomy) is pertinent. 
The semantic aspect postulates observation to be completely 
independent of theoretical assumptions. Opponents of inductivism have 
argued that there is a fallacy in this claim. For instance, a certain 
theory on gases is necessarily presupposed to render the statement 
"oxygen is a gas" meaningful. Thus, as Kuhn [38] notes, until 1756 when 
J. Black proved that carbon dioxide was a gas different from 
atmospheric air, 	 samples of gases were thought to be distinct only in 
terms of their impurities and therefore a statement like the above, did 
not make sense. Furthermore, it is evident that there are numerous 
other examples [see note (e) on 111.2] supporting the assertion that 
"clearly formulated theories are a prerequisite for precise observation 
statements" C39]. 
At the very least therefore, the inductivists' account of the 
derivation of universal statements 	 (theories, 
	 laws) 	 from singular 
statements (observation) - i.e. the semantic aspect of the 
theory-observation distinction - seems to be in doubt. 
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The epistemological aspect of the theory-observation distinction 
entails that observations are the only secure basis for establishing 
scientific theories and laws. Here again, the history of science 
provides an abundance of instances which go against this claim. For 
example, Feyerabend [40] refers to an astronomical observation made by 
Kepler, through a Galilean telescope: "Mars is square and intensely 
coloured". If one accepts the intellectual honesty of Kepler and, since 
the falsity of the statement is well established nowadays, one can only 
accept that observation statements can be false. An explanation of this 
could be in terms of the predominant theory, which in many cases 
directs the attention of the observer to specific aspects of the 
observed. 	 It is obvious that a contention like this is at odds with 
inductivism. Instances like the above suggest that theory could precede 
and dominate observation (e.g. Rosen (41], refers to such examples, 
taken from astronomy). 
For the sake of fairness however, it should be added that 
inductivists have a counter argument. This is based on a modification 
of the aforementioned distinction between "context of discovery" and 
"context of justification". Under the pressure of critical arguments, 
sophisticated inductivists (e.g. Carnap [427, Feigl [43]) have 
abandoned any claim of jurisdiction over the philosophy of science in 
the context of discovery, maintaining that only the justification of 
scientific theories is legitimately within their realm. According to 
their position, discovery 
	 could precede observation (although the 
question of the origin of theories is not within the scope of 
philosophy of science). In contrast to discovery, justification, which 
is a logical 	 (i.e. a-historical, by definition) reconstruction of 
scientific theories, is immune from arguments based on historical 
examples. Therefore, these historical arguments do not constitute a 
compelling logical reason for one to abandon either the clear cut 
distinction between theory and observation, or even the precedence of 
observations over theories. 
It is arguable that there is no apparent a priori reason for one to 
concede the legitimacy of the discovery-justification context 
distinction [44]. However, even conceding this point (i.e. the 
epistemological aspect of the theory-observation distinction), the 
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argument of observation being theory loaded (semantic aspect) remains 
unanswered. These two aspects are interrelated. Stretching the 
anti-inductive argument somehow with regard to the semantic aspect, one 
ends up within the epistemological aspect. This is because, if 
observations are theory loaded and theories are fallible, observations 
are also fallible 	 (at least, to the extent to which they are theory 
loaded). 
In conclusion, it is clear that the basic tenets of inductivism, 
despite their considerable intuitive force (which is even greater in 
terms of the inductive schema of reasoning, as opposed to the 
theory-observation distinction), present many problematic aspects. This 
agrees with Chalmer's [45] assertion that inductivism cannot throw any 
new and interesting light on the nature of science, especially as it 
neglects any interaction of science with the social environment and 
serves to justify its description as being deadlocked [46]. 
	 It should 
be stressed however, that this is not saying that its intuitive appeal 
has been definitely refuted. 
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111.2.4 	 Some further aspects of an inductive 
image of science. 
Thus far, the inductive schema of reasoning and the distinction 
between theory and observation as held by inductivists, has been 
analysed and critically discussed. In the following section, the way in 
which the other central themes in this thesis (namely, demarcation 
criteria, patterns of scientific growth, the status of scientific 
knowledge and problems related to reality) are derived from these basic 
tenets of inductivism, will be discussed. 
With regard to the problem of demarcation, inductivism is very 
clear: one can distinguish scientific knowledge from non-scientific 
knowledge (and by the same token choose between competing scientific 
theories). The criterion for such a distinction is whether or not the 
inductive schema is being properly applied. 
Taking into account the inductivists' tenet that observations are 
privileged vis-a-vis theories, it follows that their 	 position on 
science is that it grows through an accumulation of observations and 
experimental facts. Thus, according to inductivism, relativity for 
instance, is a generalisation of Newtonian mechanics. 
Referring to the status of scientific knowledge, it follows that 
knowledge produced by an accumulation of observation and experimental 
facts is objective, since observations are beyond any doubt objective 
and not related to the subjectivity of the observer. 
Finally, there is the problem of reality. No one account will serve 
to describe the views of all or even of most inductivists. Indeed, some 
inductivists say that only entities involved in observations exist 
independently of human thoughts about them. Others could equally defend 
their positions adopting an idealist stance, saying for instance that 
neither theoretical nor observational entities exist independently of 
human thoughts. In this case however, since only observational entities 
can be sensed, they alone constitute the only secure source of 
knowledge, being in that sense privileged. 
Encapsulating the inductive image of science. 
In this section a set of statements is presented, which according to 
the above analysis will be considered to represent an inductive image 
of science, in an attempt to produce a reasonably accurate, although 
simplified depiction. The construction of the part of the research 
instrument referring to inductivism will be based on these statements. 
Similar sections, with the same purpose, and subject to the same 
qualifications, will be given for each succeeding discussion of the 
main philosophical positions. 
1. For the different kinds of scientific enquiry there is 
basically one scientific method. 
2. The scientific method is to start from data about a problem, 
basing hypotheses on the data. 
3. When the consequences of a theory are compared with data, sound 
conclusions can be drawn if, and only if, theory and data agree. 
4. When there is a debate about whether a given theory is to be 
regarded as "scientific", there are rational and defensible criteria 
for making the decision. 
5. When there are competing theories and scientists want to decide 
between them there are rational and defensible ways of doing so. 
6. In general the better of two competing theories is the one 
which is nearer to the "truth". 
7. To be sure of approaching nearer to the "truth", one should 
follow the appropriate scientific method. 
8. As science changes or develops, new knowledge generally 
replaces ignorance or lack of knowledge. 
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9. New scientific knowledge arises mainly through an accumulation 
of new experiments and observations. 
10. The status of scientific knowledge is different from other 
kinds of knowledge, having a characteristic value of its own. 
11. Scientific knowledge has particular characteristics in that it 
attempts to be an objective account of Nature. 
Notes on 111.2 
*(a). Another way to put it. could be that observations could apply without making any theoretical 
assumptions, that is observations are theory-independent [20]. A closer examination of the 
implications entailed by such a position will be made later. 
013). This point is further elaborated in the chapter dealing with methodological issues. 
1(c). Following this line, an empiricist, who assumes experience as the sole source of knowledge, is 
bound to be led to scepticism (e.g. Hume), as maintained by Russell [34]. 
1(d). An interesting, although unconvincing in terms of the perspective of this thesis, 
counter-argument was put forward by Feyerabend in "Against Method' [37]. 
1(e). One of them is almost common place (although its interpretation is far from being unique) in 
the relevant literature: the term °force" as employed in Newtonian Aristotelian, or quantum 
mechanics not to mention its multifarious and imprecise use in every day language. 
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111.3 	 HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVISM: A continental tradition. 
It would seem that hypothetico-deductivism could best be conceived as 
setting out to take the offensive in defending the place of rationality 
in science. 
	
In this programme the target is two-fold: firstly, to 
criticise the empirico-inductivistic heritage of science, which leads 
either to scepticism or to idealism; and secondly, to defend 
realism-based rationality in science against the current relativistic 
trends, which tend towards agnosticism. 
Thus, it would not be inaccurate to describe recent philosophical 
debates as a three cornered fight between logical positivism (the 
inevitable e;;treme form of inductivism), hypothetico-deductivism and 
relativism. Of added interest, particularly from an educational 
standpoint, is the introduction of historico-sociological factors and 
certain psychological considerations within this debate [1]. 
In the following section, an attempt is made to provide an account of 
the main features of hypothetico-deductivism and some criticisms of 
them. 	 It should be stressed that the system to be presented represents 
by no medn5 d 	  ce taken by one particular philosopher. 	 Nonetheless, 
in this stream of thought, the sources will be primarily the writings 
of Popper and Lakatos, who, in the context of this thesis are 
considered to speak for hypothetico-deductivism. 
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111.3.1 
	 The main hypothetico—deductivistic theses: 
A "rational" tableau of science. 
One element which characterises this position is that its exponents 
present a direct and integrated account of their view of the scientific 
enterprise, as opposed to a debate on particular issues. Thus the 
hypothetico-deductive tableau consists of points referring to 
methodological issues such as the permissible form of reasoning in 
science (deductive structure of theories), the type of evidence to be 
sought (priority of falsification as opposed to verification), the 
nature of differences between observational facts and theory 
(0-terms/T-terms distinction), the pattern of scientific growth, 
criteria of demarcation, the status of scientific knowledge and the 
question of reality. 
A second major element of hypothetico-deductivism, is its retention 
C2l of the distinction between discovery and justification, which 
constitutes a cardinal component of inductivism (and logical 
positivism) 	 [3]. For this reason, this philosophical system, quite 
distinct otherwise from logical positivism [4], is equated sometimes 
with the latter [5]. Of course one could argue that they differ in a 
number of minor points as there is a great deal of common ground [6] 
and consequently that they are essentially versions of the same 
philosophical system. However, in the face of their quite numerous, and 
in my view significant differences [7], this view is not adopted here. 
The Popperian schema of reasoning for science, prescriptive rather 
than descriptive in character, is intended to be very rational. That is 
the reason why, as Newton-Smith Lel remarks, Popper has specified both 
an aim for the scientific activity and certain methodological 
principles. 
Regarding the aim, Popper writes in "Objective Knowledge" [9]: 
	 Our 
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main concern in science and philosophy should be, the search far 
truth". One can encapsulate the central aspect of Popper's position in 
so far as the methodological issues are concerned, in two inextricably 
connected theses: 
-firstly, that only deductively valid arguments are admissible in 
science C10] and 
-secondly, through the principle of falsification: i.e. science as 
a process of falsification by instances of conjectures which are not 
necessarily entailed by the facts hitherto known. Popper [11] expresses 
it this way, in his famous dictum: the method of science is the method 
of bold conjectures and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them". 
The above statements delineate in outline three basic aspects of 
Popperian philosophy. They need to be elaborated to show how (a) the 
notion of criteria of demarcation is derived, (b) how the distinction 
(or its absence) between observational facts and theory is managed and 
(c) how the pattern of scientific growth is conceived. 
Firstly, the notion of truth will be considered. As Popper has 
stated: 
"We should seek to see or discover the most urgent problems and we 
should try to solve them by proposing true theories....; or at any rate 
by proposing theories which come a little nearer to the truth than 
those of our predecessors" [12], 
and later, 
"I accept that truth is correspondence with the facts 	 or with 
reality); or more precisely that a theory is true if, and only if, 
corresponds to the facts" [13], 
and finally, 
"the idea of truth is absolutist, but no claim can be made for 
absolute certainty: we are seekers for truth but we are not its 
possessors" [14]. 
Newton-Smith [15] is therefore correct to argue that Popper's view of 
the inaccessibility of truth led him to reconstrue the aim of science 
as that of achieving a better approximation to the truth, which Popper 
called achieving a higher verisimilitude, or a higher truth content of 
certain theories. This position, as Popper [16] explicitly 
acknowledges, is influenced by Tarski's views in the latter's "Logic, 
semantics, mathematics" [171. 
Turning to tne methodological issues, an account of Popper's 
prescription of the scientific method and its diagrammatic 
representation taken from Harre [181, will be used. (One should bear in 
mind that central to this are the above stated contentions that only 
deductively valid arguments should be used in science, together with 
the principle of falsification). 
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(A) All metals 
	
4 	  
are conductors. 
3 	
4 
(I) Some metals 
	
4 	  
are conductors. 
5 
	
6 
(0) Some metals 
• 
are not conductors. 
1 (E) No metals 
• 
are conductors. 
 
The forms of reasoning are indicated by routes 1-8. 
-Reasoning along routes 4,6 is inductive in character, inconclusive 
by nature and therefore should be excluded from science. 
-Statements (A) and (E) 	 (route 1) cannot both be simultaneously 
true. 
-Statements (I) and (0) (route 2) cannot be simultaneously false. 
-Reasoning along routes 3,5 is deductive in character, but 
inconclusive as to the truth of the antecedents. Statements (I) and (0) 
"verify" statements (A) and (E) respectively, but not conclusively. 
It is therefore routes 7,8 which are deductive in character and which 
employ falsification [the truth of (I) contradicts (E) and the truth of 
(0) contradicts (A)l, which provide conclusive arguments and which 
should be used in scientific reasoning, as Popper has advocated. 
The notion of verisimilitude, which is central to both aim and Tiethod 
of science on the one hand, and to the pattern of scientific growth on 
the other, could be seen as bridging these two aspects of science. As 
Popper put it, "All growth of knowledgp consists in the improvement of 
existing knowledge which is changed in the hope of approaching nearer 
to the truth" i19]. This is so (according to this view), because a 
scientific revolution, however radical, cannot really break with 
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tradition since it must preserve the success of its predecessors. 
However all knowledge is seen as theory-impregnated, including our 
observation [20]. 	 It is not unreasonable therefore, to say that this 
view implies that the growth of science is in fact a succession of 
theories, each having greater truth content than the one it replaces, 
without nevertheless being incompatible with each other. 
This problem however, is similar to that of the criterion of 
demarcation. Accepting that science proceeds this way, how can one be 
sure as to what criteria to use in order to judge the truth-content of 
a newly proposed theory, which is intended to replace the accepted 
theory? Furthermore, how can one distinguish between scientific and 
pseudo-scientific theories? 
This question is an intriguing one in the content of Popperian 
philosophy, given that Popper has asserted (explicitly and implicitly 
[21]) the possibility of a criterion of truth. 
The explicit argument is roughly speaking as follows: scientific 
theories contain universal propositions over large domains (possibly 
infinite). However, "in real time we cannot fix the truth value of more 
than a finite number of basic statements drawn from observation" [22]. 
Therefore, we cannot derive the truth of generalisations which range 
over a larger domain - possibly infinite - from such information (this 
argument could be seen as anti-inductive). The implicit argument is 
that observational 	 statements are not factual and therefore true by 
virtue just of being observation (as inductivists and logical 
positivists argue), since according to Popper all of them are 
"theory-impregnated". Consequently, there is no more justification far 
believing an observation statement, than there is for believing the 
pertinent theoretical sentences, unless observation contradicts its own 
theoretical premises (falsification). In the latter case the evident 
power of the observation is obviously much greater (i.e. conclusive in 
the Popperian sense). 
In this philosophical framework the force of the implicit argument 
depends on the way the distinction between theory and observation is 
conceived. A brief aside to elaborate this point follows. 
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For Popper [23] (but not for Lakatos [24]), there exists a 
distinction between observation and theory. However this distinction 
does not mean that observational statements are epistemologically 
privileged vis-a-vis theoretical statements, as the inductivists hold. 
The opposite is in a sense true for Popper, because for him, even the 
humblest of observations presupposes (either explicitly, or implicitly) 
a kind of theoretical assumption [25]. 
For instance, even for the statement "This is a cube of ice", one has 
to appeal to parts of theory in order to claim the truth of this 
statement; in this case the theory referring to the formulation of ice 
or geometrical considerations about cubes [261. Besides, it is theory, 
which as Popper [27] argues, directs attention to what appears to be 
the relevant aspects of the phenomenon under consideration, while what 
seems to be irrelevant is ignored. 	 It is in this sense that the 
proposition "observations are theory-laden", has to be understood. 
The above paragraph states what the distinction between theory and 
observation is not. A positive account, according to the stance in 
question, distinguishes observational statements from theoretical ones, 
in terms of their form and their role. Popper's favourite example of an 
observational statement 	 (basic in his own terminology) is as follows: 
"there is a raven in spatio-temporal region K". Thus, in terms of form, 
observational statements are "existential assertions about some 
definite spatio-temporal region" [28]. 
	 In so far as their role is 
concerned, observational statements are the potential falsifiers of a 
theory. 
Having dealt with the issue of the observation-theory distinction, I 
shall return to the question concerning the basis for the criteria of 
demarcation, 	 which 	 remains 	 open. 	 In 	 the 	 context 	 of 
hypothetico-deductivism, the answer is to be found in methodological 
terms [29]. 
An e;:ample of a logical schema, which is correct in the Popperian 
sense, could approximate: 
(i). Hypothesis: All ravens are black. 
(ii). Observation: A raven, which was not black, was observed at 
place x at time t. 
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(iii). Conclusion: Not all ravens are black. 
The traits of the above logical schema are two: 
-firstly, it is deductive in character, 
-secondly, the premise (in a scientific context, a theory, or a 
hypothesis) can be falsified. 
It is upon these characteristics that the criterion of demarcation is 
based. Theories or hypotheses which do not conform to this schema 
should not be regarded as scientific. Thus for example the statement: 
"All points on an Euclidean circle are equidistant from the centre" 	 is 
not - scientific 	 in character according to this view, as it cannot be 
falsified [30], being instead true by definition. Of course, Popper's 
main attack is on statements purporting to be scientific, but which in 
his view are not - those of psychoanalysis, for example. 
One could say therefore, that for Popper science is distinguishable 
from non-science, in that scientific theories ought to have a deductive 
structure and be potentially falsifiable. What is the position then, 
regarding the choice between two competing theories which both have the 
required traits? 
It seems that Popper downplays this question [31]. Considering the 
comparison of rival theories, he focuses on the highly special 
situation of a pair of theories; let us say theories A and B, A 
entailing B, but B not entailing A. In the Popperian terminology, 
theory B is the weaker [32]. The very term indicates the outcome. 
Indeed: 	 "If we fail to refute it, or if the refutations we find are at 
the same time also refutations of the weaker theory 
	
 then we have 
reasons to suspect or to conjucture that the stronger theory has no 
greater falsity content than its weaker predecessor, and therefore that 
it has a greater degree of verisimilitude" [33]. 
Evidently, what differentiates the stronger from the weaker theory is 
its content. The former is more general (in the sense that it entails, 
without being entailed) 	 than the latter and that should be the basis 
for choosing between them. 
However, as it has been previously pointed out this is a special 
case. 	 If a clearer position is wanted, which is still within the 
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general frame of hypothetico-deductivism or modern rationalism, one 
should consider Lakatos. 
With respect to this problem, Lakatos objected to Popper. He argues 
that Popper tends to represent the scientific exercise as a fight 
between theory and experiment, seen as two isolated combatants, so that 
the only conclusive outcome can be the falsification of the theory 
[34]. However, the history of science suggests that tests are three 
cornered fights between rival theories and experiments. As a 
consequence, Lakatos put forward his terms for choosing between two 
rival theories, for instance T' (the new) instead of T (the old ): 
-theory T' has more empirical content over T; 
-theory T' explains everything that T explains; 
-some of the excess content of T. is corroborated [35]. 
However, as Lakatos has emphasised, this is a general principle, which 
should not be construed as a binding rule for selecting a research 
programme, or choosing between them: every decision about the relative 
merits should be with hindsight" [36], [37]. 
This line of thought led Lakatos to modify in addition, the Popperian 
model of scientific growth. Thus, according to Lakatos, science grows 
through a succession of better and better theories; but the rejection 
of theory T on behalf of a new and better theory T', should not proceed 
without previously trying to modify T in such a way as to produce a 
theory better than both T and T' [38]. Thus, in terms of the Lakatosian 
model, what transpires is that science proceeds through a sequence of 
theories, in which each theory is generated through a modification of 
its predecessor; this sequence is in Lakatosian terminology a 
scientific research programme. 
What remains to be discussed then, is the status of scientific 
knowledge and the issue of reality, in the context of this system. 
With regard to objectivity, a useful distinction can be drawn between 
weak and strong objectivity [39). According to this distinction, a 
statement is weakly objective if it is supposed to be valid for any 
observer. Weak objectivity in this sense, is synonymous with 
inter-subjectivity. On the other hand, a statement is strongly 
objective if it refrains from making any reference to any community of 
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human beings. Positively speaking, the objectivist in the strong sense, 
gives priority in his analysis of knowledge to the traits of bodies of 
knowledge which are independent of the subjective states of individuals 
(attitudes, beliefs, etc.) who may consider such bodies of knowledge. 
As a matter of fact, Popper draws a distinction between knowledge in 
the subjective sense and objective knowledge, defining the latter as 
follows: 	 "knowledge in the objective sense is totally independent of 
anybody's claim to know, it is also independent of anybody's belief, or 
disposition to assent; or to assert, or to act... it is knowledge 
without a knower: it is knowledge without a knowing subject" [40]. 
At a later stage, in his first thesis concerning the status of 
scientific knowledge, Popper [41] states that knowledge in the 
subjective 
	
sense is irrelevant to the study of proper scientific 
knowledge. 
Lakatos supports fully this view, writing that knowledge has no 
scientific value, unless it is independent of the human mind which 
creates or understands it [42]. 
It seems, therefore correct to claim that for both Popper and Lakatos 
scientific knowledge is by definition objective. Obviously, this 
asserts more than a mere description. 	 It is clearly normative in 
character. 
The positions of Popper and Lakatos are not equally unequivocal, in 
so far as the existence of observational and theoretical entities is 
concerned. Thus, as Hacking [43] points out, Lakatos can be read as a 
Hegelian, since he bases his arguments for a rational interpretation of 
scientific activity upon the assumption that knowledge grows, 
irrespective of what one thinks about truth and reality. Lakatos' 
problem is to provide a theory of objectivity without presupposing a 
realist interpretation of science: "it does not matter whether we 
stress the 	 'instrumental' 	 aspect of imaginative research programmes 
.... or we stress the growing Popperian verisimilitude of their 
successive versions" [44]. 
As already noted, Lakatos doubts the distinction between theory and 
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observation. Indeed the more he doubted it, the more he became 
attracted to what Popper calls the "third world". This alleged "third 
world" in his definition is the Platonic world of objective spirit, the 
world of ideas [45]. Thus, Barnes' [46] assertion that Lakatos is in 
harmony with a Platonic idealism, is not without justification. 
Conversely, Popper [47] declares emphatically that to him, idealism 
appears absurd and that "denying realism amounts to megalomania". 
However he considers this particular belief of his as a conjecture to 
which no sensible alternative has been offered. 
A critique: The dilemma persists. 
The following critique will deal mainly with the feature of 
hypothetico-deductivism which I shall take to be fundamental in this 
context, namely that of falsificationism [48] and its interconnections 
with other aspects of this philosophical system. 
Falsificationism is considered of primary importance, because what 
actually permits the exponents of hypothetico-deductivism to reverse 
the sequence of observation followed by theory construction (on which 
inductivism is based), is the assertion that one should try to refute 
theories instead of trying to verify them. This is founded on the 
contention that the distinction between theory and observation is not 
significant epistemologically. 
It is precisely the latter which undermines hypothetico-deductivism. 
For as Putnam [49] points out, even if a theory is refuted by an 
experimental test which takes into account the hypothetico-deductivist 
position that observations and theories can be equally fallible, the 
theory may still be correct and the observation false. 
Theories therefore, cannot be conclusively falsified, because the 
observation statements that form the basis for the falsification may 
themselves prove to be false in the light of later developments [501. 
Furthermore, as Newton-Smith [51] and Putnam [52] argue, 
falsificationists, by stressing the attempted refutations as strongly 
as Popper has done, give a rather distorted picture of the actual 
practice of science. More specifically, as their actual practice 
indicates, "scientists get themselves in the grip of a theory which 
they aim to develop and defend" [53], not just simply trying to refute 
it as strongly as possible. 
This failure to acknowledge the highly important role of practice 
[54], which holds falsificationism as inadequate on historical grounds 
[see note (a) on III.3] [55], led Popper and Lakatos to the idea of a 
sharp demarcation between science on the one hand and political or 
ethical ideas on the other. As 	 Putnam 
	 [56] 	 points out, this 
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demarcation is rather pernicious. "One does not have to be a Marxist or 
Freudian to be uneasy about the equation of worthlessness" with their 
conception of the "unscientific" [57). To reject a-priori (and in the 
name of an anti-a-priori philosophy of knowledge) the thought of Marx 
or Freud, can for instance, blind one to the undoubted insights of 
these two very influential thinkers. 
In conclusion, one could say that despite the "rational" effort to 
reconstruct the nature of the scientific enterprise and the very useful 
insights it has offered, hypothetico-deductivism has not solved the 
problem of the intuitive appeal of induction. Furthermore, it seems to 
be more remote from actual scientific praxis than the latter. 
111.3.3 	 The hypothetico—deductivistic image: a synopsis. 
Summarising, the features science ought to have according to 
hypothetico-deductivistic account are, as follows: 
1. Deductive structure of theories. 
2. Methodologically speaking, there is unity in science and the 
scientific method should attempt to falsify statements deduced from 
theories in order to falsify the theories, rather than attempt to 
verify theories. 
3. Criteria of demarcation based on falsification. 	 In this point 
Popper and Lakatos differ (for a fuller account, see section 111.3.1). 
4. There exists a distinction between theory and observation. This 
does not mean that observations are in any way privileged vis-a-vis 
theories. 
5. Ontological issues; Popper is a realist which is not quite true 
for Lakatos. 
6. Science grows through a succession of better theories (or research 
programmes in Lakatosian terminology), each of them being a better 
approximation of truth tnan its predecessor. 
7. Scientific knowledge is objective and therefore it is 
intrinsically superior to other non-objective bodies of knowledge. 
On the basis of the above points, the following set of statements is 
offered as representing an hypothetico-deductive image of science. The 
same qualifications as in the case of inductivism so far as accuracy 
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and simplification are concerned, also apply here. The construction of 
the part of the research instrument referring to hypothetico 
—deductivism will be based on these statements. 
1. For the different kinds of scientific enquiry there is basically 
one scientific method. 
2. The scientific method is to start by deducing consequences of 
theories, checking them against the data. 
Z. When the consequences of a theory are compared with data, sound 
conclusions can be drawn if and only if theory and data disagree. 
4. When there is a debate about whether a given theory is to be 
regarded as "scientific", there are rational and defensible criteria 
for making the decisions. 
J. When there are competing theories and scientists want to decide 
between them, there are rational and defensible ways of doing so. 
	
b. 	 In general the better of two competing theories is the one which 
is nearer to the "truth". 
7. To be sure of approaching nearer to the "truth", one should 
follow the appropriate scientific method. 
B. As science changes or develops, new knowledge generally replaces 
older incorrect "knowledge". 
9. New scientific knowledge arises mainly through a succession of 
more general and more complete theories. 
10. The status of scientific knowledge is different from other kinds 
of knowledge, having a characteristic value of its own. 
11. Scientific knowledge has particular characteristics in that it 
attempts to be an objective account of Nature. 
NOTES ON 111.3 
t(a). Numerous writers (e.g. Chalmers, Putnam, Feverabend, to mention but a few) have argued that 
classic new scientific theories have been countered by obsevational claims which were considered to 
contradict them, and it was science's good fortune that they were not rejected (as falsificationism 
implies they ought to have been). 
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111.4 	 CONTEXTUALISM: Two interpretations of Kuhn. 
The rationalists, following Popper or Lakatos, assert the existence 
of timeless, universal and therefore a-historical criteria through 
which the choice between competing theories can be achieved (akin to 
the position of logical positivists and hypothetico-deductivists). 
One critical response to this position stresses the importance of 
dispassionate examination of the actual history and practice of science 
in -order to formulate an image of science. It is Kuhn and Ziman who 
argue for the latter. 
What seems to distinguish their stance from that of the relativists 
is the interpretation they attach to these historical and sociological 
considerations. On the other hand absolute relativists, impressed by 
the historical and social dimensions of scientific knowledge, conclude 
that science is merely one ideology among others. Kuhn and Ziman 
(hereafter referred to as contextualists) use such considerations to 
explain scientific growth, but they do not resort to an all inclusive 
relativism. However, in some instances their position has been 
interpreted as leading finally to relativism or agnosticism. 
111.4.1 The main themes: Evolution or revolution. 
The central theme in the work of Kuhn is the pattern of scientific 
change. Needless to say, the usual array of issues in such debates, 
such as the status of scientific knowledge, the existence and the use 
of criteria of demarcation and the very role of rationality in science, 
are clearly connected to and in fact follow from the way one conceives 
changes in science. 
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It should be added that the distinction which both inductivists and 
hypothetico-deductivists forcefully retain between discovery and 
justification, has no place in Kuhn's account. Within this system, 
social or even psychological factors influencing the shift of 
allegiance of scientists from one theory to another, are of great 
importance; indeed instrumental to the explanation of scientific change 
[1]. 
For Kuhn [2], normal science involves scientific activities firmly 
based upon past scientific achievements which a certain scientific 
community acknowledges for a time, providing the foundation for its 
further practice. 
A period of normal science is characterised by a paradigm. As 
Chalmers [3] remarks, the very nature of this concept makes a precise 
definition elusive. Kuhn, being conscious of such elusiveness, 
presented in his first version of "paradigm" two elements essential to 
it. A paradigm, according to him, is an achievement that shares two 
characteristics: 
-it is significant enough to attract a group of scientists away 
from competing modes of scientific activities. 
-it is sufficiently open-ended to leave "puzzle" solving activities 
for the practitioners to resolve [4]. 
It is these "puzzle" solving activities which are in a sense central 
to normal science [5]. 	 Hacking [6] and Losee [7] state that puzzle 
solving activities, in a Kuhnian context, mean those activities in 
n.1 
which research workers try to extend proven successful techniques so as 
to remove gaps, problems or inconsistencies which exist in an 
established body of knowledge. In this sense, normal science occupies 
the conservative end of the spectrum in the scientific enterprise, or 
as Barnes puts it: "Normal science is ... a process of extending and 
filling out the realm of the known; it does not look for fundamental 
novelties" [8]. 
However, as Kuhn himself concedes in the "Postscript", describing 
paradigms in such a way introduces a circularity, with a number of 
difficulties. This is because "a paradigm is what the members of 
scientific community share and conversely a scientific community 
consists of men who share a paradigm" C9l. 
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To remove the "vicious" aspects of this circularity, Kuhn elaborates 
further the notion of paradigm. 	 Thus he introduces a distinction 
between the use of a paradigm in a broad and in a narrow sense. 	 In a 
broad sense, a paradigm is a "disciplinary matrix" or "an entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so forth, shared by 
members of a given community" [10]. For instance, members of a 
scientific community may share a belief in the existence of certain 
theoretical entities e.g. fields, genes. Furthermore, these scientists 
may be in agreement as to which types of reasoning or investigation are 
important. All these constitute parts of a paradigm in a broad sense. 
Finally, 	 it should be noted that a paradigm in a broad sense includes 
one or more paradigms in the narrow sense [11], [12], [13]. 
In the narrow sense, a paradigm is an exemplar. It aids the scientist 
confronted with a problem within normal science, to deal with it in the 
same way as a problem already tackled: "Having seen the resemblance, 
grasped the analogy "between two or more distinct problems, one can 
interrelate symbols and attach them to nature in ways that have proved 
effective before" [14]. 
Hacking [15], 	 looking at the same issue from a slightly different 
angle, 	 interprets 	 the 	 broad-narrow 	 distinction 	 as 	 either 
paradigm-as-achievement 	 or 	 paradigm-as-a-set-of-shared-values. 
Paradigm-as-achievement means the accepted way of solving a problem, 
which then serves as a model for future workers. The other branch of 
this distinction contains the methods, standards and concepts which 
scientists share in order to work within a paradigm-as-achievement 
model. 
One can appreciate better the difference between the above mentioned 
distinctions if one considers, as Hacking [16] points out, Kuhn's focus 
on the "internal" study of scientific change. The term internal, in 
this sense, indicates an intimate and precise knowledge of science in 
an historical perspective [17], as opposed to the exclusion of all 
other factors (the Popperian sense of "internal"). 
However, if "paradigm" (despite its multifarious use and 
interpretations) and "normal science" are essential for one to 
understand how science and scientists function in a non-change period 
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of science, it is the notions of "crisis" and "scientific revolution", 
which complement them in explaining scientific change and growth. 
Generally speaking, Kuhn sees the pattern of scientific change [see 
note (a) on 111.4] as a shift from one paradigm (in the broad sense) to 
another. The obvious question then becomes, why does such a shift 
occur? Is it because new paradigms answer questions more adequately 
(inductivists', logical positivists' position)? Alternatively, is it 
because theories associated with the new paradigm are better than 
theories found in the old paradigm (Popper-Lakatos)? The answer is 
clearly negative: such a shift occurs when pressing anomalies emerge, 
which cannot be solved employing the range of intellectual armoury 
contained in the old paradigm [18]. This happens because new 
achievements present new ways of looking at things, which in turn 
create new problems. 
It is this shift from one paradigm to another - involving a period of 
crisis between two different periods of normal science - which Kuhn 
terms a scientific revolution. A further element of this revolution is 
its collective dimension: it is the abandonment of one paradigm for a 
new one by the relevant scientific community as a whole, and not by an 
individual scientist [19]; or, as Kuhn more precisely defines it, 	 an 
"increasing shift in the distribution of professional allegiances" 
[20], which is important. 
Therefore, the Kuhnian schema for scientific change approximates 
something like: 
normal science 	 crisis - scientific revolution - new normal science 
[21]. This sequence is continuous and the new normal science is 
established, 	 after resistance to the paradigmatic change [22] by at 
least part of the scientific community. 
Given the above pattern of scientific change so advocated by Kuhn, a 
question arises: 	 Is science a cumulative enterprise? In other words 
does science grow, (as inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism 
maintain) or is it merely a succession of qualitative changes? 
The use of the term "revolution", as opposed to "evolution", begs a 
number of questions about the character of the transition from a normal 
period to a subsequent normal period through a scientific revolution. 
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Does this transition mean discontinuity? And if so, is this 
discontinuity to be interpreted as indicating that scientific theories 
embedded in a paradigm are incommensurable with those of the new 
paradigm? Again, if it is so, why? Or, if the theories integrated into 
the old and the new paradigm are commensurable, what are the criteria 
for the evaluation of their merits? 
Concerning the first of the above questions, a distinction between 
normal science and the overall scientific enterprise (including normal 
science as well as periods of crises and scientific revolution) 	 is 
necessary. 
For normal science, Kuhn [23] says that it is "highly cumulative". 
Since its aim is the steady extension of the scope and precision of 
scientific knowledge, its very success depends on the degree to which 
it is cumulative. The assertion therefore, that normal science is 
cumulative is not just a description, but lends it a normative 
character as well. 
Things are different however, if one adopts an overall view. 	 In the 
overall sense, science is not strictly cumulative, since as Hacking 
[24] has noted, a change of paradigm alters what sort of questions and 
answers are appropriate. Old answers can lose their importance after a 
paradigmatic change. Whether they in addition become unintelligible, 
depends on the answers to the next cluster of questions. 
It is the interpretation of the answers in this series of questions 
which form probably the most controversial aspects of this system of 
thought. 	 For Kuhn, the abandonment of one paradigm and the adoption of 
a new one by the relevant professional community, involves a 
fundamental change in scientists' general outlook, which is likened to 
a "gestalt" switch. "The scientist with a new paradigm sees differently 
from the way he had seen before" [25]. 
The essence, though, of the questions being asked remains 
unclarified. As Newton-Smith [26] contests, there are two ways in which 
such a paradigmatic shift may bring about a change in "how a scientist 
sees things". 
Firstly, a paradigmatic shift may be understood as influencing not 
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science and non-science, have no place in the conceptual fabric of this 
position. Indeed, Barnes [32], who tends to read Kuhn this way, remarks 
that Kuhnian work "undermines any such demarcation" and "consequently 
frustrates the grand undertaking of separating 'reason' from 
unreason'. This is in contrast with Lakatos' point of view [33] who 
maintains that if science changes through scientific revolutions, then 
it is insufficiently determined by "rules of reasons" [see note (b) on 
111.4]. 
If however theories cannot be compared and their relative merits 
cannot be judged against each other, one is then asked to accept 
relativism, which implies that one has no right to see scientific 
change as scientific growth. For instance, according to relativism, one 
cannot and therefore should not claim that relativistic mechanics can 
be compared in any sense with Newtonian mechanics, nor as a matter of 
fact, with Aristotelian mechanics. Clearly, Kuhn was not prepared to 
accept such a far reaching conclusion (e.g. "...my view of scientific 
development is fundamentally evolutionary", and "one scientific theory 
is not as good as another for doing what scientists normally do" [34]), 
despite the fact that some of his remarks and terminology (e.g. 
revolution as opposed to evolution, world view change) laid the ground 
for an argument favouring relativism. 
Kuhn, apart from taking into account social and historical factors to 
eplain scientific change, argues that the built-in anomalies in the 
case of normal science are at least equal in importance to other 
(external) factors in initiating a paradigmatic shift [35]. This leads 
to the second and probably more acceptable way of understanding this 
philosophical system. Within this system, incommensurability means that 
after a scientific revolution has taken place, the new paradigm 
emerging may address new problems employing new concepts [36], yet 
scientific change is considered as progress: 	 "We must explain why 
science - our surest example of sound knowledge - progresses as it 
does, and we must find out how, in fact, it does progress" [37]. 
Furthermore, because "later scientific theories are better than earlier 
ones for salving puzzles [see note (c) on 111.4] in the often quite 
different environments to which they are applied" [38] a set of 
characteristics of good scientific theories is laid down. Roughly 
speaking a "good" scientific theory should: 
-be accurate and precise within its relevant field, 
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only the way of describing things, but affecting also where and how one 
looks for things. 	 "I have so far argued only that paradigms are 
constitutive of science. Now, I wish to display a sense, in which they 
are constitutive of nature as well....Practising in different worlds, 
the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from 
the same point in the same direction" [27]. 
Secondly, this change could be conceived as affecting the way of 
describing the objects - sources of human experience [28]. "Again, that 
is not to say that they (i.e. the scientists in competing paradigms) 
can see anything they please. Both are looking at the world and what 
they look at has not changed" [29]. 
It would be misleading and unjust to the Kuhnian position to treat 
the above distinction as a clear cut dichotomy, as it entails an 
internal contradiction. Obviously, Kuhn shifting from the first to the 
second position and using both, has tried to dialectically synthesise 
them. Nevertheless, because this presumed intention is not explicitly 
stated, one is entitled, stretching the argument a bit, to claim as in 
fact Newton-Smith did, that one can discern two versions of Kuhnian 
thought, fairly close to one another. 	 In Newton-Smith's colourful 
terminology, one can view Kuhn as "temperate irrationalist" 	 (first 
version) and Kuhn as an "embryonic rationalist" (second version) [30]. 
The first of the above versions implies that the process of 
scientific change is marked by discontinuities. As the scientific 
community leaves one paradigm (which characterises a certain period of 
normal science) for a new one, 	 it abandons the scientific theories 
embedded in the old paradigm and it accepts other theories compatible 
with the new paradigm. These two sets of scientific theories are 
incommensurable. Therefore, one has no grounds for claiming that a 
relatively rational evaluation is possible or even conceivable, because 
in a case such as the above, there are no objective, theory-independent 
principles against which the theories can be compared: 	 "The normal 
scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not 
only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which 
has gone before" [31]. 
Obviously, notions about the existence of criteria for choosing 
between competing scientific theories, Or even demarcating between 
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-be consistent internally as well as with other currently accepted 
relevant scientific theories (external consistency), 
-have broad scope so as to cover as many phenomena, observations or 
sub-theories as possible within the paradigm it is functioning, 
-be simple, e.g. by determining the values of universal constants, 
-be fruitful, i.e. provide new research findings and formulate 
quantitative laws which further articulate the relevant paradigm [39]. 
These characteristics resemble five paradigm independent criteria for 
deciding between competing theories C40]. Two remarks seem pertinent 
here. Firstly, appealing to the above criteria-like characteristics 
does not resolve the problem of choosing between theories which are 
partially heteromorphic (i.e. the first theory has the first three 
characteristics, while a second complies with the last two of them). In 
such cases, scientific changes ought to be accounted for by external 
factors. Secondly, and more importantly, one should always bear in mind 
that for Kuhn, theory choice in the face of a body of evidence, does 
not mean following a system of binding rules [41]. Therefore, the above 
set of characteristics resembles a set of criteria but they do not 
constitute criteria themselves. Strictly speaking, if one has to speak 
of criteria "What better criterion than the decision of the scientific 
group could there be?" [42]; or, as Ziman C43] puts it, the consensus 
of the relevant scientific community arising out of critical scrutiny, 
constitutes the criteria. This consensus should take into account the 
characteristics which each scientific theory ought to have, as well as 
social and historical factors. 
Regarding this, Kuhn [44] has put forward in the "Postscript" a 
number of questions referring to the acquisition of membership of a 
particular scientific community, the stages of socialisation for the 
individual member to the group, the degree of tolerance concerning 
individual and collective deviation, etc. 
Finally, to put the Kuhnian thought in perspective, 	 it should be 
noted that while this system differs from an inductivistic or 
hypothetico-deductivistic account of science (mainly by introducing 
social and historical considerations, as factors influencing the way 
science changes), it differs dramatically from the relativistic 
standpoint 	 (expressed by Feyerabend who denies that there is any sort 
of system of rules "running through the historically evolving 
scientific community" [45]), as well. 
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111.4.2 
	 A critique: The fundamental tension. 
As is evident from the above, the notion of paradigm is central to 
the Kuhnian system. It permeates this system so deeply, so as to give 
one justifiable grounds for arguing that every aspect of this position 
(e.g. normal science, crisis, scientific revolution, the way science 
changes) 	 either follows or is closely connected to the way one defines 
the concept of a paradigm. One way, therefore to discuss the possible 
merits or weaknesses of this stance, is to focus the critique on the 
way paradigms are defined. 
Restating the previous discussion, one can emphasise two points: 
-firstly, Kuhn's concession that paradigm is elusive in terms of a 
precise definition, 
-secondly, the distinction between paradigm in a broad and in a 
narrow sense. 
Attempting to defend the legitimacy of the application of a term 
(e.g. paradigm) 	 whose meaning can only be intuitively grasped, Kuhn 
invokes Wittgenstein's [46] argument that one can learn how to employ a 
term, even if there is no set of characteristics which "is 
simultaneously applicable to all members of the class described by the 
term and to them alone" [47]. 	 It is a network of overlapping and 
interlocking similarities, which help identify a term. For instance, a 
game activity is characterised as such, because when we are first 
confronted with it, we recognise its close resemblance to other 
activities previously known by that name. 
However, even having accepted the use of the term paradigm in a 
"loose" fashion, 
	
in addition to the distinction between the use of 
paradigm in a broad and narrow sense, it does not follow that one is  
entitled to shift back and forth between the broad and the narrow sense 
of paradigm. Shapere [48], criticising Kuhn, has pointed out exactly 
this. 
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Obviously, one should not underestimate these criticisms in terms of 
academic rigour and clarity. This does not however mean that the very 
substance of the Kuhnian thesis, in conceding lack of precision, is 
weakened beyond defence. 
Thus, with respect to the more substantial aspects of this position, 
certain philosophers (such as Popper [49] and Lakatos [50]), rejecting 
the inclusion of factors other than internal ones to account for 
changes in science (e.g. social of historical factors), focus their 
criticism in this direction, saying that the Kuhnian pattern renders 
scientific change a matter of "mystical conversion". 
A fair evaluation of their criticisms can be conducted in the light 
of Masterman's [51] analysis of Kuhn's different conceptions of a 
paradigm. As a matter of fact, in her paper, Kuhn's explanations of the 
meaning of paradigm, or use of term, were counted and found to number 
twenty one in total [see note (d) on 111.4]. This does not mean, as she 
acknowledges, that these "paradigms" are inconsistent with each other. 
Looking for common ground between all the senses in which the term was 
applied by Kuhn, Masterman found three broad categories: 
-philosophical paradigms or metaparadigms, e.g. an organising 
principle governing perception; 
-sociological paradigms (sociological considerations are of primary 
importance), e.g. paradigm as an accepted judicial decision regarding 
scientific disputes, 
-and finally, artefact or construct paradigms (more psychologically 
oriented) e.g. paradigm as analogy. 
Turning back to the rationalists' criticism of Kuhn's account of 
science, and given their explicitly declared position that only the 
context of justification of scientific theories is the legitimate field 
of philosophy of science, it is obvious that they focus on the 
philosophical sense of paradigm. What however remains as their starting 
point to build their argument, is Kuhn's use of paradigm in the 
sociological or psychological senses. In other words, their main 
objection lies with the introduction of what they call external factors 
(sociological andior psychological considerations) to the debate. Their 
position does not seem to assist any attempt to form an integrated, 
"holistic" image of science. 
88 
It is Feycrabend [52]. who revealing another ambiguity addressed 
another serious problem. He asked whether a paradigm presents cne with 
a methodological prescription or only a mere description "void of any 
evaluative elements". In a sense, this question is connected with 
Newton-Smith's claim which discerns two versions of the Luhnian system. 
This tension constitutes the most fundamental aspect of the issues 
undergoing criticism. 
In conclusion then, it can be said, that this tension, once 
discerned, provides good reason for the treatment of each version as a 
separate philosophical system. It should be added that the postulates 
of the second version are very close to the theoretical assumptions 
adopted in the present thesis (with the exception of the issue of 
reality), and will be analysed in a later chapter. 
111.4.3 The Kuhnian images of science. 
As already argued, Kuhnian thought can be interpreted as presenting 
two alternative images of science. Their main difference lies in the 
way in which the role of rationality in science is conceptualised by 
each of them. 
The first version is more relativistic in character. 
	 Discussing in 
this light the positions entailed with regard to 
(a) scientific method, 
(b) pattern of scientific growth, 
(c) criteria of demarcation and 
(d) status of scientific knowledge, 
one can say that: 
(1) there is no unity in terms of scientific method; furthermore, 
the choice of a certain method for a given problem is not completely a 
rational Exercise: 
(2) the pattern of scientific change as opposed to growth, is a 
never ending sequence of: normal science - crisis scientific revolution 
8 
- new normal science, occurring through paradigmatic shifts. The notion 
of incommensurability and the interpretation that the old and the new 
paradigm are absolutely non-comparable are relevant here; 
(3) the very notion of criteria of demarcation is rendered 
inoperable. One has no justifiable grounds for choosing one paradigm 
(which, in this sense determines the sort of knowledge) against 
another; 
(4) scientific knowledge has no special status, since there is no 
basis for this claim. This version does not differ from relativism. For 
this reason, a more extensive discussion of it and its possible 
variations, will be included in the next section. 
The main points of the second possible version of a Kuhnian image of 
science are as follows: 
(1) there is no unity in terms of scientific method; however, there 
are rational criteria for choosing between the available methods for a 
given problem; 
(2) the pattern of scientific growth is a never ending sequence of 
normal science - crisis - scientific revolution - new normal science, 
occurring through paradigmatic shifts. The old and new paradigms are 
incommensurable. In this instance, incommensurability is taken to 
indicate, not complete non-comparability, but rather the fact that the 
old and the new paradigms address different kinds of problems; 
(3) one can distinguish science from non-science, or choose between 
competing scientific theories. This is not to say however, that this 
choice is a sort of algorithmic procedure. 
	
It rather arises out of 
critical scrutiny and debate among the members of the relevant 
scientific community, according to some general principles which 
indicate the traits to which an acceptable scientific theory ought to 
comply; 
(4) scientific knowledge has a special status in that it is the 
surest sort of knowledge. 
Finally, it should be added that regarding the continuum whose end 
points are realism and idealism, the location of either of these two 
versions is open to debate. Nevertheless, as Newton-Smith [53] remarks, 
Kuhn himself is not a realist and this irrespectively of the version of 
his system which one chooses. 
111.4.4 Representing the Kuhnian image of science: 
Two sets of statements. 
In the following, two sets of statements are presented. The first is 
intended to represent the first version of Kuhnian thought ("moderate 
irrationalist") 	 while the second is intended to encapsulate the second 
version ("embryonic rationalist"). Again, a degree of simplification is 
acknowledged. 
111.4.4.1 First image: Contextualism A. 
1. For the different kinds of scientific enquiry there are different 
ways of being scientific in terms of method. 
In choosing between different scientific methods for a given 
problem there are standards enabling a reasonable choice to be made. 
3. The existence of various incompatible scientific methods is a 
fruitful source of scientific progress. 
4. In general the choice of the appropriate method to be used for a 
given problem is guided by a consensus of the scientific community. 
5. When there are competing theories (belonging to different 
paradigms) 	 and scientists want to decide between them there are no 
rational and defensible ways of doing so. 
0. The search for general rules for deciding either between competing 
scientific theories or which one of them deserves to be called 
scientific is pointless because when theories change, so do our ideas 
about how to decide between theories. 
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As science changes or develops, new knowledge generally replaces 
knowledge of another sort. 
3. New scientific knowledge either fits within the existing framework, 
or generates a new framework incompatible with the old one. 
9. The status of scientific knowledge is not different from that of 
any other kind of knowledge, all kinds having equal validity. 
111.4.4.2 Second image: Contextualism B. 
1. For the different kinds of scientific enquiry there are different 
ways of being scientific in terms of method. 
2. In choosing between different scientific methods for a given 
problem there are standards enabling a reasonable choice to be made. 
3. When there is a debate about whether a given theory is to be 
regarded as "scientific" there are rational and defensible criteria for 
making the decision. 
4. The existence of various incompatible scientific methods is a 
fruitful source of scientific progress. 
5. In general the choice of the appropriate method to be used for a 
given problem itself belongs within the concept of science. 
o. The search for general rules for deciding either between competing 
scientific theories or which of them deserves to be called scientific 
is not pointless. 
7. As science changes or develops, in some periods new knowledge 
replaces ignorance or lack of knowledge while in other periods new 
knowledge replaces knowledge of another sort. 
3. New scientific knowledge either fits within the existing framework, 
or generates a new framework incompatible with the old one. 
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9. The status of scientific knowledge is different from other kinds of 
knowledge, having a characteristic value of its own. 
10. Scientific knowledge has particular characteristics in that it is a 
systematic pattern of thought. 
NOTES ON 111.4 
Ca). the use of the term change, as opposed to growth is deliberate. 
m(b). 'Insufficient' in this system of thought means not exclusively determined by 'rules of 
reason'. 
f(c). 	 It should not be forgotten that solving puzzles (removing anomalies, increasing the scope et 
al.) is for Kuhn the main goal of normal science. 
f(d). To refer to each one of them, although interesting, is out of the scope of this thesis. 
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111.5 	 RELATIVISM 	 A libertarian view. 
The relativist denies the existence of universal and a-historical 
standards of rationality, which could enable scientists to choose 
between competing scientific theories [IL On the contrary, he accepts 
that judgements of the merits or weaknesses of a particular theory, 
will vary from individual to individual or from community to community, 
or from culture to culture. 
This view has a number of serious consequences, in terms of how one 
perceives the function and usefulness of science, and has of course 
profound educational implications. Before setting out to discuss these 
consequences, it should be noted that relativism is more popular among 
sociologists of science [see note (a) on 111.51 as opposed to 
philosophers of science, although one of the more interesting accounts 
of scientific practice has been produced by Feyerabend, an ardent 
follower of this stance in the philosophical context. 
In the following section, an account and a critique of philosophical 
relativism as expressed by Feyerabend is attempted. Subsequently, the 
implications of this approach from an educational standpoint as well as 
in the wider philosophical context will be briefly considered. 
111.5.1 The main thesis: "Anything goes". 
For Feyerabend, ultimately, science represents no more than one 
ideology amongst others [31. It should be noted that he does not use 
the term ideology in any strictly defined sense, but rather 
interchangeably with other terms like theory, tradition and world-view. 
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Two themes provide the foundations to Feyerabend's above-mentioned 
claim. Roughly speaking, one can encapsulate these in: 
-the assertion that "anything goes", regarding the methods employed 
by science; 
-the notion of incommensurability of scientific theories. 
The first theme would appear to be an attack on the account of 
scientific 	 method 	 provided 	 by 	 inductivists 	 and 
hypothetico-deductivists. The issue at stake, in Feyerabend's terms, is 
not what the scientific method should be - he in fact denies the very 
notion of scientific method [41, arguing that methodological debates 
have failed to provide adequate guiding principles for practising 
scientists [5]. Furthermore, he challenges on a deeper level the 
legitimacy of investigating "the" scientific method; as in his view, it 
is not only unrealistic to attempt to explain the complex interactions 
involved in the history of science, in terms of certain methodological 
rules, but also pernicious and detrimental to both society in general 
and science in particular [6]. 
Science would be affected because "there is no idea, however ancient 
and absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge" [7] and 
therefore harnessing scientific activities to the limitations and rules 
that are implied by all methodologies does nothing else but making 
"science less adaptable and more dogmatic"[0]. Society, on the other 
hand, permitting a dogmatic science to prevail, which subsequently 
overcomes other ideologies (e.g. religion, magic, to name but a few), 
does nothing more than restrict the freedom of its individual members 
[9]. 
Having dealt with an outline of Feyerabend's methodological position, 
his strategy for the case "against method" will next be examined. His 
target is to undermine the faith in rules of evidence, arguing that for 
any such rule, an equally defensible counter-rule exists; the 
counter-rule leading to exactly opposite results [10]. 
Here, Feyerabend refuses to accept that something could provide 
grounds for accepting one scientific theory rather than another -
something, "which would be a reason for any individual regardless of 
his own ideological perspective "[11]. In this, he rejects two cardinal 
distinctions (for the followers of the Vienna circle): the distinction 
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between observation and theory and the distinction between the contexts 
of discovery and justification of scientific theories [see note (b) on 
111.53. 
Consider for instance Feigl's [12] distinction: "It is one thing to 
retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis and 
developments, the socio-politico-economic conditions for the acceptance 
or rejection of scientific theories; and it is quite another thing to 
provide a logical reconstruction of the conceptual structure and of the 
testing of scientific theories". As Dolby [13] has pointed out, this 
principle of the Vienna Circle provides the demarcation line between 
philosophy (dealing with the latter part of this distinction) and 
sociology (the former part constituting its field) of scientific 
knowledge, for logical empiricists and hypothetico-deductivists. 
For if the ideological perspective of the individual scientist is the 
determinant of his allegiance to a certain scientific theory, then the 
distinction between theory and facts (the facts being a means for 
testing in one way or another the theories) loses its meaningfulness. 
Or, as Feyerabend claims, the only distinction between theories and 
facts is that "facts are constituted by older ideologies' [14]. 
Furthermore, if one agrees with Feyerabend's assertions about the 
nature of scientific theories (and facts), it is clear that the second 
of the above mentioned distinctions plays no role in scientific 
practice. Firstly, because one lacks any instrument to test the 
theories (i.e. facts in other philosophical systems) and secondly, 
because beliefs do not constitute the most appropriate domain for the 
application of purely rational and therefore emotionally detached 
arguments [see note (c) on 111.5]. 
ro undermine then, the faith in the role of rules of evidence for 
accepting or rejecting a certain scientific theory, and having prepared 
the background by abolishing the two distinctions (between theory and 
facts and between context of discovery and context of justification), 
Feyerabend argues for a replacement of what he terms the principle of 
consistency, with a counter-inductive schema [131. 
This counter-inductive schema entails that the way which does not 
restrict scientific progress is through a proliferation of theories at 
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odds with currently accepted theories; "hypotheses contradicting well 
confirmed theories, give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any 
other way" [19]. This tenet of the proliferation of scientific theories 
constitutes, obviously, a part of the pattern for scientific change 
suggested by Feyerabend; the other part being the notion of 
incommensurability to be discussed later. 
It appears that two distinctions are necessary in clarifying the 
treatment of the principle of consistency within this philosophical 
system. 
-(a): the principle of consistency (which according to Feyerabend, 
traditional philosophers of science hold) versus internal consistency 
(of an argument or of a theory) 
-(b): the principle of consistency per se, as opposed to its 
justification. 
Regarding the former, it is obvious that Feyerabend does not oppose 
internal consistency (coherence), when he rhetorically asks: "what is 
wrong with inconsistencies?" [20]. On the contrary he regards any 
internal 	 inconsistency contained in a certain position, as sufficient 
reason to abandon that position [21]. 
As far as the latter is concerned, it should be considered in the 
light of Feyerabend's justification for giving preference to a 
counter-inductive schema (in order to explain scientific change) rather 
than in the light of his version of the principle of consistency [see 
note (d) on 111.5]. 
Thus, arguing for this substitution, Feyerabend invokes the history 
of science to substantiate his thesis. His argument, roughly speaking, 
proceeds as follows: any scientific argument (for instance, the 
Aristotelian tower argument which was used to refute the motion of 
earth) 	 involves interpretation of observation closely connected with 
the currently prevailing theories. Therefore, the first step is always 
to find the principles embedded in observational notions. Having 
disentangled the implicit old theoretical notions from the relevant 
observations, one can express observations using a new observational 
language, which obviously is sustained by a number of implicit 
theoretical ideas taken from the new theory being proposed [23]. 
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To illustrate this point, Feyerabend quotes an excerpt from Galileo. 
In this, Galileo inverted a version of the tower argument in order to 
replace the observational language used in the initial characterisation 
of the e;:perience, with a different observational language. By doing 
so, he rendered the theoretical conceptions implicit in the old 
observational 	 language 	 inoperative, 	 thereby 	 preempting 	 their 
replacement. 
Feyerabend construes this as being not a confrontation with facts 
which leads one to move from one scientific theory to another, because 
at the time of Galileo, the evidence (i.e. facts) available did not by 
any means, favour the then new Copernican theory vis-a-vis Aristotelian 
mechanics, on which the Ptolemean astronomical system was based. So, 
why did Galileo's view prevail? In Feyerabend's account, other factors, 
extraneous to the principle of consistency made the difference (e.g. 
the style and the artful use of persuasion, the use of Italian instead 
of Latin and the appeal to an audience attracted to new ideas [24]. 
Clearly, what follows from such an interpretation, is that the 
principle of consistency as stated in a normative fashion by 
Feyerabend, cannot account for changes in scientific theories. 
Turning back to the distinction between this principle and its 
justification, it is interesting to note that Feyerabend conceded the 
possibility of it being used to logically reconstruct the course of 
science, providing that it is not expressed in strong normative terms, 
i.e. hypotheses not concurring with accepted theories should be 
abandoned immediately (Feyerabend's reading of Lakatos' distinction 
between progressive and degenerating scientific programmes) 	 [25]. He 
insists however, that in this case its justification through an appeal 
to reason is impossible: 	 in so far as the methodology of research 
programmes is 'rational' 	 it does not differ from anarchism [see note 
(e) on 111.5]. In so far as it differs from anarchism, it is not 
'rational'" [2j]. 
One further reason rendering any attempt at such a reconstruction 
futile is that by definition any such attempt is retrospective. 
Feverabend's [28] position, on the other hand, is that any proposed 
reconstruction should be based on the evidence available at the time of 
theory confrontation, if to be of normative use. 
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Looking at Fe•rerabend s argument "against method", 	 and 	 more 
particularly at his attack on the principle of consistency, as a 
principle guiding scientific change, one can discern amongst its basic 
starting points, the tenet of the theory-dependence of observations 
i.e. that observation statements will depend on the theoretical context 
in which they occur, because they carry implicit theoretical concepts 
relevant to this context. 
The other main component of Feyerabend's system of thought is the 
notion of incommensurability of rival scientific theories. As already 
stated, in the section on contextualists (Kuhn and Ziman), Kuhn s 
notion of incommensurability is that of scientific theories not 
addressing the same kind of problems, not employing the same conceptual 
fabric and finally serving different kinds of functions. Feyerabend's 
interpretation of incommensurability is far more radical; It entails a 
fundamental shift in the way of thinking, the general outlook. His 
favourite Example of incommensurability can be found in the break 
between the cosmologies of the archaic period (8-9th cent. D.C.) and 
classical Greece [29]. 
The contrast between Kuhn's and Feyerabend•s interpretations of this 
notion can be seen as helpful towards the demarcation of their 
positions. It is however the relationship between the way the above 
authors employ incommensurability and guinea thesis on the 
indeterminacy of translations, which may help us to understand better 
the roots of relativism as well as its inevitable tendencies forwards 
to scepticism. 
Roughly speaking, Cuine holds that there are an indefinite number of 
possible but mutually incompatible translations between two languages, 
let us say A and B, spoken by two actually disparate linguistic 
communities. It is not a matter of technical, so to say, difficulties, 
which could be overcome. On the contrary, it is a matter of principle. 
To illustrate the point, let "a" be a sentence taken from A; one can 
translate it by a certain system of translation into "bl" of B. 
Furthermore, the same sentence "a" can be translated by another system 
of translation into "b2" of D. According to Cuine s position, apart 
frcm the possibility of transforming "a" into either "bl" or "b2", "bl" 
and "b2" are mutually incompatible 1:0]. 
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Feveragend suggested that incommensurability should be understood in 
terns of translation between disparate systems of thoughts. Now, 
comparing Quine's thesis on the indeterminacy of translation (supposing 
disparate languages to be disparate systems of thoughts, as well) and 
Feyerabend's idea of incommensurability, one can see that, in terms of 
the confidence one can have in a body of knowledge, they lead towards 
similar ends, despite the fact that they entail different processes 
towards these ends. 
As a matter of fact, indeterminacy says that there is an indefinite 
number of possible but mutually incompatible ways of moving from one 
conceptual 
	
schema to another disparate one, while incommensurability, 
in Feyerabend's sense, says there is none at all. 
Despite, therefore, this phenomenological discrepancy both lead to 
similar sceptical claims. 	 If too many mutually incompatible ways of 
translating propositions from one system of thought to another 	 (for 
instance, 	 in the scientific context, from Aristotelian to Newtonian 
mechanics), are available, then one lacks any sound ground for their 
relative evaluation, and therefore only scepticism is a secure resort. 
Conversely, if there is no way of communication between systems like 
the above mentioned, one cannot but retreat to scepticism. 
At this point, given the consequences of relativism, not only for 
scientific enterprise per se, but for science education as well, a 
taxonomy of 	 forms of relativism will be developed, in the hope that 
distinctions between the various forms of relativism can help not only 
to pinpoint the basic assumptions of Feyerabend's thought, but to 
further dindrLate his position from both Kuhnian philosophy and other 
relativistic trends. 
Hollis and Luces [31] distinguish five forms of relativism: moral 
relativism, conceptual relativism, perceptual relativism, relativism of 
truth and relativism of reasoning. As Barnes and Bloor suggest the 
basic starting points of relativistic doctrines are: 
(a). the claim that beliefs on a certain topic vary and 
(b). the assertion that "which of these beliefs will be found in a 
certain context, depends on, or is relative to the circumstances of the 
users" C32]. 
However, these assumptions are shared by each form of relativism; thus, 
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they can be distinguished by a third feature, namely the "equivalence" 
postulate. 
There are three alternative versions of this postulate. One can 
either hold that all beliefs are equally true, or that all beliefs are 
equally false, or that all beliefs are on a par with one another 
regarding the sources of their credibility. Barnes and Moor C33] point 
out that the first two alternatives run into considerable difficulties, 
being in a sense, as Popper and others argue [34], self contradictory. 
For instance, to say that all beliefs are equally true, one encounters 
the problem of how to handle beliefs which contradict one another. 
Conversely, to say that all beliefs are equally false casts the status 
of relativists' own claims in a dubious light (Zenon 's problem). 
Clearly, Kuhn and Feyerabend's notion of incommensurability is based 
on the third version of the equivalence postulate. Asserting that all 
beliefs are on a par with one another, with regard to the foundations 
of their credibility, one is undoubtedly subscribing to conceptual and 
perceptual relativism. What remains then, is the question to what 
extent relativism of reasoning is involved. This seems to be the point 
at which the systems of Kuhn and Feyerabend diverge. While Kuhn [35] is 
not prepared to accept relativism of reasoning (at least the first of 
the two versions of Kuhnian thought, 	 identified in the previous 
chapter), Feyerabend appears most content with this form of relativism, 
by emphasising the extreme and focusing on the significant shifts of 
human thought (as opposed to the lack of common measures). 
To summarise, it could be said that Feyerabend's notion of 
incommensurability differs from Ouine's thesis of the indeterminacy of 
translation (which holds that no communication of thinking is possible 
as opposed to excessive interpretations) and from the Kuhnian notion of 
incommensurability (first version [36]), since it involves relativism 
of reasoning. Dearing this in mind, any attempt to connect Feyerabend's 
system of thought with the sort of relativism emanating from linguistic 
considerations (e.g. Wittgenstein's language games [37]), appears to be 
most risky. 	 The need for caution becomes stronger if one takes into 
account that both Ouine and Wittgenstein 
- spoke of absolutely closed systems; furthermore, 
- relativism emanating from linguistic considerations is more akin to 
logical positivism (e.arly Wittoenstein, Carnap) of which Feyerabend is 
a great adversary. 
A critique: does "anything goes" mean that in 
practice "everything stays"? C38]. 
critique of Feverabend's system of thought could be discussed from 
two different angles: either by focusing on those criticisms that 
reveal internal tensions and weaknesses in his position (which is 
legitimate even in his own terms), or more generally by trying to 
ascertain what his position means for organised knowledge, social and 
particularly physical sciences. 
With regard to the first, Feyerabend concedes that science has made 
"marvellous practical achievements" [39]. 	 If this is the case, one 
could argue that science is privileged vis-a-vis other forms of 
knowledge, even if its practice is far removed from the description of 
other philosophical systems [40]. In response to this, Feyerabend might 
argue that to support any such claim one would have to show: 
(a) that no other view has anything comparable, and 
(b) that the results of science are autonomous in the sense that 
they do not take on any of the features specific to nonscientific 
traditions [417. 
As far as the first claim is concerned, Newton-Smith [42] has asked 
"what is wrong with the obvious answer that the other traditions fail 
to thrive for the simple reason that men came to perceive correctly 
that they were not delivering the goods?". If we accept that the 
apostles of science were the more determined conquerors and that they 
materially suppressed the bearers of alternative cultures" [43], one 
could ask "how did the apostles of science come to have this alleged 
power to suppress other traditions?" [44]. Unfortunately, Feyerabend 
gives no detailed account of such an event. Therefore, in the absence 
of any supportive argument there is reason to suppose that even if 
alternative traditions were competing with science on an equal basis, 
the scientific tradition would triumph by virtue of its fruits [45]. If 
this is speculation it would seem that Chalmers' remark is more 
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convincing [467: "We are simply not in a position to have a free choice 
between science and voodoo, or western rationality and that of the Auer 
tribe". Freedom of choice in this respect is as illusory as the choice 
between pollution and industrial goods. 
Turning to (b), as Newton-Smith remarks "why should the facts that 
arose from such sources (i.e. non-scientific traditions) detract from 
the success claims of science"? [47]. The salient point here is that 
the scientific tradition has evolved methods for evaluating and even 
successfully developing such primitive beliefs. As Chalmers argues 
£431, Feyerabend has done nothing to provide a detailed study of voodoo 
"which could reveal that they have well defined terms and methods of 
achieving those ends", so as to remove one's prejudice, conceding the 
existence of prejudice. Furthermore, the status of astrology and the 
like is not a pressing problem in our society at present, such as to 
cast doubt on our surest example of organised knowledge. 	 In other 
words, Feyerabend's critique of science is at least misdirected. 
Of much more importance than the criticism above is one which 
examines relativism in its extreme form, from a different angle. It 
seems that Krige C497 summarises it most aptly, asking "does "anything 
goes" mean that in practice "everything stays" ?". Taking Feyerabend's 
assertion that "anything goes" in its normative sense, (as it is 
intended to be taken), would mean that everyone should follow his 
individual inclinations. If however, this view is adopted, it is liable 
to lead to a situation in which those who already have access to power, 
knowledge, etc. will maintain it. Although this may not be relevant to 
scientific practice for the simple reason that scientists do not 
usually look at epistemology for guidance in their practice, 
nonetheless it has considerable implications for education. This is 
related to the point made earlier, that an analysis of scientific 
knowledge along philosophical and/or sociological lines has probably no 
immediate impact on the way science is practised, but it is highly 
pertinent to the way science is taught. 
Out of relativism a completely different set of principles emerges, 
regarding the way of selecting, presenting and teaching science. 	 If 
there is no way of establishing the privileged position of what is 
usually called "Western science" (a term which is considered to be not 
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quite appropriate in the context of this thesis), then the only 
criterion for the above functions is that of social relevance. This in 
turn could lead to one science curriculum for, say, working class 
children, or blacks, or women and another one for middle and upper 
class children, or whites, or men. Given that certain groups are de 
facto privileged in society (and one could argue that middle and upper 
classes are privileged vis-a-vis the working class), then the 
construction of a working class curriculum could serve to deny these 
children access to the sort of knowledge which by virtue of its 
outcomes is a tool of social hegemony. This is not to deny that other 
factors could interfere in the establishment of this privileged status. 
111.5.3 	 A depiction of relativism. 
The set of statements below, as before, is an attempt to encapsulate 
the relativistic image of science. The construction of the research 
instrument referring to relativism will be based on these statements. 
1. For the different kinds of scientific enquiry there are different 
ways of being scientific in terms of method. 
2. In choosing between different scientific methods for a given problem 
there is no rational way of choosing, other than preference. 
The ex istence of various incompatible scientific methods shows the 
pointlessness of discussions about scientific method. 
4. In general the choice of the appropriate method to be used for a 
given problem is made by individuals, using their own critical 
standards. 
5. When there is a debate about whether a given theory is to be 
reaarded as "scientific" there are no rational and defensible criteria 
for making the decision. 
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o. When there are competing theories and scientists want to decide 
between them there are no rational and defensible ways of doing so. 
7. The search for general rules for deciding either between competing 
scientific theories or which one of them deserves to be called 
scientific is pointless because science merely persuades us to look at 
things in a certain way, which is no better than any other. 
8. As science changes or develops, new knowledge generally replaces 
knowledge of another sort. 
9. New scientific knowledge follows no pattern of growth, being purely 
the result of what scientists happen to have done. 
10. The status of scientific knowledge is not different from that of 
any other kind of knowledge, all kinds having equal validity. 
NOTES ON 111.5 
*(a). Barnes [2] commenting on the consequences of relativism writes: 
'What then of the problem of relativism? The first thing to be said is that whatever conclusions 
are reached on the matter should not count against the preceding discussion ....one does not turn 
back because its consequences prove unpleasant'. 
*(b). For logical empiricism (Popper and Lakatos retain this distinction, too) 	 a blurring of the 
processes of discovery and justification of scientific theories falls just short of committing a 
sin. 
fiC). As Lakatos [15] writes, for a Popperian, commitment is an unavoidable biological weakness to 
be limited as far as possible. For Marxists on the other hand, who retaining the objectivity of 
scientific knowledge espouse commitment [16], ones ideology is determined mainly by social factors 
(e.g. social class [17]). 
i(d). As Newton -Smith [22] points out Feverabend is attacking a very weak version of this 
principle. A more sophisticated version should proceed as follows: 	 All things being equal, new 
theories should agree with the observationally successful aspects of currently accepted acceptable 
theories'. 
f(e). Feyerabend means his own position because he was a self-styled epistemological (as opposed to 
political) anarchist, or more precisely (again his own qualification) dadaist [271. 
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111.6 KNOWLEDGE AND THE ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION. 
111.6.1 	 Outline of scope of discussion. 
As the account of the four systems (III level systems, according to 
the terminology proposed Cll), which constitute the poles of recent 
epistemological debates indicates, their differentiation roughly 
speaking, finds expression in the way they interpret or prescribe the 
scientific enterprise with regard to certain focal points. 
These focal points are the distinction of theory and observation, 
including their relative importance and the pattern of scientific 
growth. The way scientific method i•a described (or in certain cases 
prescribed) depends on the former, while the latter is related to 
issues such as criteria of demarcation and the status of scientific 
knowledge [27. 
One way of examining the underpinnings of these philosophical systems 
and the way the above focal points are articulated, is through a 
discussion of how the issue of reality is conceived in this context. 
The issue of reality is fundamental - one could claim with 
justification that it is central to philosophy, as opposed to 
philosophy of science. As such, the position regarding reality, within 
the epistemological systems, could be seen from the standpoint of more 
general philosophical systems (I level systems [3]). Thus, these 
epistemological systems are given a certain shade which could enable 
one to make finer distinctions: e.g. distinctions between the various 
philosophers espousing inductivism, with reference to scientific 
reasoning but starting from non identical assumptions at the 
ontological level. The oeneral systems of philosophy in terms of 
ontology which philosophers of science encounter are idealism, 
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scepticism and realism. To these pragmatism may be added. 
Pragmatism is rather different from the other philosophical systems 
in two senses: 
-firstly, 	 it does not principally deal with ontology in General, 
i.e. the ontological status of theoretical and observational entities; 
-secondly, philosophy of science and education were among the 
major concerns of some pragmatists, notably Dewey. 
Furthermore, of particular interest in relation to the ontological 
argument is a form of inductivism, i.e. logical positivism. This is due 
to the clear cut ontological position to which its exponents subscribe 
and their particular influence in the epistemological debates (Vienna 
Circle) [4]. 
Admittedly, from a philosophical standpoint, terms like realism, 
idealism and pragmatism are very general, despite their widespread 
(although not always precise) use in educational debates, as evidenced 
in the paper by Smolicz and Nunan [4]. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, an attempt will be made: 
-To discuss a number of issues relevant to these terms. These 
include: the demarcation between these principal philosophical systems, 
i.e. between realism and idealism including certain of their extreme 
versions, as well as between "intermediate" (II level) systems, i.e. 
pragmatism and logical positivism; 
-To make explicit their connections with the systems dealing 
specifically with the philosophical dimensions of scientific knowledge 
and reasoning. 
-In addition, (with regard to pragmatism and logical positivism), 
the problem of theory and;or method choice and the relevant criteria 
will be discussed. 
In the above, reference to the distinction between the 
epistemological and ontological levels was made. There is, however, a 
further necessary distinction. One could distinguish between ontology, 
in a broad sense, and ontological issues with particular reference to 
scientific knowledge. Thus, for instance, realism in general could be 
distinguished from "scientific realism"; the latter dealing exclusively 
with the status (in ontological terms) of scientific theoretical and 
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observational entities. This is not to say that "scientific realism" 
differs in philosophical orientation from realism in general. 	 It is 
rather because scientific realism is of immediate relevance to 
scientific knowledge, that it is of particular interest in the context 
of this thesis. By adding scientific realism to pragmatism and logical 
positivism, the intermediate level (II level systems Es]) of the 
taxonomy of the philosophical systems under discussion is formed. 
111.6.2 	 Realism and Idealism. 
No matter what direction a philosophical enquiry - and especially one 
concerning the nature of scientific knowledge - may take, and no matter 
what its scope is, the "problem of being" has to be eventually 
confronted, at least implicitly [s]. It should be stressed that in this 
regard, there exists consensus across the spectrum, on the importance 
of underpinning knowledge claims by ontological considerations. This 
consensus stretches from both inductivists to relativists (on the 
epistemological level) and from realists to idealists (on the 
ontological level). Evidence of this can be found in van Freesen [77, 
Popper !Al, Newton-Smith C9l, Hacking C10], Putnam Elll, Ruben [12], 
Althusser [13], Hegel C147. 
Accepting this, a series of relevant questions arises. What does one 
mean by reality? Is there any distinction between reality and existence 
- if so, what is it? Are there certain things which can be called real? 
If this is the case, how can one distinguish between truly real and 
other entities? If so, what are these other entities? Are they images 
or counterfeits of the real? Or, more concretely, what is it to say, 
for instance, that an "electron is real"? Finally, is there any sense 
in addressing such questions? These issues are considered in this 
section.,  
Reality and existence, in accordance with the views expressed in this 
thesis, are two sides of the same coin, sharing certain qualities, but 
being essentially different. 
	 To clarify this, two notions (and the 
implied dichotomies) will be employed: 
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-Reality which is the other side of appearance. That is to say 
whether one accepts the world as it appears or whether one seeks access 
to the way the world essentially is [151. 
-Existence or "being" which is connected with the question of 
whether or not the constituent parts of reality (in other words the 
objects on which knowledge is founded) have an existence, 	 independent 
of thoughts about them (16]. 
Taking these into account and returning to the question about the 
meaning of "X is real" (X being an electron or a table, etc.), it could 
be said that to state such a proposition is in fact to claim that: 
1. 	 certain objects are constituent parts of physical reality, 
and, 
. their existence is independent of the way they are conceived 
(their appearance). 
It should be stressed however that this is not necessarily to say 
that physical reality is something unalterable, immovable, with which 
human beings do not interact. To elaborate briefly, Smart C171 and Marx 
as argued by Ruben C187) 	 appear to show the right direction by 
stressing that our notion of reality is dependant on and formed by our 
abilities to intervene and change the world. 
It thus appears that taking into account this qualification, one can 
contribute towards solving a tantalising dilemma within recent 
educational debates: i.e. the diametrically opposed positions which 
consider knowledge (and therefore school curricula) as either 
something exterior with which pupils should be acquainted (e.g. Phenix 
C15], Hirst I20]), or as an arbitrary social construction, without any 
value outside the social stratum, which is responsible for such an 
organisation of knowledge (Michael Young et al. C217). 
After having attempted to establish a working terminology, the sort 
of answers 	 (to the ontological question) given by the above mentioned 
philosophical systems will now be addressed. 
Deciding what is real is a problem which has a long and acrimonious 
history. This question in its profound simplicity strikes a notoriously 
difficult issue in the history of philosophy. Roughly speaking one can 
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discern two sorts of answers, each of which has an impeccable record 
dating back to the arguments posed by the Presocratics and Plato [22]. 
These two main stances are realism and idealism. Needless to say this 
distinction is a crude one since each of these philosophical systems 
has ramified into various, and sometimes overlapping, subschools. 
Realists (in a broad philosophical sense, to be distinguished from 
"scientific realists"), regardless of the particular school to which 
they belong, argue that "being" (object) is dominant and encompasses 
consciousness within itself, whilst for idealists, consciousness is 
dominant and encompasses "being" within itself [23]. In other words, 
idealism implies that no object exists independent of human thoughts 
about it, while realism maintains that the existence of the constituent 
parts of physical reality is independent of thoughts about them [24]. 
Finally, as stated above, it is necessary to consider whether these 
questions should be addressed at all. In this regard, there is no way 
of producing a conclusive answer. On the one hand, scepticism contests 
the meaningfulness of such a query. According to this philosophical 
system, knowledge of how things really are may be sought, but cannot be 
found. The reason lies in the unreliability of our senses. One has only 
to look (the sceptical argument goes on), at the way experts contradict 
one another. So, there is no way of producing a "conclusive" answer 
[25]. This stance, however, despite its appearance as "neutral", 
inevitably leads to relativism which is more akin to idealism than to 
realism. 
This rough, but fundamental three-fold distinction between idealism, 
realism and scepticism, does little to help one contrast directly and 
in detail the implications of the postulates of each of these systems, 
either in terms of knowledge claims or methodological issues. Being so 
general, it begs the following questions: 
-when one speaks of mind dependence, does one include minds other 
than one's own (01)? 
-does the mind-dependence of objects mean that one can meaningfully 
investigate only the relations of objects and relevant phenomena or is 
one able to query the objects themselves (02)? 
The answers to such questions, which constitute the basic starting 
points of the different philosophical systems will be discussed 
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briefly. However, before entering this discussion, an essential point 
must be restated, namely that the position adopted in this thesis is 
one where the choice (implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious) 
made by any individual (or groups of individuals), in so far as his 
stance on the ontological level 	 is concerned, is ultimately not a 
matter of "proof" in its formal sense. Attempts to defend a certain 
ontological position are in the final analysis a matter of value 
judgement and one can neither invoke common-sense (very often 
misleading and inconclusive, formally), nor pure "reason" (vicious 
circularity, since these issues bear upon the forms of reasoning), in 
defense of one's choice. 	 This leaves then, as a way out, only the 
identification of the consequences of a certain ontological position 
regarding a variety of aspects. These range from the scientific (e.g. 
existence of electrons) to the social, the religious, the ethical 	 or 
the aesthetic, when defending or attacking a certain ontological 
stance. In other words "praxis" is ultimately the criterion of choice 
for a certain ontological stance. Obviously a more elaborate analysis 
of this point remains, despite its crucial character, well beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It should be noted however, that this is far from 
disputing the legitimacy of ontological queries. On the contrary, as 
already stated, the kind of ontological beliefs one holds not only 
underpin one's thought, but render it with regard to other levels (e.g. 
epistemological), both meaningful and coherent. 
Returning to the above mentioned questions, the first (01), entails 
the distinction between idealism in general and its more extreme 
variation, namely solipsism. 
	 Solipsism, roughly speaking, holds that 
one can be sure only of one's own mind Or, as O'Hear [26) put it, 	 "the 
theory that there is nothing in the world other than myself and my 
ideas". This is a position occupying the precarious privilege of being, 
in a way, the extreme consequence and at the same time, the least 
defensible version of idealism (if one wants to take idealism to its 
"logical" conclusions). It is claimed that solipsism is an 
extreme/terminate version of idealism because once one concedes 
(following for instance Locke) that the immediate objects of sensory 
experience are mind dependent (ideas, impressions, etc.), the extent to 
wnich one can forcibly argue for the existence of another conciousness 
(or mind) external to one's own is indeed highly questionable. In this 
sense other minds or consciousness are in fact constituent parts of the 
world external to ourselves and therefore their existence is 
115 
questionable, as are other objects (e.g. chairs). Clearly, this is the 
almost "pathological" consequence of Cartesianism. 
If however, solipsism is "logically" a strong version of idealism, it 
is also on this view thoroughly indefensible. Oliver [277 argues that 
one can attack solipsism from two perspectives: namely the 
psychological and philosophical. 
Psychologically, solipsism entails and is consequently characterised 
by withdrawal - principally withdrawal into a private world. How then 
does one argue for solipsism? What becomes of reason in the world of 
the solipsist? For, such a stance not only questions the legitimacy of 
thinking about other's minds (psychology for instance is impossible 
within this framework, as Ogborn [28] remarks), but even prohibits any 
intelligible communication. 
Philosophically speaking, solipsism is in a way paradoxical: adopting 
the privacy postulate and taking for granted the respect for "reason" 
(otherwise "thinking" is impossible), is probably an attempt to deal 
effectively with the fact of error by bypassing it. This attempt 
however, is of considerable futility. Firstly, to bypass something is 
not to tackle it. Secondly and more fundamentally, O'Hear [29] argues 
that "coping with my own experiences, [means that] my solipsism will 
have to rely on a set of terms and beliefs which entail the falsity of 
solipsism". 
The second question (02) refers to the distinction between 
philosophical idealism and phenomenalism. Phenomenalism differs from 
the former because it deals more explicitly with issues concerning thE 
relation of scientific reasoning and ontology. As Harre C307 put it, 
phenomenalism, in its extreme form, holds that only propositions about 
observed phenomena have the status of genuine knowledge. Therefore, on 
the basis of this theory science should concern itself only with the 
identification, classification and codification of phenomena. The term 
"phenomena" indicates here what can be analysed from what is perceived. 
The association here with empiricism is obvious. 
To illustrate their differences as well as similarities, it is 
possible to draw on the one hand on Hegelianism, and on the other on 
tne philosophy of Berkeley and Mach (phenomenalism). For Hegel [317, an 
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idealist himself, "...self-conciousness is ... certain its self is 
reality, 
	 certain that all concrete actuality is nothing else but it". 
Berkeley. a phenoT.enalist [7.2]. wrote "It is plain philosophers amuse 
themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient cause 
distinct from a mind or spirit" and "...by a diligent observation of 
the phenomena, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from 
them deduce the other phenomena, 
	
I do not say demonstrate" [33]. 
Finally, Mach declared that "...in the investigation of nature, we have 
to deal only with knowledge of the connection of appearances with one 
another" 1343. 
It seeTis then that a final remark is in order: what has been 
attempted is to demarcate roughly between realism on the one hand, and 
scepticism and idealism - including certain philosophical systems 
considered akin to the latter - on the other, so as to put in 
perspective the subsequent considerations regarding "scientific" 
realism. For this reason the discussion has been confined within 
certain limits and other philosophical systems, referring to 
distinctions such as transcendental vs. materialistic realism and its 
versions [35] (obviously of great importance to ontology), have not 
been included. 
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111.6.3 	 Ontology in the context of scientific knowledge. 
Of particular init in the context of this thesis is scientific 
realism, or more precisely realism with regard to the ontological 
issues in relation to scientific knowledge. As Hacking 17.,76) puts it 
"scientific realism says that the entities, states and processes 
described by correct scientific theories really do exist". In other 
words, protons or electrons are as real as tables or chairs (assuming 
of course that one does accept the ex istence of such things as tables 
or chairs). 
In a more abstract vein. Harre tries to encapsulate scientific 
realism schematically by way of the following three principles: 
"1. Some theoretical terms can be used to make reference (verbal) 
to hypothetical entities. 
2. Some hypothetical entities are candidates for existence ii.e. 
some could be real things, qualities, and processes in the world). 
Some candidates for existence, for reality, are demonstrable, 
i.e. can be indicated by some sort of gesture of pointing in the 
appropriate conditions" [37). 
The above example highlights two important points. Firstly, the 
belief that idealism is indefensible in philosophy of science even if 
it cannot be proved "rationally" wrong. Secondly, it snows that while 
positions denying the existence of directly observable things have been 
abandoned, this is far from true in the case of non-observable 
entities. 	 The question concerning the distinction between theory and 
observation and consequently of entities whose existence is entailed by 
either of them is once again at stake. 
Because the ontological beliefs referring to the various entities are 
interwoven with the way the difference between theory and 
cbservation/exper iments 
	 is 	 understood, 
	 the latter is regarded in the 
present analysis as the bridge which facilitates the move from the 
ontological to the more "technical" epistemological level. 
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From what has been said about scientific realism, it is obvious that 
in its context the distinction between theory and observation is 
recognised in a technical and very limited sense (terms like concrete 
and abstract are much more appropriate) on the one hand, but on the 
other hand realists hold that at the ontological level this distinction 
cannot be drawn. Thus, the assertion that observations are 
theory-loaded takes on a completely different meaning for the realist 
than, for example, the idealist. One can cast further light on this by 
taking into account that for the former, entities do exist 
independently of human thoughts and that if one wishes to demarcate 
between theory and observation this is possible in a very technical 
sense, 	 while for an idealist neither of the entities exists outside 
human minds. 
A consequence of the realist position is that it implies a notion of 
knowledge in such a way that true theories can be considered to 
describe correctly some aspect of the real world 	 (correspondence or 
reflection theory of knowledge) [see note (a) on 111.6]. 
What characterises and diversifies the various sub-schools within 
the camp of scientific realism is the particular version of the 
correspondence theory employed. Moreover it should be noted that this 
notion of correspondence theory is employed by philosophers belonging 
to logical positivism which is an "anti-realist" system [41]. 
The correspondence theory of knowledge is a consequence of realism 
because realists set out to defend the idea that truth depends on the 
way things are in the world (existence) and not on the way one looks at 
things or conceptualises reality (the appearance - idealistic 
position), or on what satisfies one in some way or another (the 
usefulness - pragmatism) [42]. 
A final remark about the correspondence theory of knowledge (which 
from a "scholastic" standpoint is distinct from the correspondence 
theory of truth, but in the view taken here does not amount to any 
substantial difference) refers to the notion of approximation as 
opposed to exact depiction. Such a move enables one to overcome some 
objections to the application of the correspondence theory to science. 
For instance, one could say that Newton's theory is a better 
approximation than Galileo s even though botn are less accurate than 
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the mechanics of the theory of relativity. In this respect, the work of 
Tarski [43], who defines truth recursively through the distinction 
between "object" language and "meta-language", is quite crucial. This 
is not to say however, that a robust version of this theory, which 
takes the ideal end-point of some branch of science as the "absolute 
truth", is defensible. As Chalmers [44] has remarked "science is a 
social product, and if it were ever to reach its end-point, so 
conceived would abruptly change from being a human, social product to 
being something that in one strong sense is not a human product at 
ail". Further elaboration of this point lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis, although it should be said that the position adopted here is 
one wherein the process of science approximates reality closer and 
closer, but never quite reaches an end-point. 
Hpart from idealism, two other responses have been developed with 
regard to scientific realism: pragmatism and positivism (and especially 
its more recent version, logical positivism) [45]. 
Pragmatism has no quarrel with common sense notions. For instance, 
chairs and electrons are both real in so far as one never comes to 
doubt their value. For Peirce who is the father of the term pragmatism 
"...the real then, is that which, sooner or later, information and 
reasoning should finally result in and which is therefore independent 
of the vagaries of me and you" [46]. This sounds very close to the 
position of realism. How therefore do they differ? In the 
interpretation adopted here, the difference between pragmatism (or at 
least, this branch of pragmatism, as distinct from instrumentalism) and 
realism lies in how the criteria of truth are defined within them [47]. 
For realists, truth to some degree corresponds with physical reality. 
Crudely speaking reality itself is the definition of truth, practice 
being the criterion for truth. On the other hand, pragmatists are in 
this respect, potentially the heirs of the Kantian legacy. They take 
for granted that process and contingent progress are the essential 
characteristics of the nature of human knowledge. Of particular 
interest is Hacking's [43] remark that Peirce tried to replace truth by 
method, being in this respect the precursor of Popper. Thus, for him, 
method is a substitute for the idea that truth corresponds to a mind 
independent reality. Truth then, is whatever the community of 
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researchers, who pursue a certain end and in a certain way, is 
delivering in the end. Thus, for pragmatists of this type (Peirce, 
Putnam [49]) practice (and usefulness) is in the final analysis the 
definition of truth. 
The other influential type of pragmatism which became known as 
instrumentalism, is far more explicit. Dewey had no interest (in the 
long run) in how canons of rationality are developed - rationality is 
extrinsic: 	 it is whatever scientists agree on [50] (the influence of 
instrumentalism on Kuhn is quite obvious, in this respect). 
Furthermore, 	 theories have no truth in themselves - they should rather 
be understood as instruments, as opposed to literary assertions that 
intervene when scientists try to follow their queries. Thus, 
instrumentalism involves a sharp distinction between theory and 
observation. In this respect, this branch of pragmatism is much further 
from realism than its first version. Indeed, one could say that the 
latter is much closer to the second response to realism, i.e. 
positivism. 
Positivists set out to show that all speculations about existence are 
cognitively meaningless C51] - some of Wittgenstein's remarks in the 
"Tractatus" [527 would appear to support this position. For instance, 
sentences containing terms like being, substance, noumena are not 
analysable into sentences about anything a human being could possibly 
experience. 	 In principle, their target is any metaphysical speculation 
and it is interesting to note that they use the term "metaphysics" to 
denote any ontological query, whilst in reality they end up with 
another ontological speculation, not very different from the common 
sense of an empiricist. For them, there are no electrons, nor any other 
unobservable entities or, as Hacking puts it in a less dogmatic mood 
they say that we have no good reason to suppose that such a thing as an 
electron exists; nor have we any expectation of showing that it does 
exist" 	 [53]. Unless we are able to observe something, this cannot be 
known to be real. This, it would appear to be a good reason for 
establishing a connection between them and the sceptic tradition, which 
Hume best represents. 
In trying to demarcate between positivists and pragmatists, one 
should point out that pragmatism shares the Kantian-Hegelian doctrine, 
which puts all its faith into the process of knowledge [547. For 
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instrumentalists, terms that seemingly denote invisible entities do not 
function as referential terms [55]. Positivists, on the other hand, 
hold that theoretical expressions should be believed but not be taken 
literally [56]. 
	
This should be seen in conjunction with one of the 
basic tenets of logical positivism, namely the strong assertion that 
the distinction between tneory (theoretical entities) and observation 
(observational entities) is quite fundamental 
	
[57]. This determines 
their position in so far as the ontological status of entities 
postulated by theoretical statements is concerned. Since theoretical 
statements should not be taken literally, obviously entities (the 
existence of which is postulated by these statements), are not real. 
Of considerable interest in the context of this thesis, is the issue 
of what, within logical positivism and pragmatism (instrumentalism 
included) count as adequate criteria for theory choice, given the 
position which this issue occupies regarding the four previously 
discussed epistemological systems. 
For pragmatists - either its mainstream version (e.g. Peirce), or the 
instrumentalist version (e.g. Dewey) - "descriptions of the observable 
world will be true or false according to whether or not they correctly 
describe it. However, the theoretical concepts and constructs, that are 
designed to give us instrumental control of the observable world, will 
not be judged in terms of truth or falsity but rather in terms of their 
usefulness as instruments" [58]. What follows according to pragmatists 
is that "usefulness" is the criterion for theory choice. As Laudan [59] 
argues, theory T1 is to be preferred to theory T2 when T1 solves more 
problems than T2. We ought not to worry whether TI is closer to the 
truth than T2. A position like this however, raises some interesting 
sociological questions of the type "useful for whom?", particularly if 
one adopts a sociological theory belonging to the "conflict" family. 
For the exponents of logical positivism, the issue of theory choice 
is a matter of conforming to methodological principles. It could be 
added that for the mainstream of this system, the cornerstones of these 
principles are inductive reasoning and verification [60] 
	 (as opposed 
for instance, to deductive reasoning and falsification, which roughly 
epitomise the hypothetico-deductive position [61]). 
In the following table, an attempt is made to summarise the 
interpretation of the main philosophical systems at both the 
ontological and the epistemological level. 
Realism 	 Idealise 	 Scepticism 
Physical 	 Physical 	 Meaningless 
I Level 	 Ontological 	 Reality 	 Reality 	 Question 
Systems 	 Question 	 'as it is'; 	 as it appears'; 
independent of 	 dependent on 
human thoughts 	 human thoughts 
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theoretical 
II 	 entities 
Level 
Systeas 	 observational 
entities 
Sc. Realism 
Real 
Real 
Log. Positivism 	 Pragmatism 
No real 
	
Instrumental 
existence 
Real 	 Real 
Inductivism 	 Hyp.- Deductivism 	 Contextualism 	 Relativism 
theory-observation 	 significant 	 exists 	 no 	 no 
distinction 	 (observation 	 (theory 	 distinction 	 distinction 
III 	 privileged) 	 privileged) 
Level 
Systems 	 Status of 	 special 	 special 	 special 	 no 
scientific 	 difference 
Knowledge 	 no difference 
(depending on 
version of contextualism) 
TABLE T3.1: Philosophical-epistemological systems. 
111.6.4 	 Some tentantive connections: Linking the 
epistemological and ontological levels. 
In addition to the representation of various positions their 
connections need to be made explicit. The focus will be on the 
potential contradictions that arise when two incompatible positions are 
held; these being on the ontological and epistemological levels, 
respectively. 
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What the analysis thus far has indicated (as summarised in table 
T3.1) is that the various philosophical systems belonging to both the 
ontological and the epistemological levels could be juxtaposed by using 
the axes defined by the following distinctions: 
1. theory-observation distinction; 
2. status of scientific knowledge for the epistemological level); 
3. the distinction between appearance and reality (first level 
ontological systems); 
4. the ontological status of entities entailed respectively by 
theoretical and observational statements (second level ontological 
systems). 
As table T3.1 indicates inductivism postulates a very strong 
distinction between theory and observation; observation being 
privileged vis-a-vis theory in epistemological and semantic terms which 
ultimately are based on a different ontological status. This view seems 
to be incompatible with the realist view which does not see any 
significant difference between theory and observation in ontological 
terms, while recognising tnat observation is a good starting point. On 
the other hand, it is compatible with the two other first level 
ontological systems, namely idealism and scepticism. The reason for 
arguing in this way is that inductivism, based on the strong 
distinction between theory and observation, leads through its emphasis 
on observation to a reinforcement of the view that science should 
restrict itself to appearance (idealism). Alternatively, by recognising 
the imperfect nature of the inductive schema of reasoning (when 
defending it by introducing probability) it may lead to the admission 
that knowledge of the world as it is" is impossible and therefore that 
ontological claims make no sense 	 (scepticism). 
Regarding the second-level ontological systems, inductivism seems to 
be incompatible with scientific realism, which attributes the same 
ontological status to both theoretical and observational entities and 
to pragmatism (or instrumentalism), which plays down this distinction. 
Logical positivism however, is in accordance with inductivism - (in 
fact it is inductivism's extreme version if one follows the sort of 
logic implied by this position). 
The 	 second 	 of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 systems, 
	 namely 
hypothetico-deductivism, seems to be compatible with both realism and 
124 
idealism but not with scepticism. The exemplification of this argument 
can be found in the systems proposed by Popper and Lakatos 
respectively. The former subscribes to realism while the latter leans 
towards idealism (Hegelian version). It should be noted that due to the 
fact that objectivity is an essential characteristic of the scientific 
enterprise, 	 hypothetico-deductivism 	 becomes 	 incompatible 
	 with 
scepticism. In so far as the second-level ontological systems are 
concerned, the first version of hypothetico-deductivism (Popperian) 
	 is 
compatible with scientific realism, while it differs from pragmatism 
regarding the ontological premises and from logical positivism 
regarding both the ontological premises and technical aspects (i.e. 
falsification versus verification; deductive versus inductive schema of 
reasoning). Its second version (Lakatosian) is more akin to pragmatism 
(but not identical), given the faith both systems put in the process of 
knowledge (Hegelian heritage). 
The third of the above mentioned epistemological systems, namely, 
contextuzlism, is more difficult to locate in terms of the above grid 
of distinctions. In both its versions (Kuhn being an "embryonic 
rationalist" or a "temperate non-rationalist"), a connection could be 
established with pragmatism, particularly with regard to the aspect of 
the conception of truth and theory choice within these systems. 
Furthermore, this contention appears to gain force when seen in the 
context of the triangular framework of the second-level ontological 
systems. 	 In other words, when contrasting contextualism with either 
scientific realism or logical positivism, its connections with 
pragmatism become clearer. On the primary ontological level however, it 
could be said that contextualism and particularly its second version is 
geared towards scepticism rather than towards realism or idealism. A 
note of caution is in order here: as argued in an earlier chapter, 
contextualism is open to a rather wide range of interpretations. Thus, 
the above mentioned incompatibilities should be seen as more tenuous in 
this case than in the case of the other epistemological systems. 
Finally, the essence of relativism should be seen to lie in its 
tenets concerning the status of scientific knowledge as opposed to 
within the theory-observation distinction. For this reason as in the 
case of contetualism, contingent connections with philosophical 
systems at levels other than the epistemological are not as direct. 
Given, however, the difficulty in establishing criteria for a 
A 	 Relativisa 
s4 
Inductivisa 	 Hypath.- Deduct. 
Scepticiss REalisa 
	 Idealism 
Log. Positiv. 
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comparative evaluation of the different kings of knowledge within 
relativism, one inevitably drifts towards the same sort of conclusions 
as with scepticism. Taking this into account a connection between these 
two systems could be established. Again, judging from the standpoint of 
the potential consequences of relativism and realism (including 
scientific realism) one could discern the resulting tensions. Needless 
to say, relativism is incompatible with logical positivism. In so far 
as the relationship between pragmatism and relativism is concerned, 
there seems to exist a slight tension, given the optimistic outlook 
inherent in pragmatism regarding scientific knowledge, as opposed to 
the pessimistic complexities found within relativism. 
The diagram below attempts to portray the above representation of the 
connections between the various philosophical systems. 
Cantextualism 
DIAGRAM 	 D3.2: A tentative linkage between systems at the philosopnical and episteloioQical Ie els. 
 
111.6.5 	 Re-fleeting an image. 
As in the previous cases, the attempt here is not to select a fully 
comprehensive set of statements which depi:ts each of the above 
discussed systems; it is rather an attempt to present certain 
statements so as to permit a rough distinction between what is termed 
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the "first" and "second" level philosophical systems. This distinction 
is based exclusivel'v on the most basic tenets of each system. 
These statements are as follow: 
I. First level systems. 
A. For realism. 
The world of nature exists independently of human thoughts. 
D. For idealism. 
No objects exist independently of thought about them. 
C. For scepticism. 
There is no sense in asking whether observable things (like mountains) 
or unobservable entities (like energy) exist or not. 
II. Second level systems. 
A. For scientific realism. 
1. The world of nature exists independently of human thoughts. 
Genes, photons or chemical bonds exist, as do rabbits, radios or 
chairs. 
D. For pragmatism. 
1. Only observable things e.g. rabbits, radios or chairs, exist. 
2. In general the better of two competing theories is the one which 
gives the more useful results. 
C. For logical positivism. 
1. Only observable things e.g. rabbits, radios or chairs, exist. 
2. In general the better of two competing theories is the one which is 
nearer to the "truth". 
3. To be sure of approaching nearer to the "truth", one should follow 
the appropriate scientific method. 
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IV. 	 SYSTEMIC NETWORK ANALYSIS. 
This chapter deals briefly with the technique of systemic network 
analysis (used as a basis for the development of the research 
instrument). 	 In addition the particular networks employed here are 
presented. 
More specifically, the points raised are as follows: 
1. The origin and the historical background of the technique. 
2. An exposition of the technique including the basic ideas and 
notation. 
3. The systemic network developed for the purposes of this thesis, 
followed by an attempt to link it with the analysis of the relevant 
issues made in chs. II and III. 
IV.1 	 The origin and historical background. 
Networks were originally developed by systemic linguists (e.g. 
Halliday C13) to formalise their functional approach to grammar. They 
arose as a means for expressing the idea, put forward by Saussure [23 
and later by Firth C3], that meaning in language can be described in 
terms of choice. 	 That is, a phrase has a particular meaning, not so 
such because of some intrinsic attributes of the words involved, but 
because of its opposition to the possible, but nevertheless, not chosen 
phraseology. 
The use of the technique of systemic network analysis in the context 
of educational research was conceived by Bliss and Ogborn [4] as a 
means leading to the formation of a scheme of descriptive categories 
for handling qualitative data. Bernstein C53 and Ogbo.c- n C63 proposed 
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the use of this technique for the description and coding of data of 
that kind. Furthermore, as evidenced by Bliss, Monk and Ogborn [7] this 
technique has been used by a number of researchers to provide the basis 
for a subsequent anal,;sis of qualitative data. 
TV.2 	 An exposition of systemic network analysis technique. 
Systemic network analysis can usefully be regarded as an extension of 
categorising. Thus, a network can be seen as a map of the set of 
categories one has chosen to use, which shows how they relate to one 
another [8]. 
What is said essentially means, that "to categorise is to draw 
distinctions and to name them recognising that distinctions may need to 
be drawn along several independent dimensions and that any distinction 
may need to be further divided into subsidiary divisions" [9]. Networks 
offer a uniform notation to express such schemes at any required level 
of complexity and a terminology intended to clarify and assist 
communication of the issues involved. 
The purely notational aspects of networks are simple. Networks can be 
constructed using lust a few elementary notations: two indicating kinds 
of choice or selection (bar, bracket), one indicating constraints or 
conditions on choice (inverse bracket), and one indicating the 
possibility of repeated choice (symbol of recursion) C10]. 
Bar is taken to indicate mutually exclusive categories at one level; 
bracket co-occuring categories (that is simultaneous categorisations on 
two or more aspects); inverse bracket a conditional link (which is used 
to draw together certain meaningful combinations of distinctions for 
developing the network further in selected areas); 	 recursion symbol 
which acts as an optional choice to repeat the function indicated by a 
bar or bracket. 
To exemplify this notation a description of certain aspects of the 
structure of Greek education at the secondary level follows: 
`Gymnasia 
.3trus tur°-- 
;General (Academic) 
Lycea 	 ;Technical-Vocational 
)Multilateral 
State 
Sector-- 
>Private 
In addition to the above notation there are two other formal 
components which could be seen as a driving force in network 
construction: delicacy and rank. 
Categories (and subcategories) can have their own subcategories. 
Correspondingly, terms on a bar can lead to further systems so 
generating a tree—like structure as illustrated in the above network. 
Thus, in a finished network as one passes down any branch of the tree, 
it is usual to find that the right hand distinctions become finer than 
the left hand ones. The network is more "delicate" as it develops from 
left to right [111. 
In this contet, rank is used as a technical term for changing the 
le•;el of discussion. For instance, consider the above example of a 
network concerning the organisational structure of Greek secondary 
schools. Referring to this e ample, will one choose to construct a 
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network to make distinctions such as "hierarchical", which d stinguish 
different kinds of total structure, or will one choose to describe 
smaller elements of that structure such as "department' together 
perhaps with their relationship to one another"' In the first case, the 
network categories make distinctions about the whole; in the second 
such differences would emerge as different patterns in describing the 
arrangements of the parts [12]. The second case involves change of 
rank. 
It should be stressed however, that the application of this technique 
in educational research concerns mainly qualitative data analysis. 
	 In 
the context of this thesis, the sequence is in a way reversed. Systemic 
network analysis is used in an a-priori fashion that is, in the course 
of conceptual organisation aiming at the construction of the 
instrument. An attempt to justify this choice is made in the following 
chapter V. 
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IV.3 	 The systemic network used in the construction 
of the research instrument. 
In this section, the network, which was constructed to lay the ground 
for the development of the research instrument, is presented. The 
various parts of the network are based on the analysis of the relevant 
issues, 	 specifically 
	 chapter 	 III 	 for 	 the 	 (philosophical 
-epistemological component) and chapter II (for the curricular and 
pedagogical components). 
Besides the presentation of the network, an attempt is made to 
provide links between the development of the network and the background 
analysis. Thus, following the presentation of each part of the network 
a table is given in which bath the relevant distinctions as well as the 
sections of the thesis where these distinctions are discussed, are 
shown. 
A. Philosophical—epistemological component. 
The areas ("themes") around which the analysis of the 
philosophical-epistemological component is conducted are five, as 
indicated in ch. III, namely scientific methodology, criteria of 
demarcation, patterns of scientific change, the status of scientific 
knowledge and finally the issue of reality. 
1. Scientific Methodology. 
Anductivism I. Observation preceeds Theory. 
2. Verification. 
)0ne scientific aethod 
Mvp.-Deductivism 1. Theory preceeds Observation. 
2. Falsification. 
Scientific methodology-- 
---)Version B rintrinsic . criteria). 
---)Contextualism-- 
---)Version A la matter of consensus). 
----;Many scientific methods-- 
---)Relativism. 
135 
This part of the network primarily distinguishes methodological views 
by their attachment to a single "correct" scientific methodology, or to 
a position allowing variety in method to be proper. The first covers 
both 	 inductivism 	 and 	 hypothetico-deductivism; 	 the 	 second 
versions 
	 of 	 contextualism, 	 as 	 well 	 as 	 relativism. 
Relevant distinction/topic. 
	 Discussed 	 in section. 	 Systems. 
includes 	 two 
Argued outcome. 
1.  Methodological 	 unity-diversity. 111.2.1 Inductivism. Methodological 	 unity. 
111.3.1 	 and 	 111.3.3 Hyp.-Deductivism. Methodological 	 unity. 
:11.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism B. Methodological 	 diversity. 
111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism A. Methodological 	 diversity. 
111.5.1 Relativism Methodological 	 diversity. 
2.  Inductive-Deductive schema. 111.2.1 Inductivism. Inductive reasoning. 
Verification. 
111.3.1 	 and 	 :11.3.3 Hyp.-Deductivism. Deductive reasoning. 
Falsification. 
3.  Acceptance-rejection of rational rules 111.4.1 	 and 
	 111.4.3 Contextualism B. Acceptance. 
for 	 the choice of 	 method. 111.4.1 
	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism A. Acceptance. 
111.5.1 Relativism. Rejection. 
4.  Basis for such criteria. 111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism B. Intrinsic criteria. 
111.4.1 	 and 
	 111.4.3 Contextualism A. Consensus of sc. 	 community. 
TABLE 
	 T4.1: References for the theme of 'scientific methodology'. 
2. Criteria of demarcation. 
	  'Rational criteria 
Criteria of demarcation-- 
---)'Internal rules (Contextualism A). 
Rational criteria 
cannot be found 
---)An issue of values (Relativism). 
Here, the main distinction is between two fundamentally different 
views of the possibility of demarcating science from non-science 
(likewise, demarcating between competing scientific theories). The 
first, which takes such a demarcation to be possible on rational 
grounds, nevertheless includes very different alternative ways of doing 
so - that science is "true", or "useful", or a matter of informed 
agreement. On the second branch, which rejects a "rational" basis, the 
ramification distinguishes those who understand such an exercise on the 
basis of "internal" criteria from relativists (value judgement). 
'Truth' (Inductivism, Hyp.-Deductivism). 
)'Usefulness' (Pragmatism). 
)'Consensus' (Contextualism B). 
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Relevant 	 distinction/topic. Discussed in section. Systems. Argued outcome. 
1.  Acceptance-rejection of 	 'rational' 111.2.1 	 and 	 111.2.4 lnductivism. Acceptance. 
criteria for cnoice of 	 at. 	 tneories. 111.3.1 	 and 	 111.3.3 Hvo.-Deductivism. Accebtance. 
111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism B. Acceptance. 
111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism A. Rejection. 
111.5.1 Relativism. Rejection. 
2.  Basis of 	 criteria for at. 111.2.1 	 and 	 111.2.4 Inductivism Proper method-"truth". 
theory choice-if 	 accepted. II1.3.1 	 and 	 111.3.3 Hyp.-Deductivism. Proper method-"truth'. 
III. e.3 Praceati se. Usefulness" 
111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism B. Consensus of 	 sc. 	 community. 
Basis 	 for 	 choice-if 	 "rational' 111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualisa A. 'Internal" 	 rules. 
criteria are rejected. 111.5.1 Relativism. Value judgement. 
TABLE 	 T4.2: References for the theme of "criteria of demarcation". 
Pattern(s) of scientific change. 
:Accumulation of facts. (Inductivism). 
:Growth (coepatible). 
>Succession of theories. (Hyp.-Deductivism). 
?Development (Contextualisa B). ----)Periods of compatibility and 
periods of incompatibility. 
--->Development (Contextualism A). 
---->Change (incoepatible) 
---No pattern (Relativism). 
With regard to the views concerning the pattern(s) of scientific 
change, one is faced with a gradual shift instead of radically 
different positions as in the case of the previous two themes. This is 
not to say however, 	 that the extreme points, i.e. growth of science 
viewed as an accumulation of observations (facts) and considering 
changes in science as incompatible and having no discernible pattern, 
are not fundamentally different. Nor is it to say that the difference 
between seeing scientific growth from an inductivist perspective and 
interpreting 
significance. 
this process as a succession of theories lacks 
Relevant distinction/topic. Discussed in section. 	 Systems. 	 Argued outcome. 
       
1. Pattern of scientific chanae 	 111.2.1 and 111.2.4 	 Ihductivisa. 	 Compatible. 
(compatible-incompatible). - 	 II1.3.1 and 111.3.3 	 Hvp.-Deductivism 	 Compatible. 
111.4.1 and 111.4.3 	 Contextualism B. 
	
r 
111.4.1 and 111.4.3 	 Contextualisa A. 
	 Incoeaatible. 
111.5.1 	 Relativism. 	 Incompatible. 
*The position on this issue of the second version of Contextualisa entails a succession of periods of compatibility 
and incompatibility. On the whole rtgWeVEr, science is thouant to grOW. 
Pattern of sc. change---- 
2. Mechanism. of growth 
-if compatible. 
3. Characteristic of EC. change 
it IELL.Lpwtible. 
111.2.1 and 111.2.4 
III.3.1 and 111.3.3 
111.4.1 and 111.4.3 
111.5.1 
Inductivise. 
Hyp.-Deductivisa. 
Contextualism A. 
Relativism. 
Accumulation of facts. 
Succession of theories. 
Sc. development. 
No definite pattern. 
TABLE 	 T4.3: References for the theme of "pattern(s) of scientific change". 
4. Status of sc. knowledge. 
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'Objective 
;account of nature'. 
:'Usefulness' (Praaeatise). ;Special  status 
)'Systematic pattern of thought'. 
Status of sc. knowledge-- 
;Not unique Ian ideology among others - Relativism). 
The main distinction as far as the status of scientific knowledge is 
concerned, is between those systems which recognise scientific 
knowledge as in some way privileged and those which do not attach any 
particular value to science. This analysis has similarities with that 
in terms of criteria of demarcation. What differentiates these 
conceptual maps is that they operate on distinct levels: i.e. arguments 
belonging to systems of thought of the latter theme constitute the 
basis for the stances expressed in the former theme (status of 
scientific knowledge). As a consequence of this, the justifications 
given 	 by 	 non-relativist 
	 systems 	 cover 	 essentially 	 the 	 same 	 ground 	 as 	 in 
the 	 case 	 of 	 the 	 basis 
	 for 	 criteria 	 for 	 demarcation. 
Relevant distinctionitopic. 	 Discussed 	 in 	 section. 	 Systems. 	 Argued outcome. 
1.  Status of 	 sc. 	 knowledge. 111.2.4 Indictivism. Special. 
III.3.1 	 and 	 111.3.3 Hyp.-Deductivisa. SOecial. 
111.6.3 Pragmatism. Special. 
111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 lAntextualise B. Special. 
111.4.1 
	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualism A. Not unique. 
111.5.1 Relativism. Not unique. 
2.  Justification-if 
	 special. 111.2.4 Indictivism. 'Objective account 
111.3.3 Hyp.-Deductivism. of 	 nature". 
111.6.3 Pragmatism. `usefulness'. 
111.4.1 	 and 	 111.4.3 Contextualisa B. Systeeatic pattern 
of thought. 
TABLE 	 T4.4: References for the theme of "status of sc. knowledge". 
5. Ontological question. 
:Realism. 
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?Idealism. 
(General philosophical systems) 
-Level I 
Scepticism. 
;Scientific Realism. 
	 :Pragmatism. 
-Level II 	  
(philosconical systems haying 
a special relevance to 
episteiolopy) 
`Instrumentalism. 
>Logical Positivism. 
The distinction between level I and II philosophical systems (defined 
in section III.1) should be recalled at this point. In level I (general 
philosophical 	 systems) 	 the 	 network 	 distinguishes 	 three 	 main 
philosophical systems. At level II (general philosophical systems 
especially relevant to epistemology) four systems are discerned 
(pragmatism and instrumentalism taken to be close to one another). A 
fuller account is given in section 111.6.3, summarised by table T3.1. 
As was argued in section 111.6.4 (see also diagram D3.2) the 
articulation between these two levels is not necessarily simple. Thus, 
although realism (level 	 I) fits with scientific realism (level II), 
pragmatism (and instrumentalism) can be better understood in terms of 
scepticism (level I), while logical positivism appears to be consistent 
with either idealism or scepticism (level I). 
B. Curricular component_ 
As one could expect, debates in the area of curricular design and 
development are more pragmatic (pragmatic in a common as opposed to a 
philosophical sense) in character. Accordingly, there is a tendency, 
regarding the relevant parts of the network to reflect this pragmatic 
character. The subject matter of the curricular component includes two 
strongly connected themes: 
- the question of teaching science as separate subjects (e.g. 
Physics, Chemistry, Biology) or as an integrated subject; 
- the distinction between content and process of science in an 
educational context as well as the meaning attached to these terms. 
1. Integrated science. 
	  
Differences in Content. 	
- 	
;Differences in Process. 
:Separate subjects 
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----;Practical reasons. 
	 >Maintenance of Academic Standards. 
	 >Unity of Concepts. 
	
- >Unity of Methods. 
Separate subj.lintegr. sci.---- 
:Integrated Science 
---,Practical reasons. 
./Social Relevance. 
This theme has been de eloped in section II.1 Clearly, the main 
distinction is between views which advocate teaching of science (in 
secondary schools) 
	
in the traditional fashion of three iifferent 
subjects and those which consider proper the teaching of a unified 
subject. The reasons given to justify such a choice belong to three 
different levels: epistemic considerations (differences/unity in terms 
of concepts and methodology), practicalities and finally, the ad roc 
1 4 0 
(and rather odd conceptually) polarisation between maintenance of 
academic standards vs. social relevance. 
2. Meaning of content and process in science teaching. 
--Relation of Content-Process in Sc. Educ.---- 
>Related. 
	 >Theories-Laws. 
->Ohs.-Exp. Data. 
	
>Sc. Techniques. 
Meaning of content. 	  
\---!lenino of Content-Process. 
>Sc. Methods. 
>Data Handling. 
>Experiaentation. 
Meaning of process. 	  
The essence of the discussion (after section II.1) regarding content 
and process could be encapsulated in two questions: 
-are these two notions conceptually related or distinct? 
-to what is one referring when using these terms? 
As far as the second question is concerned, the alternatives for 
content are scientific theories and laws, observational and 
experimental data and finally scientific techniques (or any combination 
of them) while for the meaning of process any arrangement of scientific 
methods, handling of data or experimentation techniques is proposed. 
C. Pedagogical component. 
What is termed the pedagogical component contains assumptions atout 
learning, about instruction and about certain aspects of classroom 
activities. It should be noted that while the debates regarding each of 
the two previous components has a definite character (philosophical and 
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pragmatic respectively), in this case the character of the discussion 
changes from assumptions on learning (which is rather highly structured 
around theoretically coherent systems) to how certain classroom 
activities are viewed (by definition non-theoretical in orientation). 
1. Assumptions about Learning. 
AIMS. PREREQUISITE. 	 LEARNING OUTCOME. 
Rational 
understanding 
of tne subject. 
Level of 
abstract thinking.  
Acquisition of 
concepts 
of the subject. 
Assumptions on 
learning 
Knowledoe and 
skills 
of the subject. 
Immediate prior 
knowledge 
of tne subject. 
What pupils can 
be seen to do. 
Individual view 
of the subject. Pupils' perception of their needs. Pupils' own self assessment. 
A linear sequence of positions, after the initial branching, is what 
distinguishes this part of the network from others. The constituent 
parts of this sequence are the aims learning activities should have, 
what their crucial prerequisites are, and finally the basis for 
assessing their outcome. The systems considered during the discussion 
about learning assumptions are Cognitivism (emphasis on rational 
understanding, abstract thinking, acquisition of proper concepts), 
Eehayiourism (knowledge and skills, prior knowledge, assessment on 
"what they can do" basis) and Constructivism (individuality, 
self-assessment), as discussed in section 11.2.1 Thus, a further 
element which separates the statements referring to learning from the 
other statements in this component is that they deal with these issues 
on the normative level. 
Assumptions 	 on 	 Instruction. 
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)Objectives 	 oriented. 
Orientation of 	 Instruction-- 
aodei. 
----'Teachers oriented. 
:Balanced 	 orientation. 
:Active participation. 
Crucial 	 element for motivation.-- ---->Eaotional 	 involveaent. 
'Adequate 	 feedback. 
>Integral/essential 	 part 	 of 	 teaching. 
Role of 	 reinforcement.--- ----'Occasional 	 use in teaching. 
'Irrelevant 	 to 	 teaching. 
>In 	 saall 	 steps. 
Presentation of 	 knowledge.-- 
;The whole idea. 
The four networks, 	 which 	 attempt 	 to 	 present 	 systematically the 
relevant arguments, are simple and straightforward. This is clearly a 
reflection of the kind of corresponding analysis (section 11.2.2), 
which draws upon certain theories of instruction. For, theories of 
instruction dealing with, and guided by more practical 	 than for 
instance theories of learning) aspects of education, require neither 
the same decree of theorising nor the same striving for explanatory 
power. 
Assumptions about certain aspects of classroorR activities. 
	  Clear explanations. 
	
investigations. 	
- )Guided discovery. 
	
Active discussions. 
;knowledge of subject. 
----:Understanding of pupils' thinking. 
Traits of a successful teacher.--- 
Effective teaching techniques. 
>Respect for pupils' decisions. 
With the above parts the presentation of the entire network which is 
employed for the development of the research instrument is completed. 
Again, these networks are very simple. It should be stressed that in 
this case the categories provided do not have any consistent 
theoretical background but are an ad hoc organisation of some focal 
points of arguments (section 11.2.3) referring to the practice of 
teaching. 
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Crucial element in science 
lessons activities. 
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V. 	 GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
A thesis which e::amines questions concerning philosophy of science 
can hardly avoid the duty of considering the methodological basis of 
its own and related research. To conduct such an analysis fully would 
be to pretend to solve all the problems of educational research, which 
would be absurdly ambitious. The aims of this chapter are more modest, 
namely to: 
-Justify the use of systemic network analysis technique In  
organizing conceptually a questionnaire. 
-present a tentative general frame for the methodological location 
of the relevant previous research. 
-close the discussion making some general remarks concernino certain 
aspects of the methodological debates in educational research. 
V.1 	 Systemic network analysis and questionnaire 
construction. 
Systemic network snsl'aJS was proposed and subsequently used for 
qualitative analysis of data. Why then was it considered useful in 
constructing a questionnaire? 
This question can be discussed in the light of the problems one faces 
in educational research (as any other research which attempts to 
extract views or understanding), namely: 
a. that of making sure that the respondents understand the issues 
the research poses (questions) sufficiently, and 
b. that the researcher is able to interpret with a reasonable 
degree of confidence the responses given. 
There are roughly speaking two camps with respect to the above 
problems. The first prefers to USE closed-ended questionnaires as an 
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instrument and deals with (a) by pilot testing and checking the 
validity statistically while (b) is taken to be tackled automatically 
or "by definition", from the use of closed-ended responses. As 
Oppenheim [1] maintains, questionnaires consisting of closed-ended 
questions are preferable to those with open-ended questions, because 
they ensure the unequivocality in the interpretation of the responses -
difficulty (b) above. 
In addition, it has been noted that "people are more willing to 
reveal themselves by checking "those that apply" on a standard list 
than by answering an open question on the same topic" [2]; because, as 
Oppenheim [3] puts it "a momentary lapse, a feeling of. reticence or the 
inability to put ideas into words....causes [the] omission of 
significant points". 
However, this approach includes the danger of introducing selective 
bias i.e. 	 restricting the range of choices the respondent could have 
made. To overcome this, Oppenheim [4] suggests that a pilot study 
should be conducted first, in order to reveal the spectrum of 
alternatives a respondent could opt for. The difficulty tends to be 
circular: 
	 if the pilot study reveals with sufficient clarity what 
respondents might say, why should it not be the main study? And if not, 
the difficulty remains; the best that can be hoped for, being that the 
difficulty is reduced. 
The second camp advocates the use of open-ended instruments (e.g. 
interviews) to overcome difficulties (a) and (b). They deal with (a) by 
repeated live probing while for 
	 (b) 	 they make use of judges for 
categorising the responses. 
The current consensus seems to be that if the research problem is 
factual e.g. survey) then for reasons of economy (i.e. large 
populations, easily comparable answers etc.) closed-ended instruments 
are to be preferred. On the other hand, if the r.,.,.atLh problem 
involves "deep understanding" of a certain situation there are some who 
advocate the use of closed-ended questions (as for instance Eysenck 
[5]), while others ie.g. ethnographers [6]) subscribe to the use of 
open-en:led research instruments. 
The issues this thesis is dealing with are concerned with "deep 
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understanding", at least in the sense of being far from concrete. 
Consequently some iustification is needed as to why, given tnese 
characteristics: 
-a closed-ended format was preferred and why 
-the application of the systemic network analysis technique was 
considered suitable in oroanising the a-priori conceptual analysis. 
The research instrument provides a certain number of categories 
(positions) thus being closed-ended but the treatment of the responses 
is that of looking for categorical patterns (rather than quantitative 
modelling). The choice then, of a closed-ended instrument does not mean 
an exclusively quantitative treatment of the data. Apart from this 
however, the empirical element of this research is oriented towards 
answering "what" (i.e. it is exploratory in character) teachers believe 
rather than "why" they believe so (which arguably does call 	 for in 
depth interviews). Of course this is far from saying that this choice 
is unproblematic, in the sense of it being "correct", or that there are 
no alternative soluLions. 
Thus, it was thought that instead of providing the alternative 
choices through a pilot study, a map of the alternatives as emerging 
from recent debates could be worked out by an a-priori conceptual 
analysis so as to present a sufficient spectrum of choices. As noted 
Elsewhere, the intention is not to include in the instrument every fine 
shade of argumentation, whilst preserving if possible the essence of 
the positions under consideration. This approach would seem to have the 
advantage of partly dealing with the aforementioned criticism of 
providing inadequate categories. 
Additionally, it could be argued that a factor which contributes to 
render the philosophical positions under consideration here complex, is 
that they are dealing with notions and conceptual categories which are 
interrelated. Therefore, a technique which could enable the instrument 
"to generate network-like structures in which descriptive categories 
appear linked in a structure which shows amongst other things, which 
categories belong within others, which are independent and which are 
conditional on the choice of others' [7] would be very helpful. For 
such an analysis would make explicit not only the set of distinctions 
on which it is based but also the extent to which the relevant ground 
is covered satisfactorily (in the sense of including a fair number of 
positions). 
A further element which makes the use of the systemic network 
analysis technique attractive in the context of this thesis is that an 
individuals conceptual system can be located as a given set of choices 
in the network. Significantly this is possible without any presupposed 
acceptance of a specific philosophical or psychological theory. Thus, 
it should be noted that the actual use made of systemic network 
technique in this research does presume that meaningful information 
about philosophical positions can be obtained by asking about them 
directly. 	 However, this presupposition is not forced by the choice to 
use a systemic network. By contrast the otherwise somewhat similar 
repertory grid technique, is inextricably connected with subscription 
to the theory of personal construct CB]. 
The systemic network analysis technique provides one also with the 
facility to focus on either the "collective" (macro) or the 
"individual" (micro) level. This flexibility is very desirable for the 
present purposes, because of the need, at least potentially, to connect 
a broad picture (survey-exploration) with work oriented to 
understanding individuals. In this study the former approach was 
chosen: however, given that the a-priori analysis is organised in the 
form of a systemic network, the basis for communication is established, 
if the latter level were to constitute the focus of any subsequent 
study. 
Beyond the above general points which support the argument that the 
systemic network analysis is appropriate as a basis for the 
construction of a research instrument, there are others concerning the 
more technical aspects of such a construction. 
Specifically, amongst the requirements of a structured instrument the 
principle of 'one concept - one statement" is usually cited [9]. 
Clearly, by using a network one can in principle proceed in making the 
necessary distinctions so as to isolate branches which contain only one 
notion. This could be coupled with developing the instrument in a 
"stem-leaf" fashion. Thus, the respondent is not presented with a 
cluster of isolated ideas but with groups of statements (each 
containing one idea) of which the "logic" of connections is at least 
potentially discernible. In addition, the relationships between the 
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ideas presented being clear, it can be argued that the responses will 
be more informed. 
Finally, as far as the analysis of the empirical evidence is 
concerned, this approach enables the researcher to compare a person's 
manifest relationships between notions in network -form, with normative 
standards or with any other standards one cares to erect. 
In summary, 	 it is argued that the technique of systemic network 
analysis can usefully be employed in the process of the development of 
the research instrument because: 
a. it is flexible in the sense of not itself determining the 
focus of the study whether on exploration or on the individual level. 
b. it facilitates the transformation of complex philosophical 
arguments into simple statements without losing their essence and in 
such a way that each statement contains one concept. 
c. it makes explicit both the extent to which the relevant ground 
is covered satisfactorily (in terms of diversity) and the set of 
distinctions on which the construction of the instrument is based. 
d. it provides a basis for the analysis of the data. 
A proposed -Frame. 
The basic assumption of this framework is that movement across 
different theoretical systems is in principle possible. In other words 
incommensurability of reasoning [ICA (which is at stake here) is not 
accepted. On the contrary it is assumed here, that different kinds of 
research can be compared in some common framework. 
If differences in philosophical and/or methodological assumptions are 
hidden because of the use of "poor" distinctions, studies operating 
under distinct assumptions become "atheoretical and decontextualised" 
and therefore their arguments or findings run the danger of being 
unsusceptible to either proper interpretation or relative evaluation. 
In this case however, the blame should be put firmly on the lack of a 
proper framework for their location rather than an inherent 
impossibility of communicating between different pieces of research. 
For this reason it is argued that there is a need for an analytical 
device capable of locating, in terms of methodological-philosophical 
assumptions. various pieces of research so that these basic assumptions 
are rendered explicit. This in turn could provide some help towards the 
objective of disentangling the areas which the studies are addressing, 
thus permitting a more rational assessment of their respective 
findings. Here, it is proposed that three different axes should be 
employed in the construction of such a framework of different 
methodological assumptions. 
The first axis concerns the functional perspective of the study, that 
is whether or not the study sets out to put norms (normative), to 
provide 
	 descriptions 	 or 	 explore 	 certain 	 area 	 (descriptive, 
exploratory), to give explanations or interpretations (explanatory, 
interpretative), or to intervene and change a certain situation 
(interventionist). 
	 Usually, 
	
studies fall into one of these categories 
but in principle there is no reason why a study could not be for 
instance, partly descriptive and partly explanatory. 
The second axis concerns the kind of instrument used (if the study 
has an empirical element). Questionnaires (both closed-ended and 
open-ended), observation (systematic and unscheduled) and interviews 
(pre-structured and free) are the options which cover this level. 
The last axis is seen in terms of the treatment of evidence. The 
analysis of evidence could be either quantitative or qualitative. In 
this case "either, or" should not be taken as indicating exclusiveness. 
The following table T5.1 depicts this proposed framework. 
Axis. 	 Alternatives. 	 Compatibility. 
Functional 	 Normative 	 Descriptive 	 Explanatory 	 Interventionist 	 + 
perspective 	 Exploratory 	 Interpretative 	 V,H 
Type of 	 Questionnaire 	 Observation 	 Interviews 	 + 
Instrument 	 V,H 
Closed ended 	 Systematic 	 Pre-structured 
Opened ended 	 Unscheduled 	 Free 
Analysis of 	 Qualitative 	 Quantitative 	 + 
evidence 	 V,H 
Where 	 +: possibility of co-selection. 	 and 	 H: Horizontally. 
f: mutually exclusive. 	 V: Vertically within the same level. 
TABLE 	 15.1: A proposed framework for the methodological location of studies. 
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In addition, speaking now in terms of the philosophical assumptions 
made, there are two further ways in which a study could be 
characterised. The first refers to the philosophical perspective of the 
study in the sense of level II philosophical systems (as analysed in 
chapter 111.6). Central to these systems is the distinction between 
observation 	 and 	 theory. 	 Scientific 	 realism, 	 positivism 	 (and 
empiricism), 	 pragmatism 	 and 	 phenomenology 	 constitute 	 possible 
alternatives. Given the fundamental differences in basic assumptions 
between them, one could argue that tease systems are mutually 
exclusive. 
Tne second point deals with epistemic aspects. More specifically 
studies could be categorised according to whether communication between 
different systems of knowledge is considered in principle possible, or 
impossible (incommensurability) in their context. This distinction is 
almost identical with Wittgenstein's distinction [11] between open and 
closed systems respectively. Ethnography with its relativistic 
overtones is the currently prevailing paradigm of closed systems. 
Alternatives on this level cannot but be seen as mutually exclusive. 
Regarding the compatibility of the above aspects, it could be argued 
that closed systems (in the epistemic sense) are incompatible with the 
first three level II philosophical systems (i.e. scientific realism, 
pragmatism, and positivism-empiricism), whilst open systems (i.e. 
communication in principle possible) can fit with any of these systems. 
A fuller account of the relevant argument is given in section 111.6.4. 
As far as the articulation of methodological and philosophical 
-epistemic assumptions is concerned, there seems to be no reason to 
consider any combination impossible. What is important here is not the 
explicit assumptions per se, but rather the extent to which one adheres 
to them when either arguing or analysing data. It is argued in the next 
section that such distinctions, if made, need to be applied with 
greater care than is sometimes done. 
Finally, it should be restated that no claim is made that the use of 
any such framework solves the problems of educational research. 
	 It is 
rather an exercise aiming at some tentative suggestions, which in any 
case unavoidably reflect personal presuppositions. 
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V.3 	 some general remarks. 
Regarding the above frame there is a general methodological issue 
which warrants some comment. Ir., the debates referring to perspectives 
of educational research use is often made of certain dichotomies. 
Applying these dichotomies, studies are classified as for instance, 
"positivistic" 	 versus 	 "ethnographic" 	 [12], 	 "traditional" 
("psychometric") versus "phenomenological" [13], "normative"' or 
"nomothetic" 	 versus 	 "ideographic" 	 [14], 	 "qualitative" 	 versus 
"quantitative" [15], "using inventories" versus "using interviews" 
[16], or "empiricist" versus "interpretative" [17] et al. Furthermore, 
there are instances where inferences about relationships between these 
dichotomies are made e.g. implications of the type: 
inventory ----> quantitative ----> positivistic 
versus 
interviews and/or observation ----> qualitative ----> ethnographic [18]. 
Such taxonomies are arguably not altogether satisfactory. The reason 
can be sought in the objective any such characterisation sets out to 
achieve. If its aim is to devise an analytical 
	 instrument, it fails 
both because such distinctions provide only a simplified - usually 
linear - model and because the reasoning and justification for making 
the distinctions is far from undisputable. On the other hand, such 
terms are also employed with an explicit or implicit intention to be 
evaluative: to decide whether the research is acceptable or not. But 
clearly it is not sufficient to dismiss (or to praise) a certain study 
on the basis of a rather unsatisfactory analytical tool. 
To elaborate on the argument concerning such distinctions as an 
analytical framework, a first remark concerns their scope. These 
dichotomies contrast only two positions. Thus, their scope cannot but 
be limited. Whatever the significance of the positions taken to be 
juxtaposed is, the fact remains that the theoretical and/or 
methodological assumptions of a certain study need not conform to any 
153 
such simple frame. This is not to say that this happens because 
alternative frames are in a sense intrinsically incapable of 
communicating one another. 
	 it is rather to say that the spectrum of 
coherent sets of theoretical and/or methodological assumptions is of 
much greater breadth than that which a single distinction would lead 
one to believe. Of course, one cannot dismiss the trade-off of accuracy 
and precision against generality. Their balance is the point. 
Secondly, there is a remark concerning conceptual precision. 	 Terms 
like positivism, phenomenology, ethnography are borrowed from other 
fields, e.g. philosophy of science and anthropology, where they are 
well established and acceptable. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to 
assume that they ought to be used either in the same fashion in which 
they are applied in their fields of origin, or if not, that the 
modifications untertaken should be made explicit. If this is not done 
then a proliferation of terms which in some cases intend to convey the 
same meaning and in other cases blur necessary distinctions is liable 
to occur. 
To illustrate very briefly these points two examples will be offered. 
Take for instance Piagetian-oriented studies. If one uses the 
distinction positivism-phenomenology, then, despite the fact that both 
positivism and phenomenology are very important currents of thought, 
one can not locate studies of the Fiagetian school in these terms. For, 
Piaget [19] was disposed to think in terms of universals 
	 (e.g. 	 the 
stages of cognitive development are cross-cultural), to refer to just 
one of his assumptions which more obviously violates ethnographic 
assumptions. And, since he has explicitly argued against positivism one 
cannot conclude that his studies fall in the positivistic camp [20] 
either. 
Since one may argue that Piagetian studies are a very special case 
due to his particular interest in epistemology as well as his specific 
philosophical position, the behaviourist tradition as represented by 
Skinner can be considered instead. At first sight this work could be 
characterised as positivistic - certainly not as ethnographic. But this 
crude distinction misses the very particular characteristics of 
Skinner's explicit philosophical assumptions. As Margolis [21] argues, 
this system should be considered more akin to scientific realism (or 
reductionist materialism in Smart's terminology [22]), than to any 
other ontological system. 
What the above examples seem to indicate is either that the location 
of studies across single dichotomies cannot be done (Pisoetian 
studies), or if such a classification is applied it is not helpful, if 
not misleading (behaviourism). 
In conclusion, 	 it is argued here that the use of too global or too 
polarised distinctions can do little in helping one to evaluate the 
findings of previous researh in addition to restricting the choice of 
combinations of compatible methodological tools which may prove to be 
of interest. 
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VI. 	 REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE. 
VI.1 	 Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to locate the present research with 
respect to the body of relevant literature (within science education). 
The basic assumption is made that research done from different points 
of view (some would say within different paradigms) can in fact be 
compared 	 [1]. 	 For, 	 it has already been argued that the notion of 
incommensurability hinders rather than helps educational research [2], 
in addition to it being philosophically unsound [3]. 
The structure is as follows: 
(a) a descriptive overview of other research 
(b) a critique of previous research 
(c) the location of the present study in terms of other work described. 
The descriptive overview 
	 (and to some extent the other sections of 
this chapter) is based on a classification of features of research, so 
as to bring a considerable number of studies into relationship with one 
another. This classification will now be explained. 
VI.2 	 The frame: A set of distinctions. 
The distinctions used in the discussion of the relevant literature 
are: 
A. The character of the studies under review. 
B. Their "subject matter". 
C. Their "general" scope. 
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D. Their "philosophical" scope. 
E. The kinds of techniques used by these studies for the gathering 
of evidence (where relevant). 
A. The character of a study is described as either being 
descriptive/exploratory or normative the latter being those in which a 
certain position is proposed or defended). This distinction is similar 
to that between empirical and non-empirical studies. For this reason 
two ad hoc categories are employed here: on the one hand 
descriptive/exploratory studies with a strong empirical element and on 
the other hand normative/ideothetic ones. 
A finer distinction is that between the ideothetic studies, which 
stress the relevance of philosophy/sociology/history of science to 
science education, and those studies which focus on the relation of a 
particular system of thought or a model of science to a certain aspect 
(or aspects) of science education. In the following, studies belonging 
to the first of these groups will be referred under the heading 
"relevance", while for the second group the heading "application" will 
be used. 
G. The "subject matter" can be viewed in two senses: 
I. Firstly, the aspects of education which the research addresses. 
The relevant dimensions here include studies which focus on: 
	 students' 
views, teachers' views, curriculum projects, policy formulation, 
teaching styles/practices and reviews. Given that this thesis is 
concerned with teachers and curricular-pedagogical issues, studies 
referring exclusively to students will be given less attention. 
2. Secondly, the character of the issues concerned in these 
studies, 	 i.e. 	 philosophy of science per se on the one hand, and the 
connection of philosophy of science with curricular and pedagogical 
issues, on the other. 
In addition, it is necessary to distinguish between studies focusing 
on teachers' and/or students' attitudes towards science; on the 
understanding of certain philosophical and/or sociological aspects of 
scientific knowledge and finally on eliciting views on the 
philosophical (and partly sociological) dimensions of scientific 
knowledge. 
The last aspect is clearly relevant to this thesis. Understanding of 
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the philosophical basis of scientific knowledge is also highly 
relevant. Attitudes towards science, however, are something of a 
different matter. 	 Certainly, 	 attitudes towards science are to some 
extent derived from ones views about its philosophical basis. The 
point here is two-edged: i.e. firstly, attitudes on the one hand and 
viewsiunderstanding on the other are conceptually distinct and secondly 
it is uncertain to what extent attitudes are formed exclusively on the 
basis of a rational understanding of the philosophical basis of certain 
issues. Of course it would be an uncomfortable position if, for 
instance, someone considered science as seeking the truth and as 
simultaneously being detrimental to society. 
C. The scope of the studies describes whether they take into account 
only one position as opposed to those which encompass more than one 
position. A finer distinction, in so far as the one dimensional studies 
are concerned, is based on the explicitness of the position adopted. 
D. The inclusion of ontological concerns constitutes a further 
important point. As has been argued, ontology is indispensable when 
dealing with epistemological problems. On this basis two kinds of 
studies can be discerned: on the one hand there are those in which 
consideration is given to the connections between epistemological and 
ontological levels and on the other hand those which regard such 
connections as beyond their concern. 
E. The final dimension concerns research techniques (applicable only 
to those studies which purport to map peoples' views). These techniques 
can be classified into closed-ended questionnaires, or into less 
structured forms (interviews - whether prestructured or not; essay 
writing etc.). 
A presentation of these distinctions in a systematic way is attempted 
by the network shown in the next page. 
Finally, it should be stressed that this set of distinctions, which 
cut across the various perspectives from which a systematic study of 
science teaching could be seen, is the basis of the following 
descriptive analysis. Given though that any such selection of 
distinctions has an inevitably personal bias, this bias cannot avoid 
being present throughout the discussion. 
----Aescriptivelexploratory (empirical). 
--Analytical and reviews. 
(—Character - - - -1 
Aoraativelideothetic (no empirical). 
---->closed-ended instrument. 
i
-data collection 	 : 
, 
. 
---->open-ended instrument. 
i 
f 
i 
---->teachers' views. 
i 
; 
1 
 
-aspects of sc.---:--->students' views. 
( 
	
education 	 . . 
. 
---->science curriculum. 
-Subject matter 
 
T----`philosophy of science. 
, 
-context----: 1 
---->philosophy of science-'pedagogy'. 
one position----: 
----;implicit. 
-Scope 	  
(epistemology) 
)several positions. 
----}ontology not included. 
-Scope 
	  
(epistemology-philosophy) 
----:ontology considered. 
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VI.3 	 A "descriptive" analysis: a cartography 
of the ground. 
In the following tables the 81 studies examined have simply been 
classified according to the distinctions suggested above. Comments 
beyond those intended to clarify aspects of the description are 
withheld for the next section. Tables T6.1 and 76.2 constitute a 
taxonomy of the studies as either normative/ideothetic (table T6.1) or 
exploratory/descriptive (table 1.6.2). 
NORMATIVE - IDEOTHETIC 	 STUDIES. 
Relevance 
Eutzow and Linz 
	 [4] 
Conant 
	
[5] 
Connelly 
	
(6] 
Connelly 
	 [7] 
Elkana 
	
[8] 
Elkana 
	 [9] 
Fenstermacher 
	
[10] 
Gardner 
	 [11] 
Gardner 
	 [12] 
Herron 
	 [13] 
Jones, 0. M. 	 [15] 
Ivany 
	 [16] 
McMurrin 
	 (14] 
Lind 
	
[17] 
Nadeau and Desautels 
	
(18] 
Nagel 
	
[19] 
Phillips 
	
(20] 
Price 
	 [21] 
Roberts and Russel 
	
[22] 
Robinson, J. T. 	 [23] 
Robinson, J. T. 	 [24] 
Rogers 
	
[25] 
Suamers 
	 [26] 
Tischer, Power and Endean [27] 
TABLE 
Application 
Abiobola 
Akeroyd 
Cawthron and Rowell 
Donnely 
Finley 
Forge 
Freundlich 
Hamilton 
Heath 
Jones, V. J. 
Knape and Rosewell 
Laura 
Margetson 
Nock and Nelson 
Richardson and Boyle 
Robinson M. C. 
Smolicz and Nunan 
Steiner 
Swartz 
Tawney 
Wagner 
Whitaker 
Westwood 
Wright 
16.1 
[28] 
(29] 
[30] 
(31] 
[32]  
[33]  
[34]  
(351 
[36]  
[37]  
(38] 
[39]  
[40]  
[86] 
[41]  
[42]  
[43]  
[44]  
(45]  
(46]  
[47]  
[48]  
[49]  
[50]  
EXPLORATORY - DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES. 
Exploratory 
	
Reviews 
(51]  
(52]  
[53]  
[54]  
[55]  
(56] 
[57]  
[58]  
[59]  
[60]  
[61]  
[62]  
[63]  
(64] 
[65]  
[66]  
(67) 
[68]  
[69]  
[70]  
(71) 
(721 
(73] 
[74] 
(75] 
BSSC 
Behnke 
Bileh and Malik 
Brown 
Carrey and Stauss 
Cooley and Klopfer 
Cruab 
Dibbs 
Kimball 
Korth 
Minas 
Moore and Sutaan 
Noll 
Ogunniyi 
Ogunniyi and Pella 
Orsini-Romano 
Rowell and Cawthron 
SchAirian 
S.L.C. 
Stice 
Swan 
Taiir 
Welsh and Pella 
Wilson 
Zupp 
Aikenhead 
Doran, Guerin 
Durkee 
Hodson 
Jungwirth 
Lucas 
Mackay 
Munbv 
Schmidt 
Trent 
(76] 
and Cavalieri (77] 
[78] 
[791 
(80]  
(81]  
[82]  
[83]  
(84] 
185] 
TABLE 
	
16.2 
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It should be added that the distinction between normative-idiothetic 
and exploratory-descriptive studies is not altogether clear cut: some 
of the exploratory studies have a normative element as well. A relevant 
example is Dibbs' work [58]. Dibbs argues that some aspects of teaching 
styles, for instance the use of experimental work, are related to 
teachers' 	 views on philosophy of science. Furthermore, he argues that 
science teachers in schools have and should have some understanding of 
the relevant issues and that this is why it is possible to construct a 
test to measure understanding (to be judged against the general 
cultural background of teachers) of philosophy of science. In such 
cases, the classification took into account the predominant character 
of each study. 
Table T6.3 focuses on the "subject-matter" of the studies. 
THE 'SUBJECT MATTER' OF THE STUDIES. 
Teachers Students Curricul. 	 Pedagogy 
Abimbola 	 [28] 	 * 
Akerovd 	 [291 	 * 
Cawthron and Rowell 	 [301 	 * 	 x 
N Dannely 	 [31] * 
Finley 
	
[32] * 
0 Forge 	 [33] * 
Freundlich 
	
[34] * 
R Hamilton 	 [35] 
Heath 	 [36] 
M Jones, 	 V. 	 J. 	 [37] * 
Knape and Rosewell 	 [381 
A Laura 	 [39] * 
Margetson 	 [40] * 
T Nock 	 and Nelson 	 [86] * 
Richardson 	 and 	 Boyle 	 [41] 4  
I Robinson M. 	 C. 	 [42] * 
Smolicz 	 and Nunan 	 [43] * 
V Steiner 	 [44] * 
Swart: 	 [45] 
E Tawney 	 [46] 
Wagner 	 [47] * 
Whitaker 	 [48] 1 
Westwood 	 [49] * 
Wright 	 [50] 1 
BSSC 	 [51] 4  
Behnke 	 [52] 
E Bileh 	 and Malik 	 [53] 
Brawn 	 [541 * 
X Carrey and Stauss 	 [55] * 
Cooley and Klopfer 	 [56] x 
P Crumb 	 [57] 
Dibbs 	 [58) * 
L Kimball 	 [59] * 
Korth 	 [60] 
0 Minas 	 [61] 
Moore and Sutman 	 [62] 
R Noll 	 [631 
Ogunniyi 	 [64] 
A Oqunniyi 	 and Pella 	 [65] 
Orsini-Romano 	 [66] 
T Rowell 	 and Cawthron 	 [67] 
Schwirian 	 [68] 
0 S.L.C. 	 (691 
Stice 	 [70] 
R Swan 	 (71] 
Tamir 	 [72] 
'1 Welsh 	 and Pella 	 [731 
Wilson 	 [74] 
[Lipp 	 [75] 
TABLE T6.3 
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Table T6.3 shows a strong relation between the character of studies 
(normative/ideothetic or exploratory/descriptive dimension) and their 
subject matter. Studies belonging to the former group tend to a large 
extent to deal with curricular issues, some attention being paid to 
the connection with pedagogy, together with an analysis of scientific 
knowledge 	 along 	 philosophical 	 and/or 	 sociological 	 dimensions. 
Conversely exploratory/descriptive studies focus mainly on a recording 
of teachers' and students' views with regard to these issues. 
The strength of this relation can be illustrated quantitatively, by 
the following table: 
Teachers-Students Curriculum-Pedagogy 
Normative 	 23 
Exploratory 	 20 
	
5 
TABLE 	 T6.4: Character and subject matter of studies. 
Some of the entries in table 76.3 are particularly worthy of comment. 
Cawthron and Rowell [30], Finley [32] and Smolicz and Nunan [43] 	 are 
of interest because they discuss curricular and pedagogical issues in 
the light of considerations drawn from philosophy and sociology of 
knowledge. However, the usefulness of their accounts is limited by 
their relatively narrow focus. That is, the first study is of 
considerable depth in philosophical terms, but on the one hand deals 
only with the Piagetian current of pedagogy and on the other hand the 
curricular considerations, while worthwhile, lack empirical evidence. 
The same applies to the third study, with the further limitation that 
it deals mainly with pedagogy. Regarding the second of these studies, a 
limitation is that only the empirical inductivist position is 
considered to represent philosophy of science. A fourth study, by Knape 
and Rosewell also warrants comment [38], since it is the only one where 
teachers' views are treated in an ideothetic fashion. 
Tables T6.5 and 16.7 list studies in terms of their scope. 
One Position. 
THE SCOPE OF THE STUDIES. 
More than one Position. 
BSSC [511 Dibbs [58] 
Behnke [52] Ogunniyi [64] 
Bileh 	 and Malik [53] Ogunniyi 	 and Pella [65] 
Brown [54] Rowell 	 and Cawthron [67] 
Carrey and Stauss [55] 
Cooley and Klopfer [56] 
Crumb [57] 
Kimball [59]  
Korth [60]  
Mitias [61]  
Moore and Sutman [62]  
Noll [63]  
Orsini-Romano [66] 
Schwirian [68]  
S.L.C. [69]  
Stice [70]  
Swan (71] 
Tamir [72]  
Welsh and Pella [73]  
Wilson [74]  
Zupp [75]  
Nock and Nelson (86] Abilbola [28] 
Wagner [47] Akeroyd [29] 
Whitaker [48] Cawthron and Rowell [30] 
Steiner [44] Donnely [31] 
Swartz [45] Finley [32] 
Forge [33] 
Freundlich [34] 
Hamilton [35] 
Heath [36] 
Jones, 	 V. 	 J. [37] 
Knape and Rosewell [38] 
Laura [39] 
Margetson [40] 
Richardson and Boyle [41] 
Robinson M. 	 C. [42] 
Smolicz and Nunan [43] 
Tawney [46] 
Westwood [49]  
Wright [50]  
TABLE T6.5 
Again, there is a strong relation between scope and character 
(normative versus exploratory dimensions) as shown in table 16.6 
One Position. 
Exploratory 	 21 
Normative 	 5 
More than one Position. 
4 
19 
TABLE 	 T6.6: Scope of exploratory and normative studies. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 
Abiabola 
Akeroyd 
Cawthron and Rowell 
[28]  
[29]  
[30]  
Ind. 
* 
H.-D. 
* 
f 
Cont. 
* 
* 
* 
Rel. 
* 
* 
Per. 
N 	 Donnely [31]  * * 
Finley [32]  * 
0 	 Forge [33]  * 
Freundlich [34]  1 * * 
R 	 Hamilton [35]  * * 
Heath [36]  * 
M 	 Jones, 	 V. 	 J. [37]  * I I 
Knape and Rosewell [38]  x 
A 	 Laura [39]  * * 
Margetson [40]  * 
T 	 Nock and Nelson [86] * 
Richardson and Boyle [41]  * * f 
I 	 Robinson M. 	 C. [42]  * f 4 f 
Smolicz and Nunan [43l x x x 
V 	 Steiner [44]  
Swartz [45]  * * 
E 	 Tawney [46]  * * 4 
Wagner [47]  * 
Whitaker [48]  * 
Westwood [49]  * * 
Wright [50]  * f * 1 
BSSC [51]  
Behnke [52]  4 
E 	 Bileh and Malik [53] 
Brown [543 
Carrey and Stauss [55]  
Cooley and Klopfer [56]  
L 	 Crumb [57]  
Dibbs [58]  * 
0 	 Kimball [59]  
Korth [603 
R 	 Mitias [61]  
Moore and Sutman [62]  
A 	 Noll [63]  1 
Ogunniyi [64]  * 
T 	 Ogunniyi 	 and Pella [65]  * 
Orsini-Romano [66]  X 
0 	 Rowell 	 and Cawthron (67) f 
Schwirian 
R 	 S.L.C. [69]  
Stice [70]  
Y 	 Swan [71]  
Tamir [72]  
Welsh and Pella [73]  
Wilson [74]  
Zupp [75] 
TABLE 	 T6.7 
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Table T6.7 shows which epistemological positions have been taken into 
account in the various studies. 
	
It is noteworthy that the great 
majority (20 out of 25) of exploratory studies are constructed around 
only one philosophical position as opposed to normative studies, which 
usually consider more than two positions. 
There are some studies which require individual attention. TOUS for 
example, 	 being of interest due to its wide use, lacks any explicit 
philosophical 
	 basis, 	 but 	 as 	 Dibbs 	 [87] 	 argues, 	 the 
hypothetico-deductive model predominates it. The studies by Dibbs (58], 
Ogunniyi 
	 [64] and Ogunniyi and Pella [65] are a step in the right 
direction, being constructed around two philosophical systems, namely, 
inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism. Even better in this respect, 
is the study by Rowell and Cawthron [677, in which three positions 
namely, inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism and contextualism are 
considered explicitly. However, none of the last three studies 
incorporates any ontological dimension, which in the view of this 
thesis is indispensable in an educational interpretation of the 
findings. Lastly, Orsini-Romano [667 deals with some pedagogical 
implications without elaborating on the link between these and 
philosophical (and/or sociological) consideri!tions. 
Amongst the normative studies, there are many (19 out of 24) which 
take more than two positions into account. 	 This discrepancy between 
normative and exploratory studies is unusual; one might even expect 
normative studies to put forward a certain philosophical 	 system. 	 The 
fact that this is not the case could be explained if one considers the 
time element. Most of the monothematic - exploratory studies are rather 
dated; the more recent ones having been developed along more than one 
dimension. 	 On the other hand, the older normative studies are centred 
around the issue of the relevance of philosophical and/or sociological 
analyses of knowledge to the teaching of science. 
Taking 1975 as a base year, table T6.8 not only provides some 
empirical evidence in support of this point but also indicates how the 
general trends and focus have developed. 
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NORMATIVE 
	
EXPLORATORY 
Relevance 	 Application 	 One position. 	 Many positions. 
	
Pre-1975 	 16 	 2 	 21 
	
Post-1975 	 6 	 22 	 4 
TABLE 
	 T6.8: Trends and focus of studies. 
Another issue to be considered is the avoidance of the ontological 
question in either the normative or descriptive studies, with the 
exception of those by Nadeu and Desautels [187, Forge [33] and Knape 
and Rosewell [387. The first of these however, concentrates more on the 
relevance, as opposed to application aspects of the philosophy-science 
teaching relationship 
	
(table T6.1), while the third deals with issues 
on the ontological level, excluding the epistemological level. 
Important in this respect are Forge's conclusions on the need to 
distinguish in the teaching of science between the realist and 
instrumentalist positions. 
As already mentioned, exploratory studies dealing with the 
ontological question are notably absent. A tentative explanation for 
this lies in the prevailing rigid compartmentalisation of knowledge. 
Thus, research in the field of science education tends to draw upon 
philosophy of science (level III systems), as opposed to philosophy in 
general (level I systems). 
What remains then, is an examination of the body of relevant studies 
with an empirical element, in terms of the sort of instrument which 
they have used for the collection of evidence. Only Mitias [61] has 
employed the instrument of essay writing. In all the other cases a 
closed-ended questionnaire has been employed. 
The strong preference for closed-ended instruments is perhaps 
surprising - given the complexity and fluidity of the issues involved. 
However, one cannot overlook the need for the researcher to have some 
security 	 (in terms both of facilitating the practical aspects of the 
conduct of the research and of having a structured means for the 
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analysis of the results) when dealing with an area of such complexity. 
Nevertheless, in the case of a closed-ended instrument, problems of 
whether the questions (statements) are well founded and intelligible, 
are unavoidable. The reasons for using a closed-ended instrument in the 
present thesis were discussed in chapter V. 
What the above descriptive overview seems to indicate is that: 
a. from the standpoint of science education there is a considerable 
interest in this area given the number of relevant papers; 
b. the issues have been dealt with at both the normative and the 
exploratory level; 
c. taking into account the philosophical scope particularly of the 
exploratory studies (even recent ones) a discussion is needed as to 
whether there are some problematic aspects in the way research was 
founded conceptually; 
d. regarding the subject matter of the exploratory studies and 
specifically those of a wider philosophical scope, the link between on 
the one hand curricular and pedagogical and on the other 
philosophical-epistemological issues has not been study. 
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VI.4 	 A critique: The comprehensiveness of the literature. 
The intention in this section is to answer the question "where does 
this thesis stand?" through a critique which will suggest that a number 
of areas have not been addressed in the existing body of literature. 
The 	 distinction 	 between 	 exploratory/descriptive 	 and 
ideothetic/normative studies will be applied here. 
It should be clarified however that given the orientation of this 
study, 	 the 	 subsequent 
	
discussion 
	 will 	 focus 	 on 	 the 
exploratory/descriptive studies, whilst for the normative ones the 
intention is to indicate the general direction of their suggestions 
rather than analyse them in any detail. 
VI.4.1 	 Exploratory/Descriptive studies. 
Studies belonging to this group are listed in table TVI.lb. 	 The 
discussion here will have the twofold orientation of, on the one hand 
establishing a four-point general critical analysis in terms of 
theoretical/methodological assumptions and on the other hand, of 
bringing this analysis to bear on the respective findings. 
1. General critique. 
As indicated by tables 16.7 and T6.8, the position projected by those 
exploratory studies which are rather older (pre-1975), is often 
"personal", i.e. an idiosyncratic collage from various philosophical 
systems, without any attempt to explicitly define the source of these 
constituent parts, as Lucas [88] points out. He cites, along with a 
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considerable number of other instances, the following 	 (item 43 taken 
from TOUS), TOUS being considered amongst the more successful 
instruments of this type: 
"Which of the following is the best description of a scientific law: 
A. It is an exact report of the observation of scientists. 
B. It is a generalized statement of relationships among natural 
phenomena. 
C. It is a theoretical explanation of a natural phenomenon. 
D. It is enforced by nature and cannot be violated." 
The "correct" answer according to the test is B. It can be argued 
however, that there are doubts as to what extent this is an appropriate 
description for one espousing an inductivist position. 
This tendency (of the instruments developed often to lack an explicit 
specification of the philosophical assumptions or at least not to have 
them explicitly acknowledged) seems to stem from the fact that most of 
these studies fail to recognise that conflicting models of science from 
a philosophical (and/or sociological) standpoint do exist, as Lucas 
[89] remarks. 	 This lack of an a-priori analysis leaves one with the 
impression that the writer of each instrument presupposes one single 
valid and universally indisputable model of science (see the above 
example from TOUS). Here, the distinction between exploratory and 
normative work is pertinent. It is one thing to propose and/or defend a 
certain philosophical system, and quite another when engaging in 
exploratory work with the purpose of recording somebody else's views, 
to obscure the fact that conflicting - and sometimes quite incompatible 
systems of thought do in fact exist. This is not to say that one 
should not engage simultaneously in both activities. Rather, a clear 
demarcation line between these two sorts of studies should be drawn. 
If this is the case, 
	 three objections can be lodged immediately. 
Firstly, the absence of explicit specifications regarding the adopted 
position(s) 	 makes it difficult to compare the results of the various 
studies. Secondly, any attempt to map a particular situation 
	 (e.g. 
teachers' philosophical views), using a "personal" position, may be an 
unorthodox way to tackle this problem, as one cannot expect others to 
be aware of one's own personal view. Lastly, any such collage (without 
a careful conceptual analysis of the issues involved) can easily end in 
a position containing internal contradictions from a philosophical 
standpoint. 
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There are however instruments which do take into account more than 
one position. Nonetheless it is argued that it is not enough to include 
only some positions. Every attempt should be made to include a 
reasonable number of philosophical systems, so as to cover the whole 
spectrum adequately. Otherwise, the introduction of bias in the 
instrument 	 (since closed-ended instruments constitute the research 
tools in this area) is difficult to avoid. 
Thus, the first point of the critique is that most of the already 
existing instruments fail 	 to recognise sufficiently the diversity of 
philosophical thought and the existence of conflicting models of 
science. 
Another related point is that philosophy of science, apart from its 
diversity in terms of systems which expresses distinct currents of 
thought, is concerned with issues of great complexity which cover a 
number of constituent topics e.g. scientific methodology, criteria of 
demarcation etc. Clearly, views with regard to these topics are 
interconnected. On the other hand however, there is no compelling 
reason to presuppose an absolute consistency of the views of people who 
are not professional philosophers i.e. to presuppose that one 
subscribing to inductivism as far as scientific methodology is 
concerned will also adopt automatically the same system for the theme 
of scientific growth. Taking these on board, one could criticise the 
practice of reporting the results (which is followed almost uniformly) 
in the form of global scores. Of course, as Gardner [90] demonstrates 
in his review, this has nothing to do with the application aspect of 
the instruments. Munby [91] commenting on this writes that "there is a 
general lack of coherent theoretical constructs in many scales, so that 
as many as three quite separate issues are often fused into a single 
scale without subscales". 
The third point refers to the inclusion of the "ontological problem" 
because epistemology by its very nature is connected, more than 
anything else, with the ontological issue and only by considering 
epistemological problems in their ontological context, can educational 
problems connected with epistemological issues become meaningful. Thus, 
while there are plenty of studies concerned with epistemological issues 
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(styles of reasoning et al.) and some which deal with ontology, there 
are none which try to forge a link between epistemology and ontology. 
It may sound abstract and could even be regarded as impertinent to 
try to establish a relationship between epistemology and ontology on 
the one hand and science teaching on the other. Indeed, there exists a 
view which appears to dispute the meaningfulness of such an attempt. 
Wilson and Cowell [92] argue that "anyone who believed that what (say) 
Popper or Kuhn were concerned with was central to education in science 
would surely either not know the kind of issues these philosophers were 
trying to tackle or not have a firm grasp of the idea of education". 
There seem to be three reasons why this brisk dismissal of the 
importance of philosophy of science for education is not wholly valid: 
-Firstly, generally speaking, it is one thing to claim that 
philosophical considerations are central to, and quite another to argue 
that they have some relevance to science education. The argument is not 
about the centrality of philosophical issues to education, as a close 
inspection of any of the relevant studies shows. Rather it is about 
their relevance; and empirical evidence exists to show that teachers at 
least accept this view, (e.g. Dibbs C58]). 
-Secondly and more specifically, it is the view taken in this 
thesis that considerations on a "technical" (epistemological) level 
lacking articulation with regard to the ontological considerations are 
difficult to interpret educationally so that their impact is 
necessarily limited, particularly in the areas of content organisation 
and students' attitudes towards science. 
-Thirdly, there is Scheffler's [93] argument, seemingly strange, 
that whilst philosophical considerations may be unnecessary for a 
scientist they are quite essential for science teachers. In this, he 
draws the very valid distinction between education in science (which 
requires a philosophical understanding of science, as opposed to 
understanding of the technicalities of philosophy of science) and 
training in science (which does not) C94]. This distinction is further 
elaborated by Margetson [95] and others. 
This argument gains further support in the currently growing body of 
research concerning the significance and impact of children's knowledge 
prior to science teaching. As already indicated in the previous 
chapter, several attempts to identify the differences in the starting 
points of these studies (either in terms of methodology, or the 
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theoretical framework employed) so as to render their findings 
meaningful have been made (e.g. Solomon [967, Driver and Erickson 
E977). These attempts focus on the methodology employed or on the 
declared objectives. It is clear however, that behind both the 
methodological aspects and the objectives, an ontological position can 
be discerned. For instance, if one tries to depict pupils' ideas about 
a certain topic in Physics through ethnomethodology, claiming 
subsequently that teachers ought to help pupils to discover their own 
science - in other words to formulate their own scientific theories -
it follows that the ontological assumption of the researcher could not 
be realism. Otherwise, one could not easily defend the position that 
teachers should help pupils to form their own ideas on science if, 
roughly speaking, reality could be used as a criterion against which 
the "correctness" or " wrongness" of a certain scientific claim can be 
judged. 
The third point therefore, 	 is that if one accepts the relevane of 
philosophical considerations to the teaching of science, then 
information about teachers' epistemological beliefs might be 
interpreted more meaningfully in educational terms if they are seen in 
conjuction with their ontological views. 
An inspection of tables T6.3 and T6.4 reveals that attention is paid 
to the connection between philosophical-epistemological issues with 
curriculum and pedagogy, at the exploratory level. This contrasts with 
the assertion by Bruner, that "there is a lack of integrating theory in 
pedagogy....in its place there is principally a body of maxims" 
	 [98]. 
This in turn, should be seen in the light of the orthodoxy that the 
study of education depends on four disciplines - history, philosophy, 
psychology and sociology - and lies in the application of these 
disciplines to a wide range of educational 	 issues. While psychology 
appears to be considered as most immediately relevant to teachers' work 
[99], philosophy and sociology are generally recognised as providing 
the link for any attempt to formulate and justify educational policy. 
However as Morrison and McIntyre [100] argue, the coordination of 
teaching in teacher training colleges is less than adequate. 
A note of caution should be added. Recently as Hodson observed, 
"...there does seem to be an assumption that teacher's epistemological 
views determine his/her choice of learning method" [101]. He considers 
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the assumption of an invariable relation between philosophical views 
and beliefs about how science should be taught to be potentially 
damaging. While this thesis does not support such a robust causation, 
as evident from detailed analysis and empirical evidence - this is not 
to say that no relationship exists at all. 
Indeed, at the level of empirical research, as argued by Eggleston a 
way of dealing with the methodological problems of research concerning 
"intellectual transactions" in the classroom "rests on the assumption 
that teachers knowledge of and beliefs about the disciplines they teach 
and the way their pupils learn determines ... the kind of [classroom] 
interactions they stage manage" C1021. Furthermore at a theoretical 
level, as the philosophy of psychology indicates, there are strong 
arguments pointing towards accepting in principle a certain 
relationship between philosophical and "pedagogical" assumptions, as 
argued by Margolis [103] and Wetherick [104]. Again, this is not to say 
that there is necessarily a congruence between teachers' views and 
their actual teaching practice. 
Thus, the last point that emerges is that any detailed consideration 
as to how teachers' philosophical assumptions are connected with their 
"pedagogical" assumptions, tends to be missing. 
2. 	 Discussion of the findings. 
Taking these points into account, the discussion of the data provided 
by the previous studies cannot be anything but cautious. 
To organise the discussion the network displayed in section VI.2 will 
be employed. The main distinction relevant here is between those 
studies which are exploring teachers' views on the basis of an 
instrument which constitutes a personal 	 stance and those which are 
constructed around some established (within philosophy of science) 
positions. 
The majority of the former studies tend to reflect an inductivist 
image of science (a notable exception is that of TAUS which projects a 
rather hypothetico-deductive position as already mentioned). Indeed, as 
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Gauld and Hukins [105] report, the evidence on the basis of these 
studies suggests that teachers have generally understood their own 
activities within the framework of an empirical-inductivist view of 
science. 
The reports of the results in these studies as already stated, appear 
almost invariably in the form of global scores e.g. 6.7 on S.L.C. 
	
[69] 
test. 	 The interpretation of 	 such results, beyond the above general 
remark that they tend to present an inductivist image of science (with 
the exception of TOUS), is very difficult due to the lack of a coherent 
basis for their construction, as Munby [106] observes. Nonetheless, it 
could be argued that they can be used for comparative purposes, 
provided that the same instrument is employed, since correlation of 
results obtained by different instruments are weak [107]. 
	 In this 
respect it is found that exposure to courses which pay attention to the 
philosophical basis of scientific knowledge enhances generally speaking 
the awareness regarding such issues [108]. 
Even these conclusions however are subiect to Lucas' question "what 
does it mean for two groups to have the same TOUS score?" [109] which 
seems at least to be far more meaningful than Aikenhead's 'what does it 
mean for one group to have an average TOUS score 4.27 points greater 
than another?" [110]. For, large differences in the interpretation of 
the nature of the scientific enterprise obscured by global scores are 
apparent and the seeming homogeneity could be misleading. Thus, 
Aikenhead's plea for more than "quantitative data elegantly manipulated 
by sophisticated statistics" [111] is reinforced. 
There are four recent studies (tables T6.5 and T6.8) belonging to the 
second group of studies (more than one position included) and dealing 
with the exploration of teachers' views, namely those by Dibbs [58], 
Ogunniyi [64], Ogunniyi and Pella [66] and Rowell and Cawthron [67]. 
According to Dibbs [58] four types of science teacher could be 
discerned: the inductivist teacher (I), the verificationist teacher 
(V), the hypothetico-deductive teacher (H), and the teacher with mixed 
(no discernible) beliefs about the nature of science (0) [in this 
thesis (section 111.2) it is argued that verification is a constituent 
component of inductivism]. On the question of which of these positions 
is the predominant one, Rowell and Cawthron [112] argue that one has to 
distinguish between teachers' views regarding science "as it is" on the 
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one hand and "as it should be" on the other. On the first level, 
according to this study, there seem to be an "apparent confusion of 
Popperian and inductive-empiricist viewpoints" while "data appear more 
separated by respondents" on the second level. Apart from this however 
and in accordance with the above mentioned findings by Dibbs it is 
indicated that the "Kuhnian debate" has had relatively little impact. 
Finally, Ogunniyi C643, Ogunniyi and Pella [66] report results showing 
teachers leaning more to Hempel's thought 11137 (a system arguably akin 
to empiricism-logical positivism). 
These examples illustrate the point argued previously, namely that 
had other stances been included in various studies, it is not certain 
that their results would have been the same. 
In conclusion it would seem that Munby's demand is quite appropriate 
1114] when asking for "rigorous, disciplined and logically consistent 
work" in disentangling conflicting models of science as a necessary 
prerequisite of the construction of any instrument of this type. 
VI.4.2 	 Normative studies. 
At this point the distinction (section V1.2) between those normative 
studies which advocate the relevance of philosophical considerations to 
the teaching of science and those which argue for the application of a 
particular philosophical system (e.g. Kuhnian) to aspect(s) of science 
education should be recalled. 
	 A discussion of the relevance of a 
philosophical analysis of scientific knowledge to science education 
which draws upon the relevant studies is given in section I.1. For this 
reason, only a brief outline of the conclusions of these studies will 
be presented here. 
Referring to these studies, generally the message which comes across 
is that an analysis of scientific knowledge along philosophical lines 
is highly pertinent to a number of aspects (teachers' views, curricular 
design, school science textbooks) regarding the teaching of science at 
school level. Pioneering in this respect are the papers by J.T. 
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Robinson [23] and (243, Scheffler C114] not to mention Piaget who takes 
this line in "Psychology and Epistemology" [116] although in a more 
general perspective than strictly speaking that of science education. 
In so far as the application of a certain model (view) of science is 
concerned, again in general terms, there seems to exist a consensus on 
the need to move away from the until recently prevailing 
empirico-inductivist model C1177 so as to keep in pace with 
developments in epistemology [118]. 
It is here that the suggestions offered diverge. The majority of 
these papers propose either hypothetico-deductivism (Popperian version) 
or contextualism (indeed, the second version of contextualism in the 
terminology adopted in this thesis) as the appropriate models, whilst 
relativism - as argued for, by Feyerabend - receives scant support. The 
specific position(s) advocated by each of the studies under review are 
indicated in table T6.7. 
VI.5 	 The dimensions of this study. 
As already stated the main objective of this chapter is to locate 
this thesis in terms of the work done previously in the field. For this 
purpose the dimensions of the general framework proposed in section V.2 
(table T5.1), as the set of distinctions in section VI.2 made it 
specific, will be applied. 
The character of the present study is exploratory. The research 
instrument employed is a closed-ended questionnaire. For its 
construction the technique of systemic network analysis was employed to 
organise the preceding analysis of the relevant issues. Thus, a 
considerable analytical element is also present. Furthermore, applying 
the distinction between relevance and application, the study deals 
mainly with the aspects of application. 
Its subject matter is the study of science teachers' views on certain 
philosophical issues pertaining to the theory of knowledge, some of 
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their views concerning pedagogic discourse, and the contingent 
connections between these two areas. It should be stressed therefore, 
that the instrument is not intended to measure teachers' understanding 
of the issues involved. 
As far as the scope of the study is concerned, it takes into account 
several positions in bath the philosophical and the pedagogical 
domains. 	 In 	 philosophy, 	 inductivism, 	 hypothetico-deductivism, 
contextualism, relativism (level III philosophical systems), scientific 
realism, pragmatism, logical positivism (level II philosophical 
systems), realism, idealism, scepticism (level I philosophical systems) 
are considered (see chapter III). In pedagogy and curricular trends the 
"traditional" as opposed to a more "innovative" stance is the main 
distinction. 
Lastly, 	 it should be noted that the ontological question is one of 
the themes included in the philosophical component 	 (level 	 I and II 
philosophical systems). The justification for this distinction (i.e. 
between the ontological and epistemological level), its relevance, as 
well as its interpretative function have already been elaborated upon. 
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VII. 	 THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT. 
This chapter presents the research instrument. The discussion is 
organised around: 
-a description of the instrument (aims, content and scope); 
-a discussion of certain problems related to this type 
(closed-ended) of instrument; 
-the format of the instrument. 
VII.1 	 Description of the instrument. 
A. An outline of the aims and content. 
The principal aim of the instrument can be seen as a means serving to 
identify and analyse teachers' assumptions in relation to: 
a. philosophical dimensions of scientific knowledge; 
b. certain aspects of the science curriculum; 
c. certain aspects of the pedagogical theory. 
It should be noted however, that the instrument was developed in such a 
way so as to make it possible to analyse respondents' views both in 
terms of the above areas treated as one entity and in terms of their 
constituent themes. 
The entire instrument is presented in Appendix 1. It contains 94 
statements and is organised in three components (philosophical, 
curricular and pedagogical). 	 The constituent themes of each of these 
components are as follows: 
1. Philosophical-epistemological component: 
a. scientific methodologies (13 statements), 
b. demarcation criteria (11 statements), 
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c. pattern(s) of scientific change (6 statements), 
d. the status of scientific knowledge (5 statements), 
e. the distinction between theory and observation in ontological 
terms (7 statements). 
2. Curricular component: 
a. the debate concerning the dichotomy specialised as opposed to 
integrated curriculum (10 statements), 
b. the meaning of the terms content and process in science 
education (11 statements). 
3. Pedagogical component: 
a. assumptions about learning (Q statements), 
b. assumptions about instruction (11 statements), 
c. assumptions about certain aspects of classroom activities (11 
statements). 
Table 18.2 (section VIII.2) indicates which statement belong to which 
theme. 
B. The scope of the instrument. 
The decision to include several coherent philosophical, curricular, 
pedagogical positions in the instrument is of crucial importance for 
its design and construction. As previously argued (see section VI.4.1), 
it does not seem reasonable for an instrument which sets about to 
explore views to assume that only a particular position is the 
"correct" one, given the fact that consensus has not been established, 
let alone any definite "proof". It should be restated that this problem 
is different from either that of setting out to establish the extent to 
which a certain position has made an impact on teachers' views; or the 
extent to which teachers (or any other group) agree (or, disagree) with 
one particular system of thought; or to propose and defend a certain 
philosophical view. 
The following table T7.1 brings together the information from chapter 
IV (in which the specific networks constructed to provide the basis for 
the development of the instrument are presented), showing the 
philosophical and psychological systems taken into account for the 
development of each theme. 
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Area 	 Theme 
	
Positions 
Philosophy Level I 
Philosophy Level II 
Philosophy Level III 
Ontological question. 
  
Realism 
Idealism 
Scepticism 
 
Observational and Theoretical 
entities distinction. 
 
Sci. Realism 
Log. Positivism 
Pragmatism 
Scientific methodologies. 
Criteria of demarcation. 
Pattern(s) of scientific growth. 
Status of scientific knowledge. 
 
(1),(2),(3),(4). 
(1),(2),(3),(4). 
(1),(2),(3), (4). 
(1), (2),(3),(4). 
Curricular issues 
Pedagogical issues 
Specialisation vs. 
	
Specialised Curriculum. 
Integrated Science 
	 Integrated Curriculum. 
Assumptions about learning. 	 (5),(6),(7). 
Assumptions about instruction. 
Assumptions about aspects of clasroom activities. 
Where (1): 	 Inductivism. 	 (5): Cognitive theories. 
i2): Hypothetico-Deductivism. and (6): Behaviourism. 
(3): Contextualism. 	 (7): Constructivism. 
(4): Relativism. 	 f : Formation of empirical categories. 
TABLE 17.1: The composition of the instrument. 
Developing such an instrument, one has to confront the problem of 
reducing rather complicated arguments which represent the various 
philosophical and pedagogical stances in consideration, into simple 
statements. 
This approach of reducing complicated arguments to single statements 
could be criticised, as introducing oversimplification, which could 
lead to a naive ex position of the respective positions. In section V.1 
it is argued how the technique of systemic network analysis helps in 
this respect. 
	 In addition to this, the assumption is made that 
teachers' 
	 views on philosophical issues should not be compared, in so 
far as articulation and sophistication are concerned, with those of 
professional philosophers. One may note that this is far from assuming 
that teacners' views lack any "validity". It is to say however, that 
the level at which their views are operational is determined by, and 
oriented towards their task, which is obviously different from that of 
a professional in this field. 
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VII.2 	 Research assumptions and the type of the instrument. 
The justification for the preference of a closed-ended instrument, 
the development of which is based on the systemic network analysis 
technique, has been argued in section V.I. Here, the focus will be on 
certain problematic aspects. 
It has been mentioned [1] that one of the difficulties to be faced, 
when such instruments are used, could be seen in terms of assessing the 
level of 	 interpretation the respondent attaches to the statements 
contained in the instrument. 
With regard to this problem, it should be made clear that without a 
complementary procedure (e.g. in depth interviews), it is not possible 
to know the exact level of interpretation teachers employ, when 
responding to the instrument. However, given that teachers usually 
share many cultural elements (ranging from similar socio-cultural 
background [2], to similar stimuli from their working environment), it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the width of the spectrum of their 
interpretation of those statements would be sufficiently narrow so as 
not to pose serious problems regarding a comparison of their answers. 
Nevertheless, to limit this difficulty (Labaw [3], Berdie and Anderson 
[4], Oppenheim [5]), the use of emotionally loaded words, like wrong, 
correct, traditional, radical, etc. were practically excluded from the 
questionnaire. 
Furthermore, Labaw [6) has identified the following further 
problematic aspects: 
(1) the respondent may have never thought about the issues being 
raised by the question and therefore his answers will be completely 
uninformed or misinformed; 
(2) the respondent ray not care about the issues being raised by 
the question and therefore his answers may reflect salience rather than 
any concern or thought of his own; 
(3) the answer categories provided by the researcher may not be 
adequate to allow the respondent a fair choice. Oppenheim [7] also 
strttt this point, arguing that it is one of the main sources of 
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introducing bias in the instrument. 
There are some elements of communality between (1) and (2 above. 
They can be defended on the basis of empirical evidence which suggests 
that science teachers do care about issues related to philosophy - the 
studies referred to in table T6.2 indeed support this contention. A 
specific example here, is the studies conducted by Cawthrcn and Rowell 
CB] and Smolizs and Nunan EU. 
	 They have forcibly argued in their 
papers, that science lessons as well as the teaching material (e.g. 
te:itbook) convey and are underpinned by certain philosophical 
position(s). In addition to this, if one detects meaningful patterns in 
the responses to nearly 100 statements, it is rather difficult to 
sustain the position that random answers were given. 
The third of the possible shortcomings (i.e. the question as to 
whether the instrument provides adequate "categories") could be seen as 
having two facets. Categories should be adequate both in terms of 
numbers (corresponding to diverse philosophical points) as well 
	 as in 
terms of introducing the right distinctions. Thus, a way of 
disentangling conceptually distinct, but interrelated systems is 
 
required. 
	 In this instrument, the categories provided arose from an 
a-priori analysis (chapter III) of the relevant issues and organised by 
a set of networks (chapter IV). What can be argued here is that this 
analysis, whicn is epitomised by the networks, is stated explicitly and 
is therefore open to critical discussion. 
The meaning of the term "categories" requires clarification. 
concrete example will serve this purpose: 
A respondent is asked to choose one of the following alternatives to 
identify the different kinds of scientific enquiry: 
1.there is basically one scientific method 
2.there are different ways of being scientific" [10]. 
These two answers each constitute a distinct catepory. 
If the respondent is not asked to choose between (1) and (2), but to 
answer the following questions in connection with both statements, 
namely, 
(a) Do you agree or disaoree with the statement? 
(b) Now sure do 0ou feel about your reply (a)? 
tnen clearly, the choices the respondent has are reflected in both the 
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provided statements (1) and (2), as well as in the questions (a) and 
(b). What, however seems to be the decisive factor in terms of the 
provision of adequate categories is the extent to which statements 
and 	 (2) cover the intended ground. The above pair of questions (a) and 
(b) could be seen as a means, of enabling the respondent to express 
his/her opinions regarding each statement and furthermore to modify to 
a certain extent the clear cut positions, which the statements put 
forward. Clearly, the modification is meaningful only if the statements 
are rot mutually exclusive and have covered, to a reasonable extent, 
all the possible ground. 
Consider now for instance, the following alternatives: 
In general. the better of two competing theories 
(1) is the one which is nearest to the truth 
(2) is the one which is the most useful 
(2.) is a matter of consensus amongst scientists arising out of 
critical scrutiny. 
These cannot be seen as mutually exclusive: a respondent could for 
example hold that the better of two competing scientific theories is 
the one which is nearest to the truth and the consensus of the 
scientific community. In such a case. applying questions (a) and (b), 
the respondent would answer 'agree" to alternative (1), "disagree" to 
alternative (2) and "agree" to alternative (.3) - (qualifying each of 
his/her responses as "sure" or "unsure"). Thus, the respondent, in 
relation to these three alternatives could present his/her view clearly 
and with a reasonable degree of freedom of choice and flexibility 
 
With regard to the significance of the role of the statements 
(alternatives) as compared with that of the role of the pair of 
questions, which complement each statement, an analogy can be drawn. 
The statement; can be seen to represent philosophical or curricular, 
or pedagogical, as applicable) positions, so as to cover all the 
possible alternatives in the case of logically mutually exclusive 
statements, or to signal the extreme and some in-between points, 
	 in 
cases where the ground is conceived as a continuum. It should be noted 
that in the second case the statements are not mutually exclusive, nor 
do they cover the whole spectrum of alternatives, but rather cover the 
whole ground. In the former case the pair of questions (a) and (b), -
which complement each statement - permit the researcher to elucidate 
the opinions of the respondent; whereas, in the latter, the questions, 
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in addition to their previously mentioned function, could be seen as a 
vehicle whicn permits the respondent to move between the constant point 
provided by the statements, so to locate his/her vle4s according to 
his/her choice. 
It is therefore the statements themselves which are more significant 
in terms of settino boundaries, since the approach of 	 ioining each 
statement wito a pair of Questions as described above was acopted in 
this study, the term "categories" referring to the content of each of 
toe statements. 
The format of the instrument. 
The above attempt to clarify the meaning of the term categories has 
touched on the point of the "internal" structure of the statements. 
Consider the following two ways of presenting two statements which are 
the same in terms of content: 
(A). The status of scientific knowledge 
(1) is not different from that of any other kind of knowledge, all 
being of equal value. 
(2) is different from other kinds of knowledge having a special value 
of its own. 
or 
(E). 
	
(1) 	 Scientific knowledge is of special status because it has a 
special value of its own differing from other kinds of knowledge 
(2) The status of scientific knowledge is not different from any 
other kind of knowledge, all being of equal value. 
The first way of presentation (in which statements are comprised of 
stems and leafs) was chosen, mainly because it could help the 
respondent to place the statement in context (since it refers to other 
possible alternatives as well) 	 thereby aiding the conceptualisation of 
the difference. 
There are two other choices concerning the format of the instrument: 
1. the use of a 1-4 scale and 
the division of the instrument into three parts. 
The first of these, which determines the scale of codification of the 
responses, refers to the kind of questions being asked. Here, the 
respondents were asked to answer two questions in connection with each 
statement in the questionnaire: 
(a) Do you agree or disagree with the statement? 
(b) How sure you feel about your reply (a)? 
In so far as the question (a) is concerned the respondent had to 
choose between "agree or disagree", whilst in terms of question (b) the 
choice provided was between "sure" or "unsure". 
This format was chosen because it as thought that it would be easier 
and in this sense more reliable for an individual to express his/her 
opinion in a qualitative way, instead of quantifying it. 
The last aspect of the format concerns, as stated above, tne division 
of the instrument into three parts. The first and the second of these 
used the above mode of questionning in relation to the respondents 
views. 
	 However, the first part contains statements which are obviously 
antithetical whilst in the second, simultaneous selection is possible. 
The third part is different in this respect. A choice of one or more 
of the options is not only logically speaking possible, but also highly 
probable. A small scale pilot study verified this assumption. This 
however raises the problem of the discriminant power of this part of 
the instrument. For instance, it is difficult to disagree with any of 
the following statements 0111: 
It is essential to effectiye learning that account has been taken 
of 
a. pupils perception of their own needs. 
b. pupils immediate prior knowledge. 
c. pupils' ability to think at a sufficient level of abstraction." 
One can reasonably argue here that the crucial element regarding 
teachers .iews is not a matter of preferring one alternative at the 
expenses of another, but rather a matter of establishing the weight 
respondents attach to each alternative. For this reason teachers were 
asked here to put the alternatives for each statement in order of 
priority. 
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VII.4 	 Summarising the position. 
The main characteristics of the instrument can be summarised in the 
following points: 
1. The area of interest is to survey teachers' views about certain 
aspects of philosophy of scientific knowledge (on the ontological and 
epistemological levels) and certain curricular and pedagogical issues 
(specified in table T7.1). 
2. The philosophical, curricular, pedagogical positions embedded in 
the instrument arose from an a-priori analysis. These positions are 
intented to cover the spectrum of currently prevailing trends in the 
respective areas. 
3. The instrument is a closed-ended questionnaire and consists of 
three parts. In the first two parts agreement or disagreement with the 
statements is asked, while the third requires ordering of priority. 
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VIII.1 	 THE EMPIRICAL ELEMENT: Outline of the 
strategy for analysis. 
The empirical element of this piece of research deals with an 
analysis of teachers' philosophical, curricular and pedagogical views 
as they are expressed in relation to the teaching of science at the 
secondary level. 
In this chapter an overall description and an analysis of the 
evidence gathered from the application of the questionnaire is given. 
This analysis is organised in four stages: 
a. The first stage presents the percentages of people who agreeior 
disagree with each statement, recording which statements show 
tendencies towards acceptance or rejection. Furthermore, attention is 
paid to the patterns of responses emerging from groups of statements 
which refer to the same theme (e.g. methodology of science, status of 
scientific knowledge, assumptions on learning, etc.). At this stage the 
focus is on the level of the whole sample as opposed to that of the 
individual. The intended outcome is an overall picture at the level of 
the whole sample, which consists of three components 
	 (philosophical, 
curricular, pedagogical). 
b. In the second stage, there is a shift in focus from the level of 
the whole sample to that of individuals. Each statement (which could be 
seen as representing a variable), is combined with the answers of other 
statements belonging to the same theme, so as to illustrate the 
position of any given individual regarding this theme. Having done 
this, one can distinguish two groups of individuals: individuals with 
consistent views in terms of the background network and individuals 
with eclectic views in terms of the network. For those individuals who 
by having consistent views in terms of the network seem to accept the 
distinctions implied by the construction of the network, a map of their 
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views regarding the three components (philosophical, curricular and 
pedagogical), can be constructed. On the other hand, an exploration of 
the correlations between the answers cf those individuals who appear to 
have eclectic views in terms of the network, is attempted. Finally, the 
differentiation of opinions at subgroup level (PGCE students -
teachers, physicists - chemists - biologists) is analysed. 
c. The third stage can be seen as a continuation of the second. 
This stage deals with correlations between answers falling within 
different themes in the philosophical, curricular and pedagogical 
components, 	 so as to lay a basis for a discussion on the sort of 
educational theory students and teachers hold. 
d. In the final stage, an the attempt -is made to bring elements 
from the three previous stages together and to draw out the conclusions 
(see chapter IX). 
A schematic representation of this overall strategy for analysing the 
evidence gathered is shown in diagram D8.1. As indicated by this 
diagram, the structure-flow of analysis, as well as the discussion is 
informed by the background analysis (theoretical - substantive 
framework). Therefore, the acceptance of the specific points raised 
during the subsequent analysis and discussion is to a large extent 
conditional upon how one evaluates this background analysis. 
Finally, before commencing the analysis proper and discussion of the 
data, a brief description of the sample and the assumptions on which 
the sampling is based as well as a reiteration of the structure of the 
instrument used is presented. 
erentiation at 
-group level 
eaciPh-Ch-Biol 
'There'-Variables.: 
	
1 	 An analysis 
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combinations). 	 . 	 individuals. 
1 Pedagogical Component : 1 
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V 
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in terms of the 
network. 
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 a 	 Analysis 
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:Philosophical Component: : 
A 'qualitative' 	 : 	 :An overall picture 
analysis. 	 1—if at the level of 	 1 Curricular Component 1 : 
: the whole sample. 
: 	 I 
Conclusion s. 
DIAGRAM 
	
D8.1: The stages of data analysis. 
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VIII.2 	 THE SAMPLE. 
The target population from which the sample was drawn was young 
science teachers in urban schools and prospective science teachers 
(PGCE students). The sample comprised physics (male and female), 
chemistry (male and female) and biology (male and female) teachers and 
prospective teachers. 	 Teachers were approached through the North and 
South London Science Centres. The cohort of the academic year 1984-1985 
in the Science Education Dept. of ULIE constitutes the sample as far as 
the PGCE students are concerned. A detailed breakdown of the sample is 
given in table T8.1 below: 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION. 
Physics 	 Chemistry 	 Biology 	 S.-Total 1 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total 
Students 	 11 	 1 	 1 	 11 	 11 	 23 	 17 	 40 
Teachers 	 12 	 3 	 14 	 6 	 7 	 12 	 33 	 21 	 54 
S.-Total 2 	 27 	 26 	 41 	 94 
23 	 4 	 15 	 11 	 18 	 23 	 56 	 38 	 94 
+1 geology student 
95 
TABLE TB.1 
It is hoped that by selecting for the sample people who have not 
expressed (e.g. by choice of attending a course) any special concern 
with philosophical-epistemological 	 issues, that the views collected 
will be representative of "ordinary" teachers. Furthermore, the 
administration of the questionnaire was managed so as to avoid the 
possibility of self-selection by obtaining a response rate of nearly 
100%. 
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VIII.3 
	 THE INSTRUMENT. 
Issues regarding the instrument are dealt with in chapter VII Here, a 
brief description of the structure and the thematic scope of the 
instrument is given, so to facilitate the unfolding of the subsequent 
analysis. 
Inc questionnaire consists of three components which respectively 
address certain philosophical views of teachers, their views on 
curriculum and finally their views on pedagogy. Each of these 
components is constructed around certain themes, as follows: 
COMPONENTS - THEMES - STATEMENTS OF THE INSTRUMENT. 
THEMES. 
1. PHILOSOPHICAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMPONENT. 
STATEMENTS. 
Sc. 	 Methods 3a., 3b., 	 4a., 	 4b., 	 5a., 	 5h., 	 6a., 	 66., 	 16a, 	 16b, 	 17a., 	 17b., 	 17c. 
Criteria of 	 Demarcation. 7a., 7b., 	 8a., 	 8b., 	 18a., 	 18b., 	 18c., 	 20a., 	 20b., 	 20c. 
Pattern of 	 sc. 	 growth. 21a., 21b., 	 22a., 	 22b., 	 23a., 	 23b. 
Ontological 	 Question. 24a, 24b., 	 24c., 	 25a., 	 25b., 	 19., 	 186. 
Status of 	 sc. 	 Knowledge. 26a., 26b., 	 27a., 	 27b., 	 27c. 
2. CURRICULAR COMPONENT. 
Content v. 	 Process 2a., 	 2b., 	 9a., 	 96., 	 9c., 	 29a., 	 29b., 	 29c., 	 30a., 	 30b., 	 30c. 
Integrated Science Ia., 	 lb., 	 12a., 	 12b., 	 12c., 	 12d., 	 13a., 	 136., 	 13c., 	 13d. 
3. PEDAGOGICAL COMPONENT. 
Assumptions on Learning. 28a., 286., 	 28c., 	 31a., 	 31b., 	 31c., 	 33a., 
	
33b., 	 33c., 	 (10a., 	 106.) 
Assumptions on Instruction. 14a., 146., 	 14b., 	 15a., 	 156., 	 32a., 	 32b., 	 34a., 	 34b., 	 34c., 	 34d. 
Classroom practice. 35a., 35b., 	 35c., 	 35d., 	 35e., 	 36a., 	 36b., 	 36c., 	 36d. 
TABLE 18.2: The composition of the themes. 
The following data description and subsequent analysis is done 
separately for each of these components. Within each component the 
discussion of the responses, when their pattern is considered, is 
organised along the constituent themes of each component. 
VIII.4 DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS. 
----------------- 
In this stage (see diagram D8.1) a description and a first elementary 
analysis of the evidence gathered is presented. There are two distinct 
intended outcomes: 
-Firstly, to reveal the "dominant" pattern of responses at the 
level of the whole sample. 
-Secondly, to check this pattern against all the possible position; 
(paths in the network), which the background analyeis sugoests 
(sections VIII.5.1 and VIII.5.2). 
The first step of this stage (sections VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2 and 
VIII.4.3) presents initially the percentages of people who agree (or 
disagree) with each statement of the instrument, recording which 
statements show tendencies (towards acceptance or rejection of the idea 
expressed). These tendencies are subsequently employed in the treatment 
of the data so as to discern the "dominant" patterns of responses. 
Instrumental in disentangling the tendencies is the following, 
classification system. 
TABLE INDICATING THE CATEGORIES FOR A FIRST CLASSIFICATION. 
Boundaries. 
 
Categories. 
 
40%-60% 
307.-40% or 601-70% 
15Z-307. or 70Z-85Z 
less 157. or more 85Z 
Relatively evenly divided. 
Clear tendency (either way). 
Strong tendency (either way). 
Very strong tendency (either way). 
TABLE T8.3 
This "qualitative" treatment of the responses is helpful since it 
permits a first estimation of the dominant pattern. It should be 
_.tressed however that it is considered to be somewhat "rough" analysis, 
failing to take into account 
	
(even at the level of groups) 
	 other 
consistent patterns (positions) which co-exist besides the 'dominant" 
one. The latter type of analysis will be discussed in the second stage 
(section VIII.6). 
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VI11.4.1 	 Descriptive analysis of the data: 
Philosophical component. 
Below (table 18.4 and figure F8.1), the percentages of tree 
respondents agreeing with each statement of the philosophical component 
of the instrument are presented. The nature of the items is described 
briefly for each; note however that an item is not an exhaustive test 
for a given position - for Example, "realism" 	 (statement 24a) means 
only a realist response to that question. 
PHILOSOPHICAL-EF'ISTEMOLOGICAL 	 COMPONENT. 
Statements. 	 Total 	 Teach. 	 Stud. 	 Phys. 	 Chem. 	 Biol. Male Female 
3a. Methodological unity. 29.8 	 42.6 	 12.5 11.1 36.0 39.0 21.1 43.2 
3b. Methodological 	 diversity. Exact reverse picture. 
4a. Inductive reasoning. 68.8 	 71.7 	 65.0 55.6 92.0 62.5 67.3 71.1 
4b. Deductive reasoning. 35.5 	 26.4 	 47.5 51.9 16.0 37.5 38.1 31.6 
5a. Verification. 53.3 	 52.8 	 53.8 30.8 68.0 60.0 49.1 59.5 
5b. Falsification. 48.9 	 45.3 	 53.8 76.9 32.0 40.0 56.4 37.8 
6a. Existence of standards for the choice of sci. 	 method. 82.6 	 82.7 	 82.5 92.3 83.3 75.6 80.4 86.1 
6b. No standards for the choice of scientific method. Exact reverse picture. 
7a. Existence of standards for considering a theory sci. 79.6 	 82.7 	 75.6 77.8 87.5 75.6 77.9 80.6 
7b. No standards for considering a theory scientific. Exact reverse picture. 
8a. 	 Standards for the choice between sci. theories exist. 78.5 	 77.4 	 80.0 81.5 70.8 80.5 83.9 70.3 
Bb. 	 No standards for the choice between scientific theories. 22.6 	 22.6 	 22.5 18.5 29.2 22.0 16.1 32.4 
16a. Incompatible methods in science: 	 Positive feature. 76.9 	 86.3 	 65.0 92.3 65.2 75.6 82.5 67.6 
16b. Incompatible methods in science: 	 Pointless to discuss 
methodology. 
22.0 	 25.5 	 17.5 07.7 56.5 12.2 22.8 20.6 
17a. Basis for choosing scientific method: 	 'consensus". 64.5 	 67.9 	 60.0 57.7 57.7 75.0 57.1 75.7 
17b. Basis for choosing sci. 	 method: 	 'embedded in science'. 58.5 	 50.0 	 70.0 77.8 50.0 50.0 66.7 45.9 
17c. Basis for choosing sci. 	 method: 	 'individual choice'. 82.8 	 87.0 	 76.9 81.5 96.2 74.4 83.9 81.1 
18a. 	 Basis for choosing between sci. 	 theories: 	 'truth'. 33.3 	 16.7 	 56.4 48.1 07.7 40.0 34.5 31.6 
18b. Basis for choosing between sci. 	 theories: 	 'usefulness'. 
18c. Basis for choosing between sci. theories: 	 "consensus'. 
	
42.6 	 51.9 	 30.0 
	
86.2 	 92.6 	 77.5 
51.9 
85.2 
23.1 
96.2 
48.0 
80.5 
48.2 
85.7 
34.2 
86.8 
19a. 	 Proper sci. method essential for 'truth' approximation. 41.9 	 42.6 	 41.0 40.7 34.6 46.2 42.9 40.5 
20a. 	 The search for demarc. crit. pointless: Knowl. 	 frames. 57.0 	 56.6 	 59.0 37.0 61.5 67.0 42.9 78.4 
20b. The search for demarc. criteria pointless: 	 Ideology. 
20c. The search for demarcation criteria fruitful. 
	
26.1 	 18.4 	 35.9 
	
65.6 	 71.7 	 56.8 
26.9 
69.2 
34.4 
73.1 
20.0 
57.9 
27.8 
73.6 
23.5 
54.1 
21a. Characteristic of pattern of sc. 	 change: 	 Growth. 64.2 	 66.7 	 61.0 37.0 76.9 73.2 56.1 76.3 
21b. Characteristic of pattern of sc. char*: Change. 76.8 	 75.9 	 78.0 88.9 61.5 78.0 68.4 89.5 
22a. Growth of knowledge: accumulation of facts. 
22b. Growth of knowledge: 	 succession of theories. 
	
93.6 	 94.4 	 92.5 
	
62.8 	 63.0 	 62.5 
96.3 
63.0 
96.2 
61.5 
90.0 
65.0 
91.2 
66.7 
97.3 
56.8 
23a. New knowledge: Successive frameworks. 8 3.2 	 87.0 	 78.0 77.8 92.3 80.5 78.9 89.5 
23b. New knowledge: 
	 No discernible pattern. 17.9 	 13.0 	 24.4 07.4 11.5 29.3 19.3 15.8 
24a. 	 Realism. 66.7 	 63.0 	 71.8 66.7 76.0 60.0 73.7 55.6 
	
4b. 	 Idealism. 
	
24c. 	 Scepticism. 
	
30.9 	 31.5 	 30.0 
In 	 19.5 
	
21.1 	 .i.L• 
37.0 
11.1 
12.0 
23.0 
Z9.0 
28.8 
24.6 
26.3 
40.5 
13.2 
25a. Scientific Realism. 02.1 	 00.0 	 04.9 03.7 03.8 00.0 01.8 02.6 
25b. Logical Positivism. 83.2 	 79.6 	 87.8 81.5 96.2 75.6 87.7 76.3 
26a. Scientific knowledge: Special status. 40.0 	 46.3 	 31.7 55.6 53.8 22.0 54.4 18.4 
26b. Scientific knowledge: 
	 As any other form of 	 knowledge. 67.0 	 69.8 	 63.4 37.0 80.0 80.5 53.6 86.8 
27a. Basis for privil. 	 position of sci. 	 knowledge: 	 Objective. 58.5 	 50.9 	 68.3 84.6 58.3 43.9 70.2 40.5 
27b. oasis for privileged position of sci. 
	 knowledge: 	 Useful. 65.5 	 61.1 	 70.7 7.1 76.9 53.7 64.9 65.8 
basis for privil. 
	 position of sci. 	 knowl.: 	 Sy'Stematic. 68.4 	 68.5 	 68.3 8
4
1.5 80.8 51.2 71.9 63.2 
TABLE T8.4 
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The following table T8.5a is a presentation of the accepted and 
rejected statements regarding the philosophical epistemological 
component. 
STATEMENTS GENERALLY ACCEPTED. 	 STATEMENTS GENERALLY REJECTED. 
:h. Methodological diversity. 	 Ca. Methodological unity. 
4a. Inductive reasoning. 	 4b. Deductive reasoning. 
5a. Verification. 	 5b. Falsification. 
6a. Standards for the choice of cc. method Exist. 	 6h. No standards for the choice of scientific method. 
a. Existence of stand. for considering a theory sci. 	 7b. No standards for considering a theory scientific. 
8a. Stand. for the choice between sc. theories exist. 	 8b. No standards for the choice between cc. theories. 
Ida. Incompatible meth. in sc.: Positive feature. 	 16b. Incomp. meth. in sc.: Pointless to discuss methodology. 
17a. Basis for choosing cc. method: "consensus". 
17h. Basis for choosing cc. method: "embedded in science'. 
17c. Basis for choosing sc. method: "individual choice". 
15c. Basis for choosing between theories: 'consensus". 	 18a. Basis for choosing between theories: 'truth°. 
la. Basis for choosing between cc. theories: "usefulness'. 
19a. Proper cc. method essential for 'truth' approximation. 
20a. Frames of known Search for demarc. criteria 	 20b. Sc. knowl.-ideolagv: The search for demarc. criteria 
pointless. 	 pointless. 
20c. The search for demarc. criteria could generally be fruitful. 
21a. Characteristic of pattern of cc. change: Growth. 
21b. Characteristic of pattern of cc. change: Change (not growth). 
22a. Growth of knowledge: accumulation of facts. 
22b. Growth of knowledge: succession of theories. 
2:a. New knowledge: Successive frameworks. 	 23b. New knowledge: No discernible pattern. 
24a. Realisa. 	 24b. Idealism. 
24c. Scepticism. 
25b. Scientific Realism. 	 25a. Logical Positivism. 
26b. Sci. knowledge: As any other form of knowledge. 	 26a. Scientific knowledge: Special status. 
27a. Basis for the unique position of cc. knowledge: Objective. 
27b. Basis for the unique position of cc. knowledge: Useful. 
27c. Basis for the unique position of sc. knowledge: Systematic. 
TABLE TB.5a: Accepted and rejected statements for the philosophical-epistemological component. 
The next step is to try to reveal the tendencies emerging from the 
responses. Applying the classification boundaries (table T8.3) in the 
above table T8.4, these tendencies are as follows: 
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TENDENCIES IN THE RESPONSES: PHILOSOPHICAL - EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMPONENT. 
Very Strong Tendency Strong Tendency Clear Tendency Evenly Divided. 
Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 
	
18c. 	 25a. 	 3b. 	 3a. 	 4a. 	 4b. 	 5a. 	 5b. 
	
22a. 	 6a. 	 6b. 	 17a. 	 I8a. 	 17b. 	 18b. 
	
7a. 	 7b. 	 20c. 	 24b. 	 20a. 	 19. 
	
8a. 	 8b. 	 21a. 	 26a. 	 27a. 
	
I6a. 	 16b. 	 22b. 
	
17c. 	 20b. 	 24a. 
	
21b. 	 23b. 	 26b. 
	
23a. 	 24c. 	 27b. 
	
25b. 	 27c. 
1 	 9 	 8 	 9 	 4 	 4 
Total: 4 Stateunts. 
TABLE 78.513 
What follows is a reconstruction of the views of the respondents, 
which is based on the classification of the data shown in the above 
tables T8.5a and T8.5b. This reconstruction takes into account the 
combination of accepted and rejected statements for any idea-choice 
which exists in the instrument. For instance, with regard to the 
question of methodological unity or diversity in science, which is 
initially asked about by statements 3a and 3b, the responses seem to 
suggest that the population leans towards methodological diversity 
since generally statement 3b is accepted whilst statement 3a is 
reiected. There are however some cases, namely statements 
-17a, 	 17b, 17c, (the basis for choosing between scientific methods 
if methodological diversity is the case); 
-27a, 27b, 27c, (the justification for considering scientific 
knowledge unique if its special status is accepted); 
-20a, 20c, (criteria of demarcation); 
-21a, 21b, (characteristics of pattern of scientific change); 
-22a, 22b, 	 (growth of knowledge by accumulation of facts or 
succession of theories); 
where more than one choice is being accepted. It is worth noting that 
in all these cases the instrument allows these co-selections. 
For the purposes of this preliminary analysis the statement with the 
stronger tendency, as indicated by table 78.5h is selected. For example 
between 17a (accepted, clear tendency), 17b (accepted, evenly divided) 
and 17c (accepted, strong tendency), statement 17c (the choice of 
3a., 3b. 
4a., -lb. 
5a., 5b. 
6a., 6b. 
7a., 7b. 
Ba., eb. 
I6a., 16b. 
17a., 17b., 17c. 
lea., ISb., 16c. 
20a., 20b., 20:. 
2:a., 21b. 
22a., 226. 
22a., 23b. 
24a., 24b., 24c. 
25a., 25b. 
26a., 26b. 
27a., 276.,  
Methodological issues. 
Inductive v. Deductive reasoning 
Verification v. Falsification. 
Standards for sc. method. 
Standards for theory "scientific". 
Standards for choice between theories. 
Posit. or negat., if diversity. 
Basis for choosing scientific method. 
Basis for choosing scientific theories. 
Criteria of demarcation. 
Change v. Growth in science. 
If growth: Facts or theories. 
Succesive frameworks v. no pattern. 
Realism, Idealilism, Scepticism. 
Sci. Realism, Log. Positivism. 
Sc. knowledge: Special or as other. 
Cn what basis, if special. 
scientific method is a matter of individual standards) was selected. 
Applying the above criteria, table T8.6 below shows the main broad 
pattern of the responses. 
RESPONDENTS' VIEW ON PHILOSOPHICAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES. 
Group of statements 	 Central notion. 	 Expressed choice. 
2 0 1 
3b. Methodological diversity. 
4a. Inductive reasoning. 
5a. Verification. 
6a. Existence of 'rational' standards. 
7a. Existence of 'rational' standards. 
Ba. Existence of "rational' standards. 
16a. Incompatible meth. in science: Positi4e feature. 
17c. Basis for choice: individual choice, "consensus'. 
lBc. Choice based on 'consensus'. 
20c. The search for demarc. crit. could be fruitful. 
21b. Characteristic of pattern of change: No growth. 
22a. Growth of knowledge: afcumulation of facts. 
23a. New knowledge: Successive frameworks. 
24a. Realism. 
25b. Scientific Realism. 
26b. Sci. knowledge: As any other form of knowledge. 
27b. and 27c. Privileged pos. of sc. knowledge: 
Useful, aysteaatic. 
TABLE T8.6 
It is thus possible to summarise the view taken by the respondents, 
(table T3.6) in the following points: 
1. It is a positive feature of science that methodological 
diversity exists; diversity which conforms to rational standards for 
choosing between scientific methods. Individuals use their own criteria 
for such a choice. 
Criteria of demarcation for scientific theories have built-in 
rational standards. 
3. Science changes through successive frameworks of 	 knowledge. 
Essential to this is the accumulation of "facts". 
4. Scientific knowledge is not privileged vis-a vis other forms of 
knowledge but it is a useful and systematic pattern of thought. 
5. As far the ontological issue is concerned realism is the 
overwhelming choice. 
5 6 7 8 16 17 18 19 28 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
FIGURE F8.1: Philosophical component. 
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What tables T3.4, TS.5a and 1.8.5b are indicating can be seen in the 
following figure F3.1, in which the percentages of the respondents who 
agree with each statement of this component are given. Furthermore, in 
this figure the areas where a tendency .as well as the strength of 
tendency) exists is shown. 
agree 
2a. Scientific content and process are distinct. 	 26.3 	 27.8 24.4 
2b. Scientific content and process are strongly related. 	 78.9 	 74.1 85.4 
9a. Teaching of science: Emphasis on the content. 
9b. Teaching of science: Emphasis on the process. 
9c. Sc. content and process: No difference in emphasis. 
10a. Teaching of science in a historical perspective. 
10b. Teaching of science as currently understood. 
on the similarities of sc. subjects. 
on the differences of sc. subjects. 
for separate subjects: Diff. in content. 
for separate subjects: Diff. in process. 
for separate subjects: Practical reasons. 
for separate subjects: Academic standards. 
for integrated science: Unity of concepts. 
for integrated science: Unity of methods. 
for integrated science: Practical reasons. 
for integrated science: Social relevance. 
Ila. Emphasis 
11b. Emphasis 
10a. Argument 
10b. Argument 
10c. Argument 
10d. Argument 
13a. Argument 
13b. Argument 
13c. Argument 
13d. Argument 
29a. Scientific content: Sc. theories and 
High preference. 
Middle choice. 
Low preference. 
29b. Scientific content: Experimental and 
High preference. 
Middle choice. 
Low preference. 
29c. Scientific content: Experimental and 
High preference. 
Middle choice. 
Low preference. 
30a. Scientific process: 
Mich preference. 
Middle choice. 
Low preference. 
30b. Scientific process: 
High preference. 
Middle choice. 
Low preference. 
30c. Scientific process: How to devise experiments. 
High preference. 
Middle choice. 
Low preference. 
laws. 
07.5 05.7 10.0 
17.2 11.3 25.0 
75.3 83.0 65.0 
observational data. 
36.0 
53.8 
09.7 
observational techniques.g  
5
29.0 
15.1 
Scientific methods (how to be scientific). 
39.0 
21.5 
38.7 
Handling of experimental and observational 
21.5 
45.2 
33.3 
38.7 50.9 22.5 
33.3 22.6 47.5 
28.0 26.4 30.0 
10.5 13.0 07.3 
28.7 29.6 27.5 
93.7 92.6 95.1 
83.2 83.3 82.9 
57.3 40.7 70.7 
20.0 16.7 24.4 
94.7 94.4 95.1 
62.8 
28.7 
52.1 
19.1 
77.7 
69.9 
30.9 
88.2 
56.6 
17.0 
62.3 
17.0 
69.8 
75.5 
34.0 
83.0 
70.7 
43.9 
39.0 
22.0 
87.8 
62.5 
26.8 
95.0 
37.7 
60.4 
01.9 
56.6 
28.3 
15.1 
28.0 
22.6 
49.1 
data. 
2. 
5
0
4.
8
7 
24.5 
35.0 
45.0 
20.0 
55.0 
30.0 
15.0 
55.0 
20.0 
25.0 
22.5 
32.5 
45.0 
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VIII.4.2 	 Descriptive analysis of the data: 
Curricular component. 
As for the philosophical - epistemological component, the percentages 
of the respondents agreeing with each of the statements of the 
curricular component of the instrument are presented below. 
CURRICULAR 	 COMPONENT. 
Statements. 
la. Teaching of separate scientific subjects. 
lb. Teaching of integrated sience. 
Total Teach. Stud. 	 Phys. Chem. Biol. 	 Male Female 
40.0 44.4 34.1 
Exact reverse picture. 
33.3 46.2 41.5 47.4 28.9 
51.9 15.4 17.1 40.4 05.3 
63.0 88.5 82.9 64.8 94.1 
18.5 00.0 10.2 10.5 10.5 
48.1 19.2 22.5 28.6 28.9 
96.3 88.5 95.1 93.0 94.7 
85.2 76.9 85.4 75.4 94.7 
59.3 42.3 58.5 50.9 57.9 
22.2 30.8 10.2 21.1 18.4 
96.3 88.5 97.6 93.0 97.4 
55.6 52.0 75.0 55.4 73.7 
33.3 24.0 29.3 30.4 26.3 
51.9 52.0 53.7 50.0 55.3 
18.5 20.0 19.5 17.9 21.1 
70.4 72.0 85.4 73.2 84.2 
66.7 64.0 75.0 69.1 71.1 
51.9 08.0 31.7 30.4 31.6 
74.1 100 90.0 81.8 97.4 
18.5 00.0 04.9 08.8 05.6 
14.8 25.0 14.6 14.0 22. 
66.7 75.0 80.0 77.2 72.2 
22.2 61.5 29.3 38.6 33.3 
59.3 30.3 63.4 54.4 52.8 
18.5 04.2 07.3 07.0 19.3 
59.3 37.5 65.9 52.6 61.1 
25.9 41.7 22.0 31.6 45.0 
18.4 20.8 10.2 15.8 13.9 
59.3 25.0 36.6 36.8 44.4 
07.4 29.2 24.4 10.3 36.1 
33.3 45.8 39.0 50.9 19.4 
25.9 33.3 09.8 29.8 08.3 
63.0 45.8 34.1 50.9 36.1 
11.1 20.8 56.1 19.3 55.6 
14.8 27.8 53.7 33.3 47.2 
29.6 25.0 41.5 36.8 27.8 
55.6 33.3 04.9 29.8 25.0 
TABLE TB.7 
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The following table T8.8a is a presentation of the generally accepted 
and rejected statements regarding the curricular component. 
STATEMENTS GENERALLY ACCEPTED. 	 STATEMENTS GENERALLY REJECTED. 
lb. Teaching of integrated science. 	 la. Teaching of separate scientific subjects. 
2b. Scientific content and process are related. 	 2a. Scientific content and process are distinct. 
9c. Sc. content and process: No difference in emphasis. 9a. Emphasis on the content. 
9b. Emphasis on the process. 
10a. Teaching of science in a historical perspective. 
10b. Teaching of science as currently understood. 
11b. Emphasis on the differ. of sc. subjects. 	 Ila. Emphasis on the simil. of sc. subjects. 
12a. Argument for separate subj.: Differ. in content. 	 12b. Argument for separate subj.: Differ. in process. 
12c. Argument for separate subj.: Practical reasons. 	 12d. Argument for separate subj.: Academic standards. 
13a. Argument for integrated sc.: Unity of concepts. 	 13c. Argument for integrated sc.: Practical reasons. 
13b. Argument for integrated sc.: Unity of methods. 
13d. Argument for integrated sc.: Social relevance. 
TABLE T8.8a 
Not all the statements have the same format in this component. 
Specifically, for the statements 29a, 29b, 29c, 30a, 30b and 30c 
indication of preference was asked for rather than acceptance or 
rejection. The preferences given, according to table T8.7, appear in 
table T8.8b below. 
TABLE INDICATING THE PREFERENCES: CURRICULAR COMPONENT. 
High preference. 	 Middle choice. 	 Low preference. 
	
29c. 	 29b. 	 29a. 
	
30a. 	 30c. 	 30b. 
TABLE 78.8b 
As before (philosophical-epistemological component in section 
VIII.4.1), that is to say applying the same criteria, the tendencies 
emerging are shown below (table T8.8c). 
TENDENCIES IN THE RESPONSES: CURRICULAR COMPONENT. 
Very Strong Tendency Strong Tendency Clear Tendency Evenly Divided. 
Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 
	 Acc. 	 Rej. 
	
9c. 	 9a. 	 2b. 	 2a. 	 lb. 	 la. 	 10b. 
	
lib. 	 Ila. 	 9a. 	 9b. 	 12a. 	 13c. 	 12c. 
	
13d. 	 29a. 	 13a. 	 Ila. 
	 13b. 	 29b. 	 29c. 
	
12b. 
	
30a. 
	
12d. 	 30c. 
30c. 
3 	 3 	 3 	 6 	 2 	 5 	 3 	 0 
Total: 25 Statements. 
TABLE T8.8c 
source) and T8.8c Taking into account tables 78.8a, T8.8b (as a 
agree 
18 
18 	 11 	 12 	 13 	 29 	 38 
FIGURE 	 F8.2: Curricular component. 
b 
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The following figure F8.2 displays in the form of a bar—chart the 
percentages of people who agree with each statement. 
(criterion as in the philosophical component) one can proceed in the 
disentaglement of the dominant view expressed by the respondents 
regarding the questions of science curriculum. 
RESPONDENTS VIEW OF CURRICULAR ISSUES. 
Group of statements. 	 Central notion. 	 Expressed choice. 
la., lb. 
2a., 2b. 
9a., 9b., 9c. 
10a., 10b. 
Ila., 1lb. 
12a.,12b.,12c.,12d. 
13a.,13b.,13c.,13d. 
29a., 29h., 29c. 
30a., 30b., 30c. 
Integrated science v. separate subjects 
Sc. content and process. 
Emphasis on teaching: Content v. Process. 
Sc. in hist. context or current understand. 
Eaphasis on diff. or simil. of sc. subjects 
Arguments for separ. subjects. 
Arguments for integr. science. 
Meaning of sc. content. 
Meaning of sc. process. 
lb. Teaching of integrated science. 
26. Scientific content and process are related. 
9c. No difference in emphasis. 
10a.,106. Both 
. 11b. Emphasis on the differences of sc. subjects. 
12a. Argument for separ. subj.: Diff. in content. 
13a.,13b.,13d. Unity of concepts and methods; 
Social relevance. 
29c. Experimental and observational techniques. 
30a. Scientific methods. 
TABLE 18.9 
Summarising, this preliminary analysis of the responses seems to 
suggest that: 
206 
a. Teaching of integrated science is favoured mainly because of a 
postulated unity of concepts coupled with the perception that this 
could help to make the teaching of science socially relevant. 	 However 
attention should also be paid to the differences between the scientific 
subjects. 
b. Content and process in science are thought to be strongly 
related; by content is meant mainly observational and experimental 
techniques whilst process is seen as having a connection with 
methodological issues. 
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VIII.4.3 	 Descriptive analysis of the data: 
Pedagogical component. 
Table TE.10 presents the percentages of the teachers who agreed with 
each statement of the pedagogical component of the instrument. 
PEDAGOGICAL 	 COMPONENT. 
Statements. 
	
Total 	 Teach. 	 Stud. Phys. 	 Chem. 	 Biol. Male Female 
14a. Reinforcement: 	 Integral 	 part of 	 instruction. 74.4 70.4 80.5 66.7 57.7 90.2 71.9 78.9 
14b. Reinforcement: 	 Occasional 	 use. 63.8 59.3 70.0 77.8 57.7 57.5 67.9 57.9 
14c. Reinforcement: 	 Irrelevant to instruction. 08.4 07.4 09.8 07.4 15.4 04.9 05.3 13.2 
15a. Effective teaching: 	 objectives oriented. 78.9 75.9 82.9 81.5 69.2 85.4 71.9 89.5 
15b. Effective teaching: 	 Teachers centred. 97.9 100 95.1 92.6 100 100 96.5 100 
28a. 	 Aims of 	 learning: 	 Rational 	 understanding of the subject. 
High preference. 58.1 55.8 61.0 51.9 75.5 51.2 51.8 67.6 
Middle choice. 21.5 23.1 19.5 22.2 08.3 29.3 26.8 13.5 
Low preference. 20.4 21.2 19.5 25.9 16.7 19.5 21.4 18.9 
23b. 	 Aims of 	 learning: 	 Knowledge and skills of the subject. 
High preference. 24.7 32.7 14.6 25.9 12.5 31.7 26.8 21.6 
Middle choice. 23.7 11.5 39.0 33.3 20.8 19.5 21.4 27.0 
Low preference. 51.6 55.8 46.3 40.7 66.7 48.8 51.8 51.4 
2Bc. 	 Aims of 	 learning: 	 Individual 	 view of 	 the subject. 
High preference. 17.1 11.5 24.4 22.2 12.5 17.1 21.4 10.8 
Middle choice. 54.8 65.4 41.5 44.4 70.8 51.2 51.8 59.5 
Low preference. 28.0 23.1 34.1 33.3 16.7 31.7 26.8 29.7 
31a. Assessment of 	 learning outcome: 	 Check of what pupils can be seen to do. 
High preference. 
	
28.7 	 32.1 	 24.4 37.0 32.0 22.0 28.1 29.7 
Middle choice. 22.3 05.7 43.9 25.9 12.0 26.8 28.1 13.5 
Low preference. 48.9 62.3 31.7 37.0 56.0 51.2 43.9 56.8 
. 	 31b. 	 Assessment of 	 learning outcome: 	 Acquisition of the concepts of the subject. 
High preference. 
	
35.1 	 26.4 	 46.3 29.6 40.0 36.6 40.4 27.0 
Middle choice. 54.3 73.6 29.3 63.0 60.0 43.9 49.1 62.2 
Low preference. 10.6 00.0 24.4 07.4 00.0 10.5 10.5 10.8 
31c. 	 Assessment of 	 learning outcome: 	 Pupils' 	 own self assessment. 
High preference. 36.2 41.5 29.3 33.3 28.0 41.5 31.6 43.2 
Middle choice. 23.4 20.8 26.8 11.1 28.0 29.3 22.8 24.3 
Low preference. 40.4 37.7 43.9 55.6 44.0 29.3 45.6 32.4 
32a. Presentation of 	 knowledge: 	 Small 	 steps. 
High preference. 
	
68.1 83.0 48.8 44.4 84.0 73.2 66.7 70.3 
Middle choice. 
	
31.9 17.0 51.2 55.6 16.0 28.6 33.3 29.7 
32b. Presentation of knowledge: 
	
The whole idea first. 
High preference. 
	
31.9 17.0 51.2 56.6 16.0 26.8 33.3 29.7 
Middle choice. 
	
68.1 83.0 48.8 44.4 84.0 73.2 66.7 70.3 
33a. 	 Prerequisite for efficient learning: 	 self perception of needs. 
High preference. 	 29.8 34.0 24.4 55.6 24.0 17.1 38.6 16.2 
Middle choice. 27.7 32.1 22.0 03.7 36.0 36.6 29.8 24.3 
Low preference. 42.6 34.0 53.7 40.7 40.0 46.3 31.6 59.5 
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33b. Prerequisite for efficient learning: 	 Prior knowledge of subject. 
High preference. 	 30.9 22.6 41.5 22.2 40.0 29.3 35.1 24.3 
Middle choice. 	 38.3 39.6 36.6 48.1 36.0 34.1 36.8 40.5 
Low preference. 	 30.9 37.7 32.0 29.6 24.0 36.6 28.1 35.1 
33c. Prerequisite for efficient learning: 	 Ability for abstract thought. 
High preference. 	 39.4 	 43.4 34.1 22.2 36.0 53.7 26.3 59.5 
Middle choice. 	 34.0 28.3 41.5 48.1 28.0 29.3 33.3 35.1 
Low preference. 
	
26.6 28.3 24.4 29.6 36.0 17.1 40.4 05.4 
34a. Crucial 	 element for motivation: 	 Active participation. 
High preference. 
	
60.2 63.5 56.1 44.4 83.3 56.1 64.3 54.1 
Middle choice. 
	
36.6 36.5 36.6 51.9 16.7 39.0 32.1 43.2 
Low preference. 
	
03.2 00.0 07.3 03.7 00.0 04.9 03.6 02.7 
34b. Crucial 	 element for motivation: 	 Enjoyment of subject. 
High preference. 
	
30.1 36.5 22.0 44.4 16.7 29.3 25.0 37.0 
Middle choice. 
	
68.8 63.5 75.6 51.9 83.3 70.7 73.2 62.5 
Low preference. 
	
01.1 00.0 U2.4 03.7 00.0 00.0 01.8 00.0 
34c. Crucial 	 element 	 for motivation: 	 Like the teacher. 
High preference. 
	
05.4 00.0 12.2 03.7 00.0 09.8 05.4 05.4 
Middle choice. 
	
46.2 42.3 51.2 48.1 45.8 43.9 42.9 51.4 
Low preference. 	 48.4 57.5 36.6 48.1 54.2 46.3 51.8 43.2 
34d. Crucial 	 element for motivation: 	 Respect teacher. 
High preference. 	 03.2 00.0 07.3 07.4 00.0 02.4 05.4 00.0 
Middle choice. 	 84.9 86.5 82.9 85.2 100 78.0 91.1 75.7 
Low preference. 	 11.8 13.5 09.8 07.4 00.0 19.5 03.6 24.3 
34e. Crucial 	 element for motivation: 	 Successful 	 feedback. 
High 	 preference. 	 01.1 00.0 02.4 00.0 00.0 02.4 00.0 02.7 
Middle choice. 	 63.4 71.2 53.7 63.0 54.2 68.3 60.7 67.6 
Low preference. 	 35.5 28.8 43.9 37.0 45.8 29.3 39.3 29.7 
35a. Essential characteristic of 	 a 'good' lesson: 	 Clear explanation by teacher. 
High preference. 	 28.7 	 41.5 	 12.2 40.7 00.0 39.0 21.1 40.5 
Middle choice. 	 25.5 17.0 36.6 18.5 44.0 19.5 29.8 18.9 
Low preference. 	 45.7 41.5 51.2 40.7 56.0 41.5 49.1 40.5 
35b. Essential 	 characteristic of 	 a 	 'good' 	 lesson: 	 Pupils' 	 investigations. 
High 	 preference. 	 13.8 	 11.3 17.1 18.5 16.0 07.3 17.5 08.1 
Middle choice. 	 44.7 41.5 48.8 44.4 44.0 46.3 45.6 43.2 
Low preference. 	 41.5 47.2 34.1 37.0 40.0 46.3 36.8 48.6 
35c. Essential 	 characteristic of a 'good' lesson: 	 Guided discovery. 
High preference. 	 46.8 47.2 46.3 33.3 72.0 41.5 56.1 32.4 
Middle choice. 	 50.0 52.8 46.3 63.0 24.0 56.1 40.4 64.9 
Low preference. 	 03.2 00.0 07.3 03.7 04.0 02.4 03.5 02.7 
. 	 35d. Essential 	 characteristic of a "good' 	 lesson: 	 Active discussion. 
High preference. 	 10.6 00.0 24.4 07.4 12.0 12.2 55.3 18.9 
Middle choice. 	 79.8 87.7 68.3 74.1 88.0 78.0 84.2 73.0 
Low preference. 	 09.6 11.3 07.3 18.5 00.0 09.8 10.5 08.1 
36a. Attributes of effective teacher: 	 Knowledge of the subject. 
High preference. 	 29.0 32.1 25.0 33.3 48.0 14.6 30.3 21.6 
Middle choice. 	 32.3 30.2 35.0 37.0 24.0 34.1 30.4 35.1 
Low preference. 	 38.7 37.7 40.0 29.6 28.0 52.1 35.7 43.2 
36b. Attributes of effective teacher: 	 Understanding of pupils. 
High preference. 
	
36.6 34.0 40.0 33.3 04.0 58.5 28.6 48.6 
Middle choice. 	 60.2 66.0 52.5 63.0 92.0 39.0 67.9 48.6 
Low preference. 	 03.2 00.0 07.5 03.7 04.0 02.4 03.6 02.7 
36c. Attributes of effective teacher: 	 Effective teaching techiques. 
High preference. 	 26.9 28.3 25.0 25.9 32.0 24.4 32.1 18.9 
Middle choice. 	 67.7 71.7 62.5 66.7 64.0 70.7 64.3 73.0 
Low preference. 	 05.4 00.0 12.5 07.4 04.0 04.9 03.6 08.1 
36d. Attributes of 	 effective teacher: 	 Respect pupils. 
High preference. 	 07.5 05.7 10.0 07.4 16.0 02.4 05.4 10.8 
Middle choice. 	 39.8 32.1 50.0 33.3 20.0 56.1 37.5 43.2 
Low preference. 	 52.7 62.3 40.0 59.3 64.0 41.5 57.1 45.9 
TABLE T8.10 
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The statements included in this component have a different format 
than those of the two previous components. For this reason in this case 
it is not helpful to speak of acceptance or rejection of a particular 
statement but it is rather a matter of relative preference. Taking this 
into account, the tendencies which emerged, regarding this component 
are indicated in the following table T8.11. 
TABLE INDICATING THE PREFERENCES: PEDAGOGICAL COMPONENT. 
High preference. Middle choice., Low preference. 
28a. 28b. 28c. 
31c. 31b. 31a. 
32a. 32b. 
33c. 33b. 33a. 
34a. 34b., 	 34c., 	 34d. 34e. 
35c. 35a., 	 35b. 35d. 
36b. 36a., 	 36c. 36d. 
TABLE 	 T8.11a 
	
With regard to the five statements 	 (14a, 	 14b, 	 14c, 	 15a and 15b) 
belonging to this component, for which agreement or disagreement was 
required, the picture is as follows: 
TENDENCIES IN THE RESPONSES: PEDAGOGICAL COMPONENT. 
Very Strong Tendency Strong Tendency Clear Tendency Evenly Divided. 
Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 	 Acc. 	 Rej. 
15b. 	 14c. 	 14a. 	 14b. 
15a. 
TABLE T8.11b 
The overall situation for this component is depicted in the following 
figure F8.3. 
%, agree 
1887- 
14 	 15 	 28 	 31 	 32 	 33 	 34 
b 
a 
2 10 
FIGURE F.G.3: Pedagogical component. 
From the tables T3.11a and TB.11b, applying the same criteria as for 
the two previous components in order to ravel the teachers' dominant 
views, for the pedagogical questions encompassed in the instrument, the 
following table 18.12 was constructed. 
Group of statements. 
RESPONDENTS"VIEW ON PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES. 
Central notion. Expressed choice. 
14a.,14b.,14c. Role of reinforcement. 14a. Reinforcement: 	 Integral part of instruction 
15a.,15b. Objectives or teacher-centred teaching. 15b. 	 Teacher-centred. 
28a.,28b.,28c. Aims of Learning. 28a. Rational understanding of the subject. 
31a.,31b.,31c. Assessment of 	 learning outcome. 31c. 	 Pupils' 	 own self assessment. 
32a,32b. Presentation of knowledge. 32a. 	 In small 	 steps. 
33a.,33b.,33c. Prerequisite for efficient learning. 33c. 	 Pupils' 	 ability for abstract thought. 
34a.,34t.,34c.,34d.,34e. Crucial element for motivation. 34a. 	 Pupils 	 active participation. 
35a.,35b.,35c.,35d. Characteristic of a 'good' lesson. 35c. Guided discovery. 
36a.,36b.,36c.,36d. Attributes of effective teacher. 36b. Understanding of pupils. 
TABLE 12.12 
Interpreting the above table T3.12, 	 could be argued that the 
following points are central to teachers views. 
1. Learning. 
learning should aim at a rational understanding of the subject and an 
essential prerequisite of successful learning is pupils' ability to 
think in abstract terms. The assessment of learning outcome should be 
judged in terms of pupils' self-perception. 
2. Instruction. 
Instruction is envisaged as teacher-centred (rather than objectives 
oriented), where knowledge is best presented in small steps. The 
crucial element for motivation is pupil' active participation in the 
lessons while reinforcement is considered an integral part of the 
teaching process. 
3. Classroom activities. 
Satisfactory classroom activities entail an understanding of pupils 
and their needs an the part of the teacher; teacher's guidance should 
aim at "active discovery" rather than put emphasis on clear 
explanations or any other feature of teaching. 
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VIII.5 ANALYSIS OF GROUP RESPONSES: How the positions 
are reflected by the "collective" opinion. 
In what follows, the responses at the level of groups will be 
contrasted with the possible positions entailed by the background 
a-priori 
	 analysis. 	 These positions can be understood to represent the 
various distinct paths in the systemic network (chapter IV). 
• 
The aim of this comparison is to explore how far the dominant pattern 
of views held by teachers (as a group) fits with, or fails to fit with 
the a-priori positions. Thus, one can look for some indications of the 
extent to which the empirically detected views of teachers are 
influenced by a certain coherent philosophical or other viewpoint. 
The convention used for the construction of the comparative tables is 
that acceptance or clear rejection of any of the postulated positions 
is indicated respectively by "a" and "r", while the positions for which 
no clear tendency is expressed, are shown by an asterisk. 
VIII.5.1 Philosophical component: An image of 
science. 
According to the background argument one can distinguish three levels 
in terms of the philosophical systems involved: 
I Level systems: Realism, Idealism, Scepticism (ontological 
question). 
II 	 Level 	 systems: 
	 Scientific Realism, Logical Positivism and 
Pragmatism (philosophical systems which in a way are bridging 
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epistemology and ontology). 
III 	 Level systems: Inductivism, Hyp.—Deductivism, Contextualism 
(two versions) and Relativism (epistemological systems). 
The postulated position of each philosophical system, regarding a 
certain 	 statement 	 of 	 the 	 instrument, 	 is 	 taken 	 from 	 chapter 	 III 	 (see 
table 	 18.13 	 for 	 references). 
	
Phil. 	 systems. 	 Sections. 
1.  Realism. 111.6.5 
2.  Idealism. 111.6.5 
3.  Scepticism. 111.6.5 
4.  Sc. 	 Realism. 111.6.5 
5.  Log. 	 Positivism. 111.6.5 
6.  Pragmatism. 111.6.5 
7.  Inductivism. 111.2.5 
8.  Hypothetico-Deductivism. 111.3.3 
9.  Contextualism A. 111.4.4.1 
10.  Contextualism 8. 111.4.4.2 
11.  Relativism. 111.5.3 
TABLE 18.13 
Table 18.14 below portrays a comparison of the empirical evidence and 
the I and II level philosophical systems. 
THE ISSUE OF REALITY. 
Realise 	 Idealism 	 Scepticism 
24a. 	 a 
1 24b. 
S 24c. 
S 
U Conclusion: 
E 	 On this level the choice is Realism overwhelmingly (24a). 
0 
F 	 Sc. Realism 	 Log. Positivism 	 Pragmatism 
R 
E 25a. 
A 25b. 	 a 
L Conclusion: 
1 	 Scientific Realism is the chosen philosophical system on this 
T level. The sample particularly oppose (97.91 reject them) the 
Y ontological component of both Logical Positivism and Pragmatism. 
TABLE 18.14 
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This interpretation is consistent not only with the position on the I 
Level (Realism) but with the rejection of the epistemological component 
of Logical Positivism and Pragmatism as well (see table 78.15). 
Logical Positivism 	 Pragmatism 
	
16a. 	 r 
	
18b. 	 Cr) 
	
19a. 	 f(r) 
TABLE 78.15 
The following tables 1.8.16, T8.17 and T8.18 (in which the same 
convention as in table T8.14 applies) deal with the themes of the 
philosophical epistemological systems of level III, namely the 
questions about scientific methodology, criteria of demarcation, 
pattern of scientific change and finally the status of scientific 
knowledge. 
SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY. 
Inductivisa Hyp.-Deduct. Contextualiss Relativism 
A 
	
S 3a. 	 r 
	
C 3b. 	 a 	 a 	 a 
I. 
4a. a 
4b. r 
M 5a. 
E 5b. 
	
H 6a. 	 a 	 a 
	
0 6h. 	 r 
0 
	
0 16a. 	 a 	 a 
	
L 16b. 	 r 
0 
	
6 17a. 	 a 
Y 17b. 
	
I7c. 	 a 
TABLE 18.16 
The pattern: 
There are many ways of being scientific in terms of method [313.7; 
rational and fruitful criteria to deal with methodological issues exist 
[6a] and [16a]; the choice of method is up to individuals who should 
take into account the consensus of the relevant community [17c] and 
[17a]. Science is "data" driven [4a]. 
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Conclusion: 
The evidence appears to reveal a standpoint close to both versions of 
contextualism plus some inductive influences. 
CRITERIA OF DEMARCATION. 
Inductivisa 	 Hyp.-Deduct. 	 Contextualism 	 Relativisa 
A 
C 7a. a 	 a 	 a 
R 76. 
T. 
8a. a 	 a 	 a 
0 Bb. r r 
F 
D 20a. 
E 20b. r 
M 20c. a 	 a 	 a 
A 
R 
K 18a. 
A 186. Epistemological component of pragmatism. 
T 18c. a 
0 
N 19a. fir) 	 Cr) 
TABLE TB.17 
The pattern: 
There are rational criteria regarding the choice of scientific tneories 
[7a], [8a] and [20c]; the consensus of the relevant community is the 
best indicator for such a choice ElBc]. 
Conclusion: 
This pattern fits very well with the second version of contextualism. 
PATTERN OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE. 
Inductivisa Hyp.-Deduct. Contextualisa Relativisa 
A 
S 21a. 	 a 	 a 	 a 
C 216. 	 a 	 a 
I. 
6 22a. 	 a 
R 226. 	 a 
0 
w 
T 23a. 	 a 	 a 
H 2:b. 
TABLE T8.17a 
Note. 
Here, the respondents appear to accept both alternatives in the pairs 
of statements (21a), 
	
(21b) and 	 (22a), 	 (22b). For this reason the 
interpretation in these cases will be based on the strength of the 
existing tendencies. Table T8.5c (Section VIII.4.1) indicates that 
statement (21b) carries a strong tendency and statement 	 (22a) a very 
stong one. Consequently, they are better indicators of tendency than 
are statements (21a) and (22b) respectively, which only belong to the 
"clear tendency" category. 
The pattern: 
As science changes new knowledge replaces knowledge of another sort 
[21b] which could be incompatible with the old [23a]. New scientific 
knowledge arises through an accumulation of new experiments and 
observations [22a] (this is consistent with the assertion that science 
is "data" driven, [4a] above). 
Conclusion: 
The responses appear close to the first version of contextualism 
(moderate irrationalism) but the consistent emphasis on the role of 
data seems to be in tension with this system. 
STATUS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 
Inductivisa Hyp.-Deduct. Contextualism Relativism 
A 
S 
C. 
26a. 
K 26b. 
	 a 	 a 
N 0
w 
L 27a. 
E 27b. 	 Dimension of Pragmatism. 
D 27c. 
	 a 
B 
TABLE T8.18 
The pattern. 
Scientific knowledge is not special or unique [26b]. But it has some 
particular characteristics, namely "usefulness" [27b] and it is a 
systematic pattern of thought [2'c). 
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Conclusion: 
There is no satisfactory fit. The position displays some internal 
tensions which, however, are quite consistent with the similar tensions 
regarding the themes of scientific methodology and the pattern of 
scientific change. 
VIII.S. 	 Curricular component. 
The curricular component of the instrument deals with two issues, 
namely: 
-integrated science as opposed to the teaching of separate 
scientific subjects and 
-the meaning of the terms content and process in the context of 
science teaching. 
INTEGRATED SCIENCE V. SEPARATE SUBJECTS. 
Integrated science. 	 Separate subjects. 
lb. 	 a 	 la. 
Arguments for integrated science. Arguments for separate subjects. 
13a. a 12a. a 
13b. a 12b. r 
13c. r 12c. m 
13d. a 12d. r 
TABLE T8.19 
It appears that integrated science is thought to be the appropriate 
way of organising science education. A twofold reason is given for 
such a choice: on the one hand the basic unity of scientific concepts 
and on the other hand the need to make school science relevant to the 
pupils. The only argument which stands, according to the evidence 
gathered, in favour of teaching every scientific subject on its own, 
is differences in content between the subjects. 
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SCIENTIFIC CONTENT AND PROCESS. 
Related. 	 Unrelated. 
2b. 	 a 	 2a. 
Meaning of content. 	 Meaning of process. 
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29a. Low preference. 
29b. Middle preference. 
29c. High preference. 
30a. High preference. 
306. Low preference. 
30c. Middle preference. 
TABLE T8.20 
The content of scientific subjects is considered connected with 
scientific process. Apart from this, of particular interest are the 
"definitions" attached to the above terms. Firstly, content is taken 
to signal mainly techniques of experimentation while scientific 
theories and laws get the lowest preference; secondly, scientific 
methodology is arguably the focus of the term "process". This stance 
seem to echo some of the 'science data driven' trends detected in the 
philosophical component previously (scientific methodology and pattern 
of scientific change). 
Pedagogical component. 
Three themes constitute the "pedagogical" component: 
-assumptions about learning which include aims; prerequisite and 
assessment of learning; 
-assumptions about instruction; 
-assumptions about certain classroom activities. 
ASSUMPTIONS ON LEARNING. 
Cognitivism. Constructivisa. 	 Behaviourism. 
     
Alms of learning. 	 28a. High preference.' 	 28b. Middle preference. 	 28c. Low preference. 
Prerequisite of Learning. 	 33c. High preference. 	 33a. Low preference. 	 336. Middle preference 
Assessment of learning outcomes. 
	 31b. Middle preference.* 31c. High preference.* 	 31a. Low preference. 
*Very close to each other. 
TABLE T6.21 
Clearly, cognitivism is the system with which the majority of 
teachers appear to agree. 
The assumptions about instruction and classroom interaction include 
several distinct elements, but no definite systems have been 
formulated, in contrast to the other themes of the study, due to the 
nature of questions under consideration, which being much closer to 
practice, preclude the use of theoretical constructs. Thus, the 
previous analysis (section VIII.4.3) includes all that can be said at 
this stage. 
In this preliminary analysis the goal was to reveal the dominant 
pattern of teachers' views, analysing their responses at the level of 
the whole sample and without taking into account the extent to which 
particular individuals follow consistently a particular path in the 
network. Thus, this treatment of the empirical evidence seems to 
indicate that contextualism 	 (second version) is the system to which 
the majority of teachers subscribe in the epistemological level. At 
the ontological level realism/scientific appear to be the choice. In 
as far as the assumptions about learning are concerned the preferred 
system is cognitivism while the teaching of integrated science both 
because of conceptual and methodological similarities and because it 
is considered that integrated science facilitates towards making 
knowledge socially relevant, is teachers' favoured position. 
It is not possible however, analysing the data this way to discern 
the extent to which the above pattern reflects a consistent stance or 
is the result of accumulated unsystematic choices. Nor it is possible 
to discern other coherent patterns which co-exist besides the 
"dominant" one. These points will be the focus of the next stage of 
analysis. 
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VIII.6 	 SECOND STAGE: Analysis of theme patterns. 
In this second stage of the analysis the target is twofold: 
-to pick up those of the individual respondants who appear to have 
views which could be seen in accordance with the background analysis as 
this analysis is realised by the systemic network and secondly to 
discuss what these expressed views entail 	 in terms of the network 
regarding all the components (philosophical 	 epistemological, 
curricular and pedagogical). 
-to analyse differentiation of opinions in terms of sub-groups i.e. 
P.G.C.E students - practising teachers on the one hand and physicists -
chemists - biologists on the other. 
The essential difference between this stage of the analysis and the 
previous part is that here the element of "consistency" is introduced. 
This means that the classification of people into distinct categories 
(i.e. inductivism, relativism, etc.) is made on the basis of their 
following consistently a particular path of the network, (as 
represented by the respective statements) each of which corresponds to 
a certain position. The definition of "consistent following" has been 
made operational through the use of a set of somewhat stringent 
criteria (i.e. people to be categorised as inductivists with regard to 
scientific methodology for instance, should have accepted or rejected a 
considerable number of statements). 
The specifications of each system in terms of their respective 
statements, for all the themes under consideration and also the 
percentages of people who followed each system, are given below in 
tables T8.22 to T8.32. Additionally, a brief discussion of the salient 
points emerging from each of the following tables will be presented. 
The sub-routine "cross-tabulation" of the SPSSx package was used for 
the present analysis CIL 
VIII.6.1 Philosophical component. 
The themes of scientific methodology, criteria of demarcation and 
pattern(s) of scientific change will be discussed together in the 
following not only because they are interrelated but also because this 
conceptual closeness is reflected by the views which teachers appear to 
hold. 
With regard to the first two of the above mentioned themes as well as 
the status of scientific knowledge, a further category was introduced 
in addition to those postulated by the a-priori analysis systems to 
cater for those people who appear undecided about the finer 
distinctions involved in the definition of the respective systems, 
whilst otherwise subscribing to these systems. 	 These categories are: 
undecided contextualists (for the theme of scientific methodology) and 
undecided rationalists (for both the themes of criteria of demarcation 
and the status of scientific knowledge). 
SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
	
Statements ought to be accepted. 	 Statements ought to be rejected. 
1. Inductivisa. 	 3a,4a,5a 	 3b,4b,5b 
2. Hypothetico-Deductivism. 	 3a,4b,5b 	 3b,4a,5a 
3. Contextualism B./A. 	 3b,6a,16a,(17a or 17b) 	 3a,6b,16b 
4. Undecided Contextualists 
	
3b,6a,16a,17a,17b,17c 	 3a,6b,16c 
5. Relativism. 	 3b,6b,166,17c 	 3a,ba,16a 
B. Their influence (Z people). 
	
Whole 
	
P.G.C.E. Teachers. 	 Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
Saaple. 	 Students. 
1. Inductivism. 	 16.8 	 04.9 	 25.9 	 07.4 	 11.5 	 26.8 
2. Hypothetico-Deductivism. 	 05.3 	 04.9 	 05.6 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 12.2 
3. Contextualism BIA. 	 23.2 
	
29.3 	 18.5 	 40.7 	 07.7 	 22.0 
4. Undecided Contextualists. 	 12.6 	 07.3 	 16.7 	 25.9 	 11.5 	 04.9 
5. Relativism. 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 
Total. 	 57.9 	 46.4 	 66.7 	 74.0 	 30.7 	 65.9 
	
---- 	 ---- 	 ---- 	
---- 
6. Eclectic. 
	
42.1 	 53.6 
	 33.3 	 26.0 	 69.3 	 34.1 
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TABLE T8.22 
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CRITERIA OF DEMARCATION. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements ought to be accepted. 	 Statements ought to be rejected. 
1. Ind./Hyp.-Ded.('Truth') 
	
7a,20c,18a 
	
7b,186,18c 
2. Context. B./Pragmatisa 
	
7a,20c,(18b or 18c) 
	
7b,18a 
3. Undecided Rationalists 
	
7a,20c,18a,18b,18c 
	
7b 
4. Context. A./Relativism 
	
8b,(20a or 20b) 
	
8a 
B. Their influence lX people). 
Whole 
	 P.G.C.E. Teachers. 	 Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
Sample. 	 Students. 
1. Ind./Hyp.-Ded.('Truth') 
2. Context. B./Prag. 
3. Undecided Rational. 
4. Context. A./Relat. 
Total. 
5. Eclectic. 
	
11.6 	 19.5 	 05.6 	 22.2 	 03.8 	 09.8 
	
30.5 	 17.1 	 40.7 	 29.6 	 42.3 	 24.4- 
	
07.4 	 02.4 	 11.1 	 11.1 	 03.8 	 07.3 
	
11.6 	 12.2 	 11.1 	 07.4 	 03.8 	 19.5 
	
61.1 	 51.2 	 68.5 	 70.3 	 53.7 	 61.0 
---- 	 ---- 	 ---- 
	
38.9 	 48.8 	 31.5 	 29.7 	 46.3 	 39.0 
TABLE T8.23 
PATTERN OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements ought to be accepted. 	 Statements ought to be rejected. 
1. 	 Inductivism. 
L. Hypothetico-Deductivism. 
3. Contextualisa B. 
4. Contextualism A. 
5. Relativism. 
21a,22a 
21a,22b 
21a,21b,23a 
216,23a 
216,23h 
21b,22b 
21b,22 
23b 
21a,23b 
21a,23a 
B. Their influence (1 people). 
Whole 
	 P.G.C.E. Teachers. 	 Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
Sample. 	 Students. 
1. Inductivism. 
2. Hypothetico-Deductivisa. 
3. Contextualism B. 
4. Contextualisa A. 
5. Relativism. 
Total. 
6. Eclectic. 
	
07.4 	 07.3 
	
07.4 	 03.7 	 11.5 	 07.3 
	
00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 00.0 
	
35.8 	 29.3 	 40.7 	 22.2 	 38.5 	 41.5 
	
18.9 	 22.0 	 16.7 	 48.1 	 07.7 	 07.3 
	
04.2 
	 02.4 	 05.6 	 00.0 	 00.0 	 09.8 
	
66.3 	 61.0 	 70.4 	 74.0 	 57.7 	 65.9 
---- 	 ---- 
	
33.7 	 39.0 	 29.6 	 26.0 	 42.3 	 34.1 
TABLE T8.24 
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From an inspection of the above three tables, it appears that 
teachers to a large extent do have discernible views. This is 
illustrated by the fact that approximately 60% of the people revealed a 
preference for one particular stance. Generally speaking, relativism 
and hypothetico-deductivism received scant support - whilst in the case 
of inductivism it is worth noting that in relation to scientific 
methodology - 16.3% of the people selected this system. More than 
double however 	 (in all 35.9%) 	 favour one or another version of 
contextualism (including the undecided contextualists). 
As far as the differences between the various sub-groups in relation 
to the choice of scientific method(s) 	 are concerned, a number of 
distinctions emerge (see table 18.22): 
Firstly, there is a difference between teachers and students - the 
former being more disposed towards inductivism. Previous research in 
this area bears testimony to this point, having demonstrated that 
teachers tend to favour this stance. It is possible that this trend 
could be declining, as suggested by the students' preference for 
contextualism. 
Secondly, it can be seen that Biology teachers were the major group 
adhering to inductivism 	 (see table TB.22). This could be due to the 
nature of the subject matter itself which as taught in schools can be 
seen as lending itself towards this system. Physics teachers on the 
other hand favoured more than any other group contextualism (66.6%). 
This too could be accounted for by the subject matter itself, which has 
in the last few decades become more informed by philosopical debates so 
that this factor may exert an influence on the choice made 123. 
Interestingly, chemists apear in a in-between position, having the 
higher percentage of eclectics. 
When examining the criteria of demarcation 	 (see table 18.23) it 
becomes clear that P.G.C.E. students are mode inclined towards the 
notion of 	 "truth" being a central element than teachers - (as implied 
by the predominance of inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism in the 
former's thinking). 
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Moreover, it can be seen that Chemistry teachers were the group most 
in favour of contextualism/pragmatism - which again could be as a 
consequence of the nature of the subject matter. Of interest is the 
observation that out of all the sub-groups, Physics teachers were the 
most committed to any one particular stance - i.e. they reflected only 
a small amount of eclecticism in comparison with the other groups. 
In relation to patterns of scientific change, contextualism B again 
emerged as the most frequently chosen system by all groups (see table 
TB.24). 
However, as a sub-group Physics teachers appear to have chosen mainly 
contextualism A, which is in contrast to their choices in relation to 
scientific methodology and criteria of demarcation - (i.e. 
contextualism B - which places particular emphasis on "rationality"). 
STATUS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements aught to be accepted. 	 Statements ought to be rejected. 
1. Ind./Hyp.-Ded.('Truth') 	 26a,27a 	 26b,27b,27c 
2. Context. B./Prags. 
	
26a,(27b or 27c) 	 26b,27a 
3. Undecided Rationalists. 	 26a,27a,27b,27c 
4. Context. A./Relat. 	 26b 	 26a,27a 
B. Their influence (7. people). 
Whole 
Sample. 	 . 
P.G.C.E. 
Students. 
Teachers. Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
1.  Ind./Hyp.-Ded.(1Truth') 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 
2.  Context. 	 B.IPragm. 07.4 07.3 07.5 03.7 03.8 12.1 
3.  Undecided Rationalists. 14.7 12.2 16.7 44.4 03.8 02.4 
4.  Context. AdRelat. 54.7 58.5 51.9 37.0 42.3 75.6 
Total. 76.8 78.0 76.1 85.1 49.9 90.1 
---- ---- ---- 
---- 
5.  Eclectic. 23.2 22.0 23.9 14.9 50.1 09.9 
TABLE T8.25 
As far as the status of scientific knowledge was concerned, the 
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predominant choice was contextualism A/relativism (see table T8.25). 
No difference between P.G.C.E. students and teachers emerged. 
However, between the various teaching groups a number of distinctions 
can be discerned: 
Firstly, 	 it was biology teachers who most often chose relativism - 
this figure (75.6) being almost double those for the physics and 
chemistry teachers. Furthermore, they were the least eclectic group. 
Their preference for relativism could be explained if one takes into 
consideration the perceived status of biology: it is often seen as less 
prestigious than the other two scientific subjects; perhaps in some 
sort of defense it is possible that they treat all sorts of knowledge 
as equally worthwhile. The choice of relativism/contexualism A on the 
part of physics teachers is in accordance with their choice in 
"patterns of scientific change"; however in the case of chemistry 
teachers, this indicates a deviation from the previous choice of 
contextualism B, as seen in the previous tables. The situation here can 
be compared with the inversed pattern regarding the theme of scientific 
methodology: a similar differentiation between the groups was revealed, 
but there the biologists occupied the traditional position while here 
they have switched to relativism. 
Clearly then, there is a movement towards the relativistic end of the 
spectrum of epistemological 
	 systems which demonstrates a shift in 
allegiance from the more "rationally-bound" systems, which were 
predominant with regard to the three previous themes (tables 78.22, 
18.23, T8.24). That is, if people are asked directly whether science is 
"objective" or "true", then adopt a more relativistic position than 
when they are asked whether one can demarcate between science and 
non-science or whether science grows (as opposed to simply changes). 
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THE ISSUE OF REALITY. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements ought to be accepted. 	 Statements ought to be rejected. 
1. Idealism. 	 24b 	 24a,24c 
2. Scepticism. 	 24c 	 24a,24b 
3. Realism-Sci. Realism. 	 24a,256 	 24b,24c,25a 
4. Log. Positivism. 	 24a,25a,19a 	 24b,24c,25b 
5. Pragmatism. 
	
24a,25b,18a 	 24b,24c,25a 
B. Their influence I% people). 
Whole 	 P.6.C.E. Teachers. 	 Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
Sample. 	 Students. 
1.  Idealism. 22.1 17.1 25.9 18.5 11.5 31.7 
2.  Scepticism. 03.2 07.3 00.0 00.0 00.0 07.3 
3.  Realism-Sci. 	 Realism. 40.0 46.3 35.2 40.7 50.0 31.7 
4.  Log. 	 Positivism. 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 
5.  Pragmatism. 01.1 02.4 00.0 03.7 00.0 00.0 
Total. 66.4 73.1 61.1 62.9 61.5 70,7 
---- ---- 
---- 
6.  Eclectic. 33.6 26.9 38.9 37.1 38.5 29.3 
TABLE T8.26 
In examining responses to the issue of reality, realism-scientific 
realism emerged by a long way as the most popular system - in 
particular this is reflected in the choices made by chemistry teachers. 
The only exception to this was in the case of Biology teachers, who 
chose realism and idealism in equal proportions. The systems of logical 
positivism and pragmatism (II level systems) were notably absent. 
Also evident is the fact that the division between idealism and 
realism was more pronounced amongst P.G.C.E. students than amongst 
teachers. Furthermore, the former group was less eclectic in 
orientation than any other group. 
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VIII.6.2 	 Curricular and Pedagogical components. 
The parts of the network which refer to the curricular and 
pedagogical components (with the exception of the theme "assumption 
about learning") 	 contain a considerable number of paths corresponding 
to different stances. Only the stances of interest in terms of 
popularity are included in the following tables. So, another category 
("other stances" as distinct from "eclectic") was created to acommodate 
the people who follow the network but do not subscribe to one of the 
main positions (as far as the empirical evidence is concerned). 
1. Integration of scientific subjects. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements ought to be accepted. 	 Statements ought to be rejected. 
Integrated: Content-Methods-Soc. Relevance. lb ,(13a or 13b or 13d) 
Integrated: Practicalities. 	 lb,13c 
Separate subjects: Content-Practicalities. 	 la,(12a or 12c) 
Separate subjects: Other reasons. 	 la,(12b or 12d) 
B. Their influence. 
la,13c 
la,13a,13b,13d 
lb,12b,12d 
lb,12a,12c 
	
Whole 
	 P.6.C.E. 	 Teachers. 	 Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
Sample. 	 Students. 
Choice. 	 Reasons for choice. 
Integrated: Content-Methods-Soc. Relevance. 	 35.8 	 41.5 	 31.5 	 25.9 	 42.3 	 36.6 
Integrated: Practicalities. 	 20.0 	 17.1 	 22.1 	 37.0 	 07.7 	 17.1 
Separate subjects: Content-Practicalities. 	 24.2 	 19.5 	 27.8 	 22.2 	 23.1 	 26.8 
Separate subjects: Other reasons. 	 08.4 	 04.9 	 11.1 	 03.7 	 23.1 	 02.4 
Total. 
	 88.4 	 83.0 	 92.6 	 88.8 	 96.2 	 82.9 
Others. 	 11.6 
	
17.0 	 07.4 	 11.2 	 03.8 	 17.1 
TABLE T8.27 
The idea of an integrated science curriculum received support from 
nearly 607.. of the people. The reasons chosen for this are related to 
their conceptions of the meaning of content and method in science -
apart from the belief that there exists a common conceptual and 
methodological framework for all scientific subjects, integrated 
science teaching was seen to make the subject more socially relevant. 
Chemistry and biology teachers were the most committed towards an 
integrated science curriculum, the former being the most determined in 
this respect. This is concordant with the strong stance they (i.e. the 
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chemistry teachers) 	 manifested in the criteria of demarcation and in 
the status of scientific knowledge 	 themes which are conceptually 
related to their justifications for choosing either integrated or 
separate science subject teaching. 
The P.G.C.E. students, in relation to both integrated science and 
separate subject teaching, disregarded - more than any other group - 
practical considerations. 
This reasoning is interesting as it contrasts quite sharply with. 
those who demonstrated a preference for teaching scientific subjects as 
separate - the latter group basing their choice on the grounds of 
practical considerations. 
2. Scientific content and process. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Related: Scientific Laws -Handling of exper. data. 
Related: Experimental data-Scientific methodology. 
Related: Experimental data-Experimentation. 
Unrelated:Experimental data-Experimentation. 
Unrelated:Experimental data-Scientific methodology. 
Statements ought to be 
accepted or preferred. 
2b,9c,29a,30b 
26,9c,296,30a 
2b,9c,29b,30c 
2a,9c,29b,30c 
2a,9c,29b,30a 
Statements aught to be rejected 
or given low priority. 
2a,9a,9b,29b,29c,30a,30c 
2a,9a,9b,29a,29c,30b,30c 
2a,9a,9b,29a,29c,30a,30b 
26,9a,96,29a,29c,30a,30b 
21,9a,96,29a,29c,30b,30c 
B. Their influence. 
Meaning of content. 	 Meaning of process. 
Whole 
Sample. 
P.G.C.E. 
Students. 
Teachers. Physics. 	 Chemistry. 	 Biology. 
Related: 	 Scientific Laws 	 -Handling of exper. 	 data. 04.2 02.4 05.6 14.8 00.0 00.0 
Related: 	 Experimental 	 data-Scientific methodology. 21.1 34.1 11.1 22.2 19.2 22.2 
Related: 	 Experimental 	 data-Experimentation. 44.2 36.6 50.0 11.1 53.8 58.5 
Unrelated:Experimental data-Experimentation. 07.4 02.4 11.1 11.1 11.5 02.4 
Unrelated:Experimental 	 data-Scientific methodology. 10.5 04.9 14.8 22.2 00.0 09.8 
Total. 87.4 80.4 92.6 81.4 84.5 92.7 
Other stances. 12.6 19.6 07.4 18.6 15.5 07.3 
TABLE TS.28 
In relation to conceptions of scientific content and process most 
people placed the emphasis on the experimental contents of teaching; 
whilst only 47. saw scientific laws as being pertinent to content. 
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Physics teachers constituted an exception to this trend: 14.8% (when 
the respective percentages are zero for biology and chemistry teachers) 
believed that content consists of scientific laws. As far as the 
meaning of process is concerned, 44.4% of physics teachers attached 
methodological considerations to it. This view was shared by a 
considerable proportion of the P.G.C.E. students. 
This is in contrast to the conceptions held by most of the chemistry 
and biology teachers, who understood process to be bound up with 
experimentation (whereas it had been intended that methodological 
considerations included ideas and processes 	 in 	 addition 	 to 
experimentation). 
3. Assumptions about learning. 
  
   
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements ought to be accepted 
	 Statements ought to be rejected 
or preferred. 	 or given low priority. 
1. Cognitivism. 	 28,3,3111,33c 	 28b,28c,31a,31c,33a,33b 
2. Behaviourism. 	 28c,31a,33b 
	
28a,28b,316,31c,33a,33c 
3. Constructivism. 	 28b,31c,33a 	 28a,28c,31a,31b,33b,33c 
B. 	 Their 	 influence. 
Whole P.G.C.E. Teachers. Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
Sample. Students. 
1. Cognitivism. 27.4 17.1 35.2 18.5 34.6 29.3 
2. Behaviourism. 11.6 14.6 09.3 07.4 11.5 14.6 
3. Constructivism. 16.8 12.2 20.4 18.5 23.1 12.2 
Total. 55.8 43.9 64.9 44.4 69.2 56.1 
---- ---- ---- 
4. Other stances. 44.2 56.1 35.1 55.6 30.8 43.7 
TABLE T8.29 
"Cognitivism" emerged as the most frequently chosen set of 
assumptions about learning - 27.47. of the people subscribing to this 
system. 	 This choice however, was by no means in the maiority - "other 
stances" in fact attained the highest percentage of responses. Out of 
all the systems, 	 "behaviourism" was the option favoured least, while 
"constructivism" had a marginally higher following. 
Given the nature of the questions under consideration here (which are 
more directly relevant to teaching than, for instance, philosophy of 
science) and the high percentage of people who appear to fall in the 
category "other stances" (44.2%), it could be said that whilst this 
outcome may be a genuine phenomenon, it could also be indicative of a 
weakness of the a-priori analysis used in the construction of the 
research instrument. 
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A number of differences did emerge between the various subgroups 
which warrant mention: teachers and P.G.C.E. students differed in that 
the former subscribed to a larger extent to constructivism; 
furthermore, more chemists and physicists supported constructivism than 
did biologists. 
4. Assumptions on instruction. 
  
Table T8.30 displays the specification of the various stances with 
regard to assumptions about instruction and their influence on 
teachers views. In addition, given that the formulation of these 
stances was based on the extent to which teachers appear to accept (or 
reject) a certain version concerning a number of rather "autonomous" 
elements (e.g. motivation, presentation-pacing of knowledge etc.) these 
stances are identified by abbreviations related to the constituent 
elements. 
Positions. 
1. Orientation of instruction. 
Objectives oriented. 
Teachers oriented. 
Balanced orientation. 
2. Presentation of knowledge. 
Small steps. 
Whole idea. 
3. Motivation. 
Act. participation. 
Emotional involment. 
Feedback. 
4. The role of reinforcement. 
Intearallessential. 
Irrelevant. 
Occasionally. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements ought to be accepted 
or preferred. 
I. 	 TO-ST-AP-OC. 	 15b,32a,34a,14b 
2. BO-ST-AP-IN. 	 15a,32a,34a,14a 
3. BO-ST-AP-OC. 	 15a,32a,34a,14b 
4. BO-ST-EI-IN. 	 15a,32a,3413,34c,34d,14a 
5. BO-ST-E1-0C. 	 15a,32a,34b,34c,34d,14b 
6. BO-WI-AP-OC. 	 15a,32b,34a,14b 
7. BO-WI-El-IN. 	 153,32b,34b,34c,34d,14a 
B. Their influence. 
Abbreviations. 
00 
TO 
BO 
ST 
WI 
AP 
EI 
FE 
IN 
OC
IR 
Statements ought to be rejected 
or given low priority. 
15a,32b,34b,34c,34d,24e,14c 
15b,32b,34b,34c,34d,24e,14c 
15b,32b,34b,34c,34d,24e,14c 
156,326,34a,34e,14c 
15b,32b,34a,34e,14c 
15b,32a,34b,34c,34d,24e,14c 
15b,32a,34a,34e,14c 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
1. 
TO-ST-AP-OC. 
BO-ST-AP-IN. 
SO-ST-AP-0C. 
BO-ST-El-IN. 
BO-ST-EI-OC. 
BO-WI-AP-OC. 
BO-WI-El-1N. 
Total. 
Whole 
Sample. 
05.3 
09.5 
16.8 
10.5 
12.6 
14.7 
03.2 
72.6 
P.6.C.E. 
	 Teachers. 
Students. 
	
04.9 	 05.6 
	
02.4 	 14.8 
	
07.3 	 24.1 
	
09.8 	 11.1 
	
14.6 	 11.1 
	
26.8 	 05.6 
	
07.3 	 00.0 
	
73.1 	 61.2 
Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
	
00.0 	 07.7 	 04.9 
	
11.1 	 07.7 	 09.8 
	
00.0 	 23.1 	 24.4 
	
07.4 	 00.0 	 19.5 
	
18.5 	 11.5 	 09.8 
	
25.9 	 11.5 	 09.8 
	
00.0 	 00.0 	 07.3 
	
62.9 	 61.5 	 85.5 
8. 	 Other stances. 	 27.4 	 26.9 	 27.8 	 37.1 	 38.5 	 14.5 
TABLE T8.30 
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With regard to the assumptions about theories of instruction, no 
clear choice emerged - the responses were evenly distributed. 
This homogeneity however obscures a pattern in which a distinction 
between P.G.C.E. 	 students and physicists on the one hand and teachers 
and chemists and biologists on the other can be drawn: the latter group 
revealed a preference for balanced orientation, teaching in small 
steps, active participation and the occasional use of reinforcement 
(BO-ST-AP-0C), whilst the former shared a preference for balanced 
orientation, teaching the whole idea, active participation and the 
occasional use of reinforcement (BO-WI-AP-0C). What then differentiates 
these two groups is the different orientations in relation to the 
presentation of knowledge. 
5. Assumptions on classroom activities. 
As previously, in the following table T8.31 the identification of the 
formulated stances by abbreviations is also included. 
Positions. 
Crucial element in science lessons activities. 
Clear explanations. 
Pupils investigations. 
Guided discovery. 
Active discussions. 
Traits of successful teacher. 
Knowledge of subject. 
Understanding of pupils' thinking. 
Effective teaching techniques 
Respect of pupils decisions. 
A. Specification of the positions. 
Statements aught to be accepted 
or preferred. 
Abbreviation. 
CE 
PI 
GD 
AD 
KS 
UP 
ET 
RP 
Statements ought to be rejected 
or given low priority. 
35a,35c,36a,36c 
35b,35d,36a,36c 
35a,35c,36b,36d 
35b,35d,36b,36d 
Whole 
	 P.G.C.E. 	 Teachers. 
Sample. 	 Students. 
35b,35d,36b,36d 
35a,35c,36b,36d 
356,35d,36a,36c 
35a,35c,36a,36c 
Physics. Chemistry. Biology. 
1. CE/GP and KS/ET 
2. PliAD and KSiET 
3. CE/GP and UP/RP 
4. PI/AD and UP/RP 
B. Their influence. 
1. CE/GP and KS/ET 
2. PI/AD and KS/ET 
3. CE/GP and UP/RP 
4. PI/AD and UP/RP 
Total. 
5. Other stances. 
47.4 	 39.0 	 53.7 	 44.4 	 69.2 
	 36.6 
27.3 	 19.5 	 33.3 	 29.6 	 00.0 	 43.9 
07.4 	 09.8 	 05.6 
	 14.8 	 07.7 	 02.4 
15.8 
	 29.3 	 05.6 	 11.1 	 19.2 	 17.1 
97.9 	 97.6 
	 98.2 
	 99.9 	 96.1 	 100 
---- 	
---- 	 ---- 	
---- 
02.1 	 02.4 	 01.8 	 00.1 	 03.9 	 00.0 
TABLE 18.31 
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The essential components of classroom practice were identified as 
being clear explanation, guided discovery, knowledge of the subject 
matter and effective teaching techniques. 
This combination, which suggests a teacher-centred approach to 
practice, was subscribed to by the majority of physicists. As far as 
the chemists and biologists were concerned, whilst they both accepted 
knowledge of the subject matter and effective teaching techniques as 
fundamental to classroom activities, they had a bias towards differing 
components: the former placed great stress on clear explanation and 
guided discovery, whilst the latter tended to emphasise more the 
qualities of teacher in terms of mastery of the subject-matter and 
teaching techniques. 
The only group to advocate a comprehensive pupil-centred approach was 
the P.G.C.E. students, who perceived the essential elements of 
classroom activities to comprise investigations by pupils, active 
discussions, understanding of pupils' thinking and respect for pupils 
decisions. 
A possible explanation for this could be experience located in the 
current courses in colleges of education, which stress a pupil-centred 
approach to teaching - an approach which is not yet mitigated by direct 
experience and the day-to-day realities of classroom life. 
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VIII.6.3 	 Discussion of positions identified. 
Before discussing the positions, it should be noted that the evidence 
suggests that teachers do in fact have identifiable philosophical 
positions. Indeed, the views of the majority (in the region of 607.-707.) 
can be identified with some coherent philosophical system. The 
inference that teachers' views can be identified is in accordance with 
previous research finding e.g. Dibbs [3]. This seems to provide some 
answer to the legitimate objection of not asking people about issues 
which they have never previously thought about. 
However, in the first instance the percentage of eclectics seems to 
be rather high (see tables T3.22 to T8.31). In fact if one looks at it 
as a separate category, it often outnumbers other categories 
(particularly as far as the epistemological component is concerned). 
But, there are two further elements which should be considered when 
debating this problem: 
-Firstly, it is argued here that given the nature of the issues 
under consideration, it is not surprising to detect a substantial 
percentage of people who are genuinely eclectic. Furthermore, despite 
the use of stringent criteria on the definition of the various 
categories-systems, generally fewer people appear to be eclectic than 
previous studies - constructed to include more than two philosophical 
systems - have reported. 
Thus Dibbs C4] for instance, reports that "examination of the scores 
obtained by individual teachers on the total scales showed that a few 
•were indeed extreme types in terms of the definitions given above. Many 
more showed either no particular bias or inclined away from one 
position while having leanings towards both of the alternatives". 
Ogunniyi 	 C5] does not report any percentage of eclectics as such, but 
an inspection of the answers which agree with every alternative 
offered, 	 indicates a high number of people falling into this category. 
Finally, according to Rowell and Cawthron [6] who use factor analysis 
in order to reconstruct teachers' epistemological views, as the loading 
of each factor indicates, conflicted ideas have penetrated the 
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educational system. This difference between the present and previous 
studies may be due on the one hand to the inclusion in this study of 
more systems of thought and on the other hand, to the analysis of 
teachers' philosophical-epistemological views along various themes 
(e.g. scientific methodology, the status of scientific knowledge, etc.) 
instead of treating them as one entity. 
-Secondly, the "eclectic" category is not treated here as a "dust 
bin" category. On the contrary, an attempt follows to further analyse 
this category so that to discern whether eclectic views are in any way 
related with the general tendencies which emerge from the identifiable 
positions. The reason why these views are analysed separately is that 
it is thought conducive to the discussion to distinguish the 
identification and analysis of strictly speaking coherent philosophical 
positions from questions about the contingent co-existence of elements 
drawn from perhaps strictly speaking contradictory systems in any one 
person's thought - i.e. the study of correlations of views on a purely 
empirical basis. 
In comparing the results of this study with previous research 
findings, it is helpful to envisage the various epistemological 
positions as four continua (each corresponding to a different theme). 
The role of rationality in science underpins these continua, of which 
the one ex treme is occupied by inductivism and the other by relativism. 
Previous research findings indicate that teachers tend to subscribe 
to those philosophical positions which emphasise the role of 
rationality in science, mainly inductivism (relatively more recent 
positions i.e. those by Kuhn or Feyerabend have been reported not to 
appear in teachers' views [7]). 
On the other hand from this study, it appears that the prevailing 
position (followed consistently within each theme) in terms of 
scientific methodology, criteria of demarcation and pattern of 
scientific change is version 6 of contextualism which Newton-Smith 
calls "embryonic rationalism" [B], while with regard to the status of 
scientific knowledge, teachers subscribe to the view that scientific 
knowledge is not unique or privileged vis-a-vis other forms of 
knowledge. This position resembles relativism, or version A of 
contextualism (a more relativistic reading of Kuhn as argued in section 
	  Undecided Rat. 	  Relat. 
Undecided Rat. 	  Cont. AJRelat. 
	  Cont.-A 	  Relat. 
Ind./Ded. 
Ind. 	  Ded. 
Ind.iDed. 	 Cont.-6 	  Undecided Rat. - 
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Thus, 	 the picture emerging is more complicated than the assertion 
that the findings of this research indicate a shift in epistemological 
allegiances away from empirico-inductivism, since the extent of this 
movement depends on the theme one addresses. Schematically, the 
resulting situation is represented below. 
Scientific methodology: 
Criteria of dewarcation: 
Pattern(s) of sc. change: 
Status of sc. knowledge: 
These views on the epistemological level should however be seen in 
the light of teachers' answers to the ontological question, in which 
they seem to support realism and scientific realism. One may note that 
philosophers close to a contextualist B position (e.g. Ziman CU) 	 also 
tend to some version of realism. 
For curriculum and pedagogy one could distinguish between 
"traditional" approaches (teaching of separate subjects, teacher and/or 
subject-centred approach in pedagogy) as opposed to more "radical" 
approaches (integrated science, pupil-centred approach, stress of 
importance of pupils" active role in lessons). 
	 Then, the change in 
philosophical orientation is coupled with support for an integrated 
science curriculum, significantly not for practical reasons but rather 
based on epistemic considerations. Interestingly enough (if one takes 
into account changes in the philosophical and curricular component) the 
indication is that teachers appear to be more on the traditional side, 
particularly regarding the way teachers conceive learning. One might, 
with some exaggeration, suggest that teachers accept fundamental 
reasons for change in curriculum, and will the end, but not yet the 
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means. 
Finally, comparing the outcome of this analysis - which takes into 
account the consistency with which every individual follows a 
particular system and what the analysis at the level of groups 
indicates, it is evident that what previously was detected is 
corroborated in this stage. 
Summarising, if both the previous research and the present study are 
valid and reliable, there is here some evidence of a complex pattern of 
change in teachers' thought in terms of the philosophical-
epistemological component, while with regard to the pedagogical 
components generally teachers still lean more to traditional stances 
(teachers of biology being the more "radical" in this sense). 
A hypothesis towards explaining these differences can be established 
along the lines that either the inclusion of more stances in the 
instrument gave teachers the opportunity to locate themselves more 
precisely, or that given that the views of 	 individuals are not 
something stable and unaltered, the present findings reflect the 
direction of change since previous studies were done. 
The above discussion raises four questions: 
-Does the same individual who consistently follows, for instance 
inductivism, in terms of scientific methodology, subscribe to the same 
system with regard to criteria of demarcation, etc.? In other words how 
are the detected views within each theme articulated across themes? 
Furthermore, is there any relation between choices in the philosophical 
component and in the curricular/pedagogical components? For example, do 
people who prefer inductivism - historically the more traditional 
philosophy of science - appear to espouse equally traditional 
curricular and pedagogical views? 
-Is there any relation between the views of people who appear to be 
eclectic and the emerging general pattern? 
-What inferences can be drawn for the validity and reliability of 
the research instrument taking into account the above analysis? 
-What are the implications of teachers' views with regard to 
science teaching? 
The second question constitutes the focus of the next section VIII.7, 
the first will be discussed in section VIII.8, while the last two 
questions will be dealt with subsequently. 
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VIII.6.4 	 An analysis of the "eclectic" category. 
People whose views did not correspond to a definite "path" of the 
network(s) were put in the "eclectic" category. It was further argued 
that there is a need to investigate what the relationship is between 
the views of people who appear to be eclectic and the a-priori 
analysis. 	 Thus, this section sets out to achieve this aim. A further 
element of this analysis is to detect whether a movement away from 
empirico-inductivism occurs as well as to check the differentiation of 
"eclectics"' views in relation to different themes against the 
background of the already discerned, prevailing for people with 
identifiable views pattern. 
For this purpose the correlations 	 (treated as contingencies) 	 of 
responses to the group of statements which represent each position (see 
tables T8.22 to 18.31 for references) will be studied. 
To implement this analysis, statements representing conceptually 
related issues are collapsed so as to generate more general variables. 
Subsequently, using the "cross-tabulation" procedure of the SPSSx 
package [10], the existence of correlations between the answers to 
every possible pair of the newly generated statements far a given theme 
is checked. 	 The last step is to inspect the standardised residuals, 
which are reported by the cross-tabulation procedure. The standardised 
residuals show the difference between observed and expected value for 
each cell, in terms of the standard error of the expected values [11]. 
Looking therefore, at the size of the standardised residuals for these 
correlations which are significant statistically (level of significance 
0.05 or better) the pattern(s) - if any - of teachers' views (who have 
been previously put in the "eclectic" category) on the relevant issues 
can be discerned. 
Tables T8.33 to T8.37 indicating the size of the standardised 
residuals for every cell follow the convention: 
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sr)1.00 or <-1.00 
	
+ or - respectively; 
sr between -1.00 and 1.00 	 blank (no association). 
TABLE T8.32 
Lastly, more about the reasons for both the choice of standardised 
residuals as a guide to discern possible patterns and the selection of 
the value 1.00 as the limit are explained in next section VIII.7. 
It should be noted that this analysis is relevant to all themes of 
the-epistemological-philosophical component and to the theme concerning 
assumptions about learning (pedagogical component). For the remaining 
themes of the pedagogical and curricular components such an analysis is 
not considered helpful for two reasons: 
-firstly, because the percentages falling into the eclectic 
category are very small (in the region below 107.); 
-secondly, because as already stated the responses to the 
statements of these themes have not been analysed on the basis of 
a-priori constructed systems but rather the construction of the 
categories-systems was made on the basis of the empirical evidence. 
Thus, below each of these themes is discussed separately. 
A. Scientific methodology. 
Scientific methodology is the largest theme constituted by six groups 
of statements. Looking at the responses to pairs of groups of 
statements for correlation, the followning pairs are correlated: 
3a,3b and 6a,6b (at 0.01, Cramer's V=0.53); 
3a,3b and 5a,5b (at 0.01, Cramer's V=0.43); 
4a,4b and 5a,5b (at 0.08, Cramer's V=0.32 - 0.08 was judged to be 
sufficient); 
6a,6b and 16a,16b (at 0.01, Cramer's V=0.46). 
Responses therefore to the group of statements 17a,17b,17c do not 
correlate with other group of statements. 
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3a,3b16a,6b 	 3a,3b\5a,5b 
rational 	 no rational 	 verification 	 falsification 
criteria 	 criteria 
one method 	 + 	 one method 	 - 	 + 
an methods 	 any methods 
4a,4b15a.5b 
	 6a,6b\16a,1613 
verification 	 falsification 	 many methods 	 many methods 
positive 	 pointless to discuss 
inductive 	 rational 
reasoning 	 criteria 
deductive 	 no rational 
reasoning 
	
criteria 
TABLE T3.33 
An inspection of the above table reveals that two distinct patterns 
emerge. The constituents of the first pattern are: 	 that there is 
basically one scientific method based on rational criteria, indifferent 
to the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning, but 
should feature falsification. It appears however, that the last element 
of this pattern, namely the view that the existence of various 
incompatible scientific methods shows the pointlessness of discussions 
about scientific methodology, is in tension with the previous ones. 
This tension may be a genuine reflection of the views of people who 
belong to this category, but it may also be a weakness in expressing 
the relevant ideas by statements 16a and 16b, since these statements 
convey two nations each, i.e. on the one hand the existence of 
incompatible scientific methods and on the other hand the implications 
of such a situation. It should be noted that in the administration of 
the research instrument, teachers were asked to indicate disagreement 
with any double-notion statement (and there are two such groups of 
statements, 	 i.e. 	 groups 16 and 20) if they disagreed with any of the 
notions contained by the statement. 
According to the second discernible pattern, there are many 
legitimate scientific methods, but no rational and defensible ways for 
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choosing among them. Nevertheless, verification is an essential 
characteristic of the scientific methods and their proliferation is a 
fruitful source of scientific progress. 
With regard to the degree of fit of the above two patterns with the 
a-priori analysis, it is clear that they do not correspond to any of 
the foreseen paths of the relevant network, even if - according to the 
way rationality is conceived within them - they could be characterised 
in the first case more "traditional" and in the second case more 
relaxed. 
B. Criteria of demarcation. 
Here, evidence of correlations were found for the following pairs of 
group of statements: 
7a,7b and 8a,8b (at 0.01, Cramer's V=0.44); 
8a,Bb and 20a,20b,20c (at 0.01, Cramer's V=0.55). 
7a,711\8a,86 	 8a,8b120a,2017,20c 
rational 	 no rational 	 new fraieworks 	 relativisa 	 fruitful 
criteria 	 criteria 
rational 	 rational 
criteria 	 criteria 
no rational 	 no rational 
criteria 	 criteria 
TABLE T8.34 
On the basis of the above table, it appears that teachers tend to 
reject rational criteria for the inclusion of theories in science, 
retaining however, that the search for general rules for that purpose 
could be a fruitful enterprise. 
It seems that a kind of internal friction is present in this 
position. Given that the group of statements 20 (statements 20a, 20b, 
20c) runs into the same difficulties as the group of statements 16, the 
same hypotheses and the same qualifications towards explaining this 
outcome as in the case of the first discerned pattern regarding 
scientific methodology are also applicable here. 
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C. Patternis) of scientific change. 
This theme consists of three groups of statements, namely 21a,21b 
22a,22b and 23a,23b. The responses to the first and last groups are 
correlated significantly at less than 0.01 level the Cramer's V 
coefficient for this correlation being 0.72. 
21a,216123a,23b 
through frameworks 	 unpatterned frameworks 
growth 
change 
TABLE T8.35 
The interpetatation of this correlation is rather straightforward. 
Teachers in this category tend to believe that science grows (as 
opposed to simple change) and that this happens through a succession of 
knowlegde frameworks - sometimes compatible and sometimes incompatible 
with each other. This position is rather close to Contextualism B and 
it could have been included in this system if less stringent criteria 
have been applied. 
D. The status of scientific knowledge. 
The pair of groups of statements which represent this theme (26a,26b 
and 27a,27b,27c) is correlated (level of significance=0.01, Cramer's 
V=0.77) 
26a,26b127a,27b,27c 
objective account 
	
objective account 
useful 	 useful 
systematic pattern 
unique 
both special and 
not different 
TABLE T8.36 
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The pattern one could establish with regard to the status of 
scientific knowledge concerns only one group. Thus, there is a positive 
association between the views of people who consider science in a way 
privileged vis-a-vis other forms of knowledge and the justification of 
this special status asserting that scientific knowledge tries to be an 
objective account of nature in addition for being "useful". This view 
has two dimensions if one attempts to locate it in terms of the systems 
postulated by the a-priori analysis: a pragmatic one and another shared 
by all of inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism and logical positivism. 
E. Ontological question. 
For the two groups of statements (24a,24b,24c and 25a,25b) which 
concern the issue of reality a statistically significant correlation 
exists (at 0.01 level of significance) and indeed it is rather strong 
(Cramer's V=0.63). The size of standardised residuals however does not 
indicate any particular pattern of association. 
F. Assumptions about learning. 
In this theme, of the three possible correlations, only one can be 
established. This correlation concerns the 28a,28b,28c and 3321,33b,33c 
groups of statements (at less than 0.01 level, Cramer's V=0.50) 
	
33a,33b,33c abstract 	 prior 	 perception of 
2Ba,28b,28c 	 thinking 	 knowledge 
	 self-need 
rational understanding 	 - 	 + 
knowledge and skills 
formation of ind. view 
TABLE T2.37 
From the above table T8.37, a pattern involving only two systems 
("cognitivism" and "behaviourism") 	 emerges. 	 Thus, there is a clear 
association between aims of learning activities conceived as rational 
CUR R ICU L AR 
COMPONENT 
PHILOSOPHICAL 
COMPONENT 
PEDAGOGIC A L 
COMPONENT 
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VIII.? 	 THIRD STAGE: A STUDY OF CORRELATIONS. 
This stage deals with an analysis of correlations. That is, the views 
of the respondants regarding each of the constituent themes (e.g. 
scientific methodology, the question of teaching integrated science or 
different scientific subjects, assumptions about learning etc.) of the 
three components of the instrument, are correlated in pairs within and 
across the three components. 
The following table provides a summary of the cross-tabulation tables 
which are shown in Appendix 2, for each of the correlations found to be 
significant at least the 0.05 level. 	 The correlation coefficients 
reported are Cramer's V [12]. 
The notation employed for the construction of this table is as 
follows: 
for significance level 
1 - 0.06 	 blank (no evidence of correlation); 
0.05 - 0.01 	 + 	 (evidence of correlation); 
less than 0.01 
	
(strong evidence of correlation). 
A "qualitative" representation of the correlations between themes 
which are evident from table T8.24 is shown in the following figure 
F8.4. 
FIGURE F8.4 
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CORRELATIONS AMONG THEMES. 
Scient. Demarc. Scient. Know'. Ontol. Content- Integrat. Learning Instruct. Classroom 
Method. Criteria Growth Status issue 	 Process Science 	 Assumpt. Assumpt. Practice 
Scientific 	 _ 
Methodology 
Demarcation 	 * 
Criteria 	 0.36 
Scientific 	 * 
Growth 	 0.33 
Status of 	 + 
Knowledge 	 0.28 0.33 0.30 
Ontological 
question 
Content- 	 * f f f 	 f 
Process 	 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.41 	 0.34 
n n 
Integrated 
	 + f f f 	 + n n n n 
Science 	 0.27 0.29 0.40 0.31 	 0.27 0.34 
Learning 
Assumptions 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.27 036 
n n 
Instruction 	 * f f * 	 + 
Assumptions 0.47 0.50 0.36 0.38 	 0.33 0.39 0.34 0.40 
Classroom 
Practice 	 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.31 0.28 0.39 
TABLE 18.38 
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Four points emerge: 
-Firstly, the various themes are correlated significantly within 
and across components. Interestingly, the two themes of the curricular 
component are both related with every theme of both the philosophical 
and pedagogical components. The same applies for the assumptions about 
learning and assumptions about instructions of the pedagogical 
component, while assumptions about activities in classroom are related 
with the curricular component but only with scientific methodology in 
terms of the epistemological component. It is not surprising of course 
that the curricular and pedagogical components are more "integrated" 
than the philosophical -epistemological component. 
-Secondly, scientific methodology and the status of scientific 
knowledge appear to constitute the poles of the epistemological 
component (i.e. they are correlated with every other theme of this 
component). This could be seen in the light of the outcome of the 
previous stage of the analysis (section VIII.6.3) 	 according to which 
these two themes are the extreme points of the movement away from the 
traditional image of science (i.e. empirico-inductive) towards a more 
relativistic stance. 
-Thirdly, views about the ontological question are correlated only 
with curricular views. Thus, it may be that it is not ontology which 
sustains teachers' epistemological beliefs, (though this does not mean 
that their views about the issue of reality lack educational interest). 
-Fourthly, 
	
the 	 existence 	 of 	 correlations 	 between 	 the 
curricular/pedagogical and philosophical components is of particular 
interest due to its educational implications and to the questions one 
can raise if an explanation is attempted. These points will be 
discussed later. 
Having established the existence of correlations, the next step is to 
interpret them, in terms of which choices of positions systematically 
go together. In other words, to find out whether people, who according 
to the analysis thus far belong to a particular system (e.g. 
contextualism B) 	 in terms of any of the themes of the epistemological 
component, subscribe to the same system (or if not, which system(s) 
they do accept) in the other themes with which this theme is 
correlated. 
The correlation tables have many degrees of freedom. An effective way 
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to report the nature of the correlation is to identify cells in which 
the model of no association leaves large standardised values. For this 
purpose, the standardised residuals are a good guide to the cells where 
the correlation largely arises. Standardised residuals having values 
larger than two standard deviations were first noted, with attention 
paid to cells with residuals larger than one standard deviation. An 
account of the statistical aspects of this analytical strategy is 
provided in Appendix 3. 
In the tables T8.40 to T8.75 in which the size of the standardised 
residuals are indicated for every cell the following convention is 
applied: 
sr>1.90 or <-1.90 	 0 cr ,..,respectively; 
1.90>sr>0.90 or -1.90sr<-0.90 	 or - respectively; 
sr between -0.90 and 0.90 	 blank. 
TABLE 18.39 
Large standardised residuals in cells with low frequencies were given 
less prominence, since they reflect the views of only a small fraction 
of the sample. In tables T8.40 to T8.74, columns with high frequencies 
are indicated by an asterisk. 
In the following sections firstly the correlations within the 
components and then the correlations across the components will be 
discussed. 
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VIII.7.1 
	 Correlations within components. 
A. Philosophical component. 
1. For the correlation between the themes concerning scientific 
methodology and criteria of demarcation (see table T8.40) the prominent 
features are that deductivists, in terms of scientific methodology, 
tend also to go for relativism with regard to the criteria of 
demarcation; that contextualists (version A and B) tend as well to see 
the choice between scientific theories as based on rational criteria, 
while the other stream stresses the notion of truth as a basis for this 
choice; and finally that "eclectics" in one theme appear to be 
"eclectics" in the other theme as well. 
Furthermore, there is a clear - although not so strong as previously 
- tendency for people who support inductive reasoning, to subscribe to 
the view that the better of two competing theories is the one which 
arises from consensus among scientists and simultaneously gives the 
more useful results, while the same criteria for the choice of 
scientific theories are favoured by teachers who for the scientific 
method accept choice on a rational basis. Interestingly, all the people 
who appear to follow a clear-cut position in the theme of scientific 
methodology tend also to do so (i.e. not to have "eclectic" views) 
regarding the theme "criteria of demarcation". 
2. In so far as the correlation between the themes of scientific 
methodology and patterns of scientific change is concerned (see table 
18.41), inductivists (in scientific methodology) are divided between 
the Kuhnian (version B) and relativistic stances as to how science 
changes, being very rarely "eclectics". On the other hand, teachers who 
see the choice of the proper scientific method to be applied to a given 
problem as a "rational" exercise, seem to prefer the view that 
scientific knowledge changes through a succession of frameworks, some 
of which are incompatible with each other. Of interest here, amongst 
the less strong tendencies present, is the evidence that contextualists 
(of either version) regarding scientific methodology, espouse 
"eclectic" views concerning the pattern of scientific change, while 
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"eclectics" in the former theme become relativists in the latter. 
3. The relationship between the themes of scientific methodology 
and the status of scientific knowledge, to be discussed now (see table 
18.42), is of particular significance, since these two themes are 
related to the other philosophical themes (see figure F8.4). It reveals 
a tendency to philosophical 
	
consistency, at least amongst those who 
support a version of contextualism (rational grounds for choice of 
scientific method can be found), in that this view goes frequently with 
the view that scientific knowledge has some characteristics which make 
it particular and less frequently with other views. 
	
Inductivists in 
terms of scientific methodology, however, appear to switch to the 
position claiming that scientific knowledge does not differ from any 
other kind of organised knowledge, and not to be "eclectics". The 
"eclectics" are consistent in being "ecle:t c" both in methodology and 
about the status of scientific knowledge. 
It may seem that the inductivists (within scientific methodology) are 
being philosophically inconsistent. That is, it appears uncomfortable 
to insist on the inductive ("data-driven") mode of reasoning while 
asserting that scientific knowledge has not special status vis-a-vis 
other forms of knowledge. Alternatively, if a particular form of 
reasoning, which emphasises the role of observation, 
	 is uniquely 
appropriate for the scientific enterprise, does not this mean that 
science is in one way or another distinct from organised knowledge 
which does not have this feature? A counter-argument, provided that one 
adopts a compatible stance at the ontological level (e.g. scepticism -
see section 111.6.4 for the relevant arguments), could be that the 
empirical-relativistic combination does not actually involve internal 
contradictions in principle. It should be noted, however that evidence 
of any such association with a compatible ontological system was not 
found. 
4. The pattern in table T8.43 resembles the one concerning the 
correlation between the status of scientific knowledge and scientific 
methodology. Those who think that scientific knowledge is specially due 
to its usefulness as well as being a systematic pattern of thought, 
also tend to understand the choice between scientific theories as made 
on the basis of rational criteria (even if they hesitate to grant any 
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priority to a certain notion, e.g. truth, usefulness, consensus of the 
relevant scientific community). The same remark (the effect however as 
indicated in table T8.43 is less strong) applies to the category of 
undecided rationalists in terms of scientific knowledge. In marked 
difference the relativistic streams on one theme have a tendency to 
choose a similar view regarding the other theme which makes the overall 
pattern much more consistent than the one concerning the correlation 
between scientific methodology and the status of scientific knowledge. 
5. The last element of the epistemological component is the 
correlation between the themes of the status of scientific knowledge 
and pattern(s) of scientific change (see table 18.44). Here, the 
strongest effect is the convergence c; undecided rationalists in terms 
of scientific knowledge with contextualists 
	
(version A). Otherwise, 
both relativists and "eclectics" in one theme tend to opt for the same 
category in the other theme. 
6, As shown in table 78.38 the ontological question is not 
correlated significantly with any of the other themes of the 
epistemological-philosophical component. A very weak correlation 
appears to exist only with the theme of criteria of demarcation. As 
noted before the only themes with which teachers' views about reality 
correlate are those referring to curricular issues (meaning of content 
and process in science teaching the question of integrated science). 
Thus, it appears that teachers' views on this, despite the fact that 
they do riot provide the linkage between the various elements of their 
epistemological views as was initially hypothesised, nevertheless have 
their educational implications. These implications will be discussed 
later. 
To conclude the discussion about the epistemological component, an 
attempt will be made to bring together the associations which point to 
systematic patterns amongst the various relationships just described. 
The following tendencies can be discerned: 
a. Inductivists with regard to scientific methodology are 
associated 	 with 	 contextualism 	 8 	 (criteria 
	 of 	 demarcation), 
contextualism B in terms of the theme "patterns of scientific change" 
and finally their views seem to be correlated with contextualism 
A/relativism concerning the status of scientific knowledge. Their views 
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in the latter theme appear to be correlated with contextualism B in so 
far as the criteria of demarcation are concerned. 
b. People who tend to subscribe to contextualism B/A for the theme 
of scientific methodology also tend to opt for the category of 
undecided rationalists in terms of both criteria of demarcation and the 
status of scientific knowledge. It is worthnoting that the latter two 
categories are associated with each other. Lastly undecided 
rationalists (status of scientific knowledge) are inclined towards 
contextualism A (patterns of scientific change). 
c. Eclectics in terms of scientific methodology tend to be 
"eclectics" in both the criteria of demarcation and the status of 
scientific knowledge. Furthermore, "eclectics" in the latter theme 
incline to be "eclectics' regarding patterns of scientific change. 
The above associations are reflected by figure F9.5. 
This analysis seems to corroborate the findings of the previous stage 
of analysis (section VIII.6.3). According to these findings as one 
TIu 'Ve5 .ut.L.—ively from the theme of scientific methodology, to 
criteria of demarcation, pattern(s) of scientific change, to end up 
with the status of scientific knowledge, a gradual shift away from 
systems in which science is envisaged as "rational" enterprise towards 
more relativistic stances occurs. 
One could proceed with the above conclusions one step further. 	 It 
could be argued that two groups of people (three if one ta k es into 
account "eclectics") can be distinguished, as shown below. 
Scientific 	 Criteria of 	 Patterns of 	 Status of 
Methodology 	 Demarcation 	 sc. change 	 Knowledge 
1st group 	 Inductivism 	 Contextualism B 	 Contextualiss B 	 Context A/Relat. 
2nd group 	 Contextualiss BiA 	 Und. Rational. 	 Contextualiss A 	 Und. Rational. 
TABLE 18.75 
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The existence of such distinctive groups could be tested, in principle, 
by a multi-variate correlational analysis. 
Furthermore, if one sees this hypothesis in the light of the data 
concerning the differentiation of views according to the subject of 
specialisation ie. physics, chemistry and biology (see section 
VIII.6.1, tables T8.22 to T8.25) it becomes clear that a further 
hypothesis can be put forward. It appears that biology teachers are 
mostly close to the first of the above proposed groups, physics 
teachers to the second group, while chemistry teachers tend to fall 
within "eclecticism". 
B. Curricular component. 
7. 	 The two themes which constitute the curricular component, as 
indicated by table T8.38, are correlated at 0.01 level of significance. 
In interpreting this correlation four groups of people can be discerned 
(see table T8.45). Two of these groups arise out of the association of 
categories with a considerable following, whilst the sources of the 
other two are categories of limited popularity. 
1st group 
2nd group 
content and process conceptually related; 
content - facts, process - methodological considerations. 
for integrated science; 
justification: practical reasons. 
content and process conceptually related; 
content - facts, process - experimentation techniques. 
for integrated science; 
justification: similarities in content and methods, social relevance. 
3rd group 
4th group 
content and process are not related conceptually; 
content - facts, process - methodological considerations. 
for separate subjects; 
justification: differencess in content, practical reasons. 
content and process are not related conceptually; 
content - facts, process - experimentation techniques. 
for separate subjects; 
justification: differencess in methods, social relevance. 
TABLE T8.76 
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C. Pedagogical component. 
3. As shown in table T8.46 the cognitive stream (assumptions about 
learning) tend to think best of a balanced approach (neither 
objectives-oriented nor teacher-centred) in instruction, that knowledge 
should be presented in small steps, reject the view that reinforcement 
is irrelevant to teaching and finally are divided between considering 
active participation on the part of students and students' emotional 
involvement as the crucial factors for motivation. "Behaviourists" 
rather predictably seem to share the preference for the first two of 
the above elements whilst envisaging reinforcement as an integral part 
of teaching and learners' participation as an essential factor for 
motivation. Lastly "constructivists" seem to think that the features of 
a reasonable approach to instruction are a balanced approach, 
presenting the whole idea firstly and proceeding to the elaboration of 
the particulars, motivation based on pupils' emotional involvement and 
rather surprisingly see reinforcement as an essential part of the 
teaching procedure. 
9. The interpretation of the correlation between the themes 
"assumptions about learning" and "classroom activities" reveals a 
rather straightforward pattern (see table T8.47). The indications are 
that "cognitivists" prefer the flow of knowledge to be controlled by 
the teacher, believing however that a "good" teacher has to focus on 
pupils' decisions and understand of pupils' thinking. "Behaviourists" 
on the other hand tend to take a reverse view judging the qualities of 
teacher in terms of his/her effective teaching techniques and mastery 
of the subject, while their attitudes appear to favour pupils' 
involvement in the exchange of knowledge taking place in classrooms. 
Followers of the last system ("constructivism"), given the emphasis 
this system puts on the self-construction of knowledge by individuals, 
quite consistently lean strongly towards a pupil oriented view 
regarding both elements (knowledge management and traits of successful 
teacher). 
10. The pattern one gets from looking at the correlation between 
"assumptions about instruction" and "assumptions about classroom 
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activities" is not as clear as the previous ones (see table T8.48). 
Nevertheless, teachers who tend to believe that the control of the 
classroom communication system should be with themselves, while 
considering that the teacher should take into account pupils' decisions 
and pupils' thinking in conducting a lesson tend to prefer instruction 
in terms of a balanced orientation, presentation of knowledge in small 
steps, attach primary importance in reinforcement and value the 
emotional aspects of motivation. This is quite consistent with what the 
above two patterns revealed (i.e. both the above described elements are 
associated with cognitivism, see tables T8.46 to 18.47). Teachers who 
are inclined to keep for themselves the control of flow of knowledge 
but emphasise the understanding of pupils' thinking and respect of 
pupils' decisions as crucial traits of a "successful" teacher 
(pupil-teacher centred approach), as far as the two elements of 
"classroom activities" are concerned, are associated with behaviourism 
(see table T8.47). Subsequently, behaviourists' views which in turn are 
associated with balanced approach, presentation of knowledge in small 
steps, stress on emphasis of the role of reinforcement and pupils' 
participation 	 (see table T8.46), have in this instance the tendency to 
opt for a balanced approach, presentation of the whole idea, pupils' 
participation and only occasional use of reinforcement. Finally, the 
"pupil-pupil" centred stream does not choose any of the categories with 
wide following regarding the theme concerning instruction. 
In all, it could be argued that three distinct groups are emerging 
from the analysis of the pedagogical component. These groups are: 
1st group 	 a. 'cognitivise; 
b. balanced orientation, presentation of knowledge in small steps, 
reinforcement integral part of instruction, motivation based on emotional involvent 
(BO-ST-EM-IN); 
c. teacher (knowledge)-pupil (traits of teacher) centred activities in classroom. 
2nd group 	 a. 'behaviourism"; 
b. pupil (knowledge)-teacher (traits of teacher) centred activities in classroom; 
(no association with any particular stance with regard to instruction). 
3rd group 	 a. 'constructivisi'; 
b. pupil (knowledge)-pupil (traits of teacher) centred activities in classroom; 
(no association with any particular stance with regard to instruction). 
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VIII.7.2 	 Correlations across components. 
A. Philosophical-curricular components. 
As shown in table T8.38, the two themes which constitute the 
curricular component are correlated significantly with every theme of 
the philosophical-epistemological component. 
11. Methodological considerations appear to be of some importance in 
the meaning of the terms content and process in science, while such 
considerations tend to play a lesser role in teachers' decisions about 
solving the dilemma between teaching integrated science as opposed to 
different subjects (table T8.49). Thus, inductivists see scientific 
content as pertinent to "facts" and define process as experimentation 
techniques. People who with regard to methodology follow either version 
of contextualism, seem to object to such an interpretation of process, 
envisaging it mainly as concerned with methodological issues. 
12. The pairs of tables T8.51, 78.52 and T8.53, T8.54 concern the 
correlations between themes of the curricular component and teachers' 
views about criteria of demarcation and pattern(s) of scientific change 
respectively. 
These tables suggest that teachers who believe that scientific 
content and process are closely related conceptually and understand 
content as "facts" and process as experimentation techniques, tend to 
subscribe to the second version of contextualism for both of the above 
epistemological themes (see tables 76.51 and 78.52). On the other hand, 
people who tend to attach facts to content and methodological 
considerations to scientific process oppose contextualism B /Pragmatism 
(for the criteria of demarcation) and express no preference for the way 
science changes or develops. 
Secondly, with regard to the question of how to organise the teaching 
of science (integrated science v.s. separate subjects), interestingly, 
teachers who base the choice between competing scientific theories on 
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the notion of truth, 	 appear to prefer the teaching of integrated 
science, justifying this choice on the grounds of practical 
considerations (see table T3.53). Others for whom the basis of 
demarcation is the consensus of the relevant scientific community and 
the "usefulness" of a certain scientific theory, seem to advocate the 
teaching of separate scientific subjects because of the difference in 
their content and for practical reasons. 
Furthermore, teachers who subscribe to a more "rationality bound" 
version of contextualism 	 (with regard to the pattern of scientific 
change) present a tendency to accept integrated science on the basis of 
similarities in content and methods, as well as to see this option of 
the science curriculum in schools as contributing to make scientific 
knowledge relevant to the pupils (see table T8.54). On the contrary, 
the more relativistic interpretation of the Kuhnian system 
(contextualism A) 	 is divided between teaching separate scientific 
subjects (for reasons of differences in content and expediency) on the 
one hand and offering an integrated science curriculum, mainly for 
practical reasons, on the other. 
13. Concluding the discussion of the interpretation of the 
correlations between the epistemological and curricular components, it 
could be noted that teachers who believe that scientific knowledge is 
privileged vis-a-vis other forms of knowledge but are undecided as to 
why this is the case (undecided rationalists), lean strongly towards 
the teaching of integrated science having taken into account practical 
constraints 	 (see table T8.55). The same group seems to strongly oppose 
the definitions of scientific content as "facts" and scientific process 
as experimentation techniques. Relativists, as far as the status of 
scientific knowledge is concerned, see content and process as 
conceptually related, interpret content as "facts" but they are 
undecided on what the meaning of scientific process is, being divided 
between methodological considerations and experimentation techniques 
(see table 18.56). 
14. If the above attempt to interpret the correlations between the 
epistemological and curricular components results in a somewhat 
fragmented pattern, surprisingly a much clearer pattern concerning the 
correlations between teachers' views on the ontological question and 
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their views about science curriculum emerges (given the fact that the 
issue of reality does not appear to correlate significantly with the 
epistemological themes). Thus, there is a simple tendency for each 
ontological position to go with a single (empirically found) pattern of 
beliefs about the relation and the meaning of the terms content and 
process in science (tables T8.57 and 18.58). This correspondence is as 
follows: 
Ontological positions 
Scientific Realism 
Idealism 
Pragmatism 
Meaning of content and process in science 
content and process conceptually distinct 
content - facts 
process - experimentation techniques. 
content and process conceptually related 
content - facts 
process - experimentation techniques. 
content and process conceptually related 
content - facts 
process - methodological considerations. 
content and process conceptually distinct 
content - facts 
process - methodological considerations. 
Scepticism 
NOTE: The first and fourth groups are of very limited interest because of the low frequencies 
involved (see table TO.26). 
TABLE T8.78 
It is also worth noting that eclectics with regard to ontology appear 
to prefer the view that scientific content and process are conceptually 
related and attach the meaning of scientific laws to the scientific 
content and the meaning of experimentation techniques to scientific 
processes (see table 18.57). 
15. As far as the correlation between the themes of ontology and 
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integrated science curriculum is concerned, the pattern emerging is not 
so clear (see table 1.3.58). In this case, the significant effects can 
be summarised as follows: 
Ontological positions 
Scientific Realise 
 
Question of integration 
  
 
teaching of separate scientific subjects 
justification: differences in content, 
practical reasons. 
 
    
Pragmatism 
  
teaching of separate scientific subjects 
justification: differences in content, 
practical reasons. 
 
 
Scepticism 
  
teaching of integrated science 
justification: similarities in content and in 
methods, social relevance. 
NOTE: Only the first group is of interest in terms of frequencies involved (see table 1.8.26). 
TABLE T8.79 
Teacher; who appear to follow idealism are for the teaching of 
integrated science, but are split in two when the question of the 
justification of their preferences arises. On the one hand, there are 
people who consider integrated science convenient for practical reasons 
and on the other hand people who ground their preference on 
epistemic-sociological considerations (similarities in content and 
method, making science socially relevant). 
Finally, eclectics about ontology do not subscribe to any of the 
previously mentioned groups with regard to the question of integrated 
science (see table 78.58). 
B. Philosophical-Pedagogical components. 
16. The outcome of the interpretation of the statistically 
significant correlations between the epistemological and pedagogical 
components (shown in table 18.38) will be presented in a tabular form 
(tables 73.75, 18.76 and T8.77) given the large number of categories 
included in each of the themes of these components. In these tables, 
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for every category of the themes constituting the pedagogical 
component, the epistemological system for which a preference is 
detected 	 will 	 be indicated 	 (from 	 tables 	 T8.59 	 to 	 18.69) 
LEARNING ASSUMPTIONS - EPISTEMOLOGY ASSOCIATION. 
Scientific Criteria of Patterns of Status of 
Methodology Demarcation sc. 	 change Knowledge 
Cognitivism Inductivism Contextualisa B/A Contextualism B 
Behaviourism Contextualism B/A 'Truth' Inductiviss Contextualisa B 
Constructivist Contextualisa B/A Eclecticism Context. 	 A/Eclecticism 
TABLE T8.80 (based on tables T8.59 to 18.62) 
CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES - EPISTEMOLOGY ASSOCIATION. 
Scientific 	 Criteria of 	 Patterns of 	 Status of 
Methodology 	 Demarcation 	 sc. change 	 Knowledge 
teacher-pupil 	 Inductivism 	 Undecided Rationalists 
centred 
pupil-teacher 	 Undecided Rationalists 
centred 
pupil-pupil 	 Relativism 
centred 
TABLE T8.81 (based on tables 78.63 and 18.64) 
Seeing the above two tables in conjunction with table T8.75, it is 
not possible to match the two groups described in table T8.75 in any 
simple way with the groups identified above. This is not to say however 
that a pattern cannot be established. Let us accept that the 
interpretation of "rationality" changes (from a set of a—historical, 
timeless criteria to a completely relativistic conception) as one moves 
from inductivism to relativism. It then becomes clear that according to 
the evidence, as one moves from knowledge or skills centred systems to 
constructivism (theories of learning), or from more traditional 
approaches in terms of control of classroom activities, one also 
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changes 	 perspective 	 in 	 the 	 way 	 the 	 role of 	 rationality 	 is 	 conceived 
epistemologically 	 (from 	 inductivism 	 to 	 relativism). 
INSTRUCTION ASSUMPTIONS - EPISTEMOLOGY ASSOCIATION. 
	
Scientific 
	 Criteria of 	 Patterns of 	 Status of 
	
Methodology 
	 Demarcation 	 sc. 	 change 	 Knowledge 
TO-ST-AP-0C Und. 	 Rational. Context. 	 B/Prage. Eclectics 
BO-ST-AP-IN Context. 
	 B/A Und. 	 Rational. Contextualism A Context. 	 B/Pragm. 
BO-ST-AP-0C Inductiviss Context. 	 B/Praqe. Relativism Eclectics 
BO-ST-EI-IN Ind./Ded. Context. 	 A/Relat. Contextualism B Context. 	 A/Relat. 
BO-ST-EI-DC Und. 	 Rational. Context. 	 B/Praga. Contextualism A Und. 	 Rational. 
BO-WI-AP-OC Context. 	 A Und. 	 Rational. 
BO-WI-EI-IN Deductivism 'Truth' Eclectics 
The reference for the abbreviations applied in this table are the same as in section VIII.6.1.2 and can be 
found in table T8.30 
TABLE 78.82 (based on tables 78.65 to 18.69) 
The almost even distribution of responses regarding teachers' 
assumptions about instruction (the situation changes considerably if 
one takes into consideration factors like the subject of specialisation 
and the P.G.C.E students-practising teachers distinction, see table 
18.30) 	 seems to be the reason why it is not possible here to establish 
a pattern as meaningful as the previous one. On the other hand, given 
the size of the population it is not reasonable to run a test in which 
these differentiating factors are taken into consideration. 
C. Curricular-Pedagogical components. 
17. A tentative map of associations will be presented here, again in 
the form of a table. This table refers to the correlation between the 
meaning of the terms content and process in science on the one hand and 
the pedagogical component on the other. Table T8.83 points out the 
essential features of tables T8.70 to T8.72, taken together. 
It should be clarified that in the following table an empty cell 
means either no association or associations of equal strength with more 
than one category. 
CONTENT & PROCESS - PEDAGOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS ASSOCIATION. 
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content-process related 
content - facts 
process - methodology 
content-process related 
content - facts 
process - experimentation techniques 
Assumption on 	 Assumption on 
learning 	 instruction 
cognitivism 	 other stances 
other stances 
Assumption on 
classroom activities 
pupil-pupil 
TABLE T8.83 (based on tables T8.70 to 18.72) 
Applying the same convention as above for the correlations between 
the theme of integrated science and the pedagogical component the 
interesting element which comes out is the association between the 
views of people who are inclined to prefer the teaching of integrated 
science for practical reasons and the "teacher-pupil" approach in terms 
of classroom activities (see tables T8.73 and T8.74). 
For the interpretation of the findings summarised above, one should 
bear in mind that: 
a. there is evidence of interaction between epistemological and 
pedagogical views (see tables 18.80 and T8.81) while no such 
correlations can be established between the ontological and the 
pedagogical views (see tables T8.38). 
b. On the contrary, it appears that teachers' views about the 
curricular issues under consideration are associated with their views 
about the issue of reality (see tables T8.78 and 18.79) while their 
pattern of association with the epistemological component appears 
fragmented [see section VIII.7.2(13)]. 
c. Furthermore surprisingly, teachers' epistemological (level III) 
and ontological (levels I and II) views are not correlated 	 (see table 
T3.33). 
It seems reasonable therefore to hypothesise that there exist two 
relatively autonomous regions i.e. epistemological and pedagogical 
interrelated elements on the one hand and ontological - curricular one 
the other which constitute parts of the "educational" theory science 
teachers hold. 
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VIII.2 	 Reliability and validity. 
Classical item analysis deals with tests consisting of several items 
set up to measure an ordinal variable (e.g. attainment in some 
ability). 
	 Thus, one can either compare the mean scores of the items, 
intended to measure the same attribute for the whole population 
(validity), 	 or compare the mean score on each item amongst different 
target populations (reliability) [13]. This classical approach, 
however, does not fit well with the analytical problems of this thesis. 
The research instrument is large 
	 (due to the attempt to cover an 
extensive area). For this reason no additional items were included in 
order to check the same attribute, so as to to make possible the 
quantification of the validity. However, as Northop (14] argues one can 
use the term validity referring to the "appropriateness" of operational 
definitions. Appropriateness, in this instance as Blalock [15] 
maintains, means the fitness of the operational definitions to the 
theoretical analysis, which "must inevitably be judged on the basis of 
one's understanding of the theoretical definitions". According to this 
ergument, considering that the operational definitions are represented 
by sets of distinctions as organised in the form of systemic networks, 
the validity of the instrument depends on the adequacy of the analysis 
(chapters II and III) preceded the construction of the network (chapter 
IV) to dissect out consistent positions. 
With regard to reliability Guilford and Fruchter [16] draw our 
attention to the fact that one should not speak of reliability of the 
measuring instrument but rather of reliability of measurements. Here 
however, the necessary assumption for the reliability test 
	 (i.e. that 
the distribution of responses regarding a certain attribute is 
identical for different sub-groups), is not held. On the contrary, the 
various sub-groups of the population are treated as distinct variables. 
Nevertheless, there is an aspect of the reliability test which 
warrants some comment. Blalock [17] writes: 
	 "Since all measurement 
involves classification as a minimal requirement, an operational 
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definition can be considered to be a detailed set of instructions 
enabling one to classify individuals unambiguously. 
	
The notion of 
reliability is thus built into this conception of the operational 
definition. 	 The definition should be sufficiently precise that all 
persons using the procedure will achieve the same results". Clearly, 
the term 'same' is used here in the sense of results being free of 
procedural distortion. In terms of this, it can be argued that the 
systemic network, on the basis of which the instrument was constructed 
and which subsequently was the basis for the analysis of data, lays 
down very precise rules as far as the categorisation of respondents" 
views is concerned. These rules are made explicit in the second stage 
of the data analysis (tables T8.22 to 18.31-specification of the 
positions). 
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IX. 	 DISCUSSION OF CONCLUSIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. 
IX.1 A brief narrative: The study. 
This piece of research sought to capture how science teachers and 
student teachers view scientific knowledge from a philosophical 
-epistemological perspective (the dimensions under discussion being 
scientific method, criteria of demarcation, patterns of scientific 
growth, issues concerning the theory-observation distinction and the 
related problems which deal with the construction of reality). These 
issues are seen as important since a well-developed philosophical 
standpoint can greatly enhance an adequate understanding of science. On 
this basis the investigation from the above perspective is followed by 
an attempt to investigate the link between these dimensions and a 
number of curricular and pedagogical issues pertaining to science 
education. 
In terms of structure, commencing with the rationale and delineation 
of the main questions of the research, the study examined a number of 
theoretical systems, which constitute the philosophical basis of 
scientific knowledge and certain relevant curricular and pedagogical 
issues. 	 There followed a discussion of methodological issues, the foci 
being on systemic network analysis technique and a framework for the 
location of pieces of relevant research. The latter framework was 
subsequently employed for an overview of the relevant literature while 
the systemic network analysis technique served as a means to organise 
the construction of the research instrument, discussed in chapter VII. 
The main advantage of the systemic network analysis (used here in a 
different fashion than that for which it was originally introduced) may 
lie in that in principle, it facilitates making explicit the choices 
and distinctions made, in a flexible but well defined way. Chapter VIII 
dealt with the analysis and interpretation of the empirical evidence; 
the present chapter reviews the overall conclusions. 
IX.2 The conclusions: Recounting and discussing. 
The aim is to bring together the specific conclusions drawn in the 
course of the analysis of the data. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of the main results and some remarks about further research. 
A. Philosophical-epistemological views: Image of science. 
1. Teachers do seem to have discernible views about the philosophical 
and epistemological basis of scientific knowledge, at least as far as 
the dimensions considered in this thesis are concerned. This 
corroborates previous findings e.g. Dibbs Cl]. 	 It should be noted 
however that despite both a number of studies which aver that teachers 
have such an interest, and arguments that a philosophical 	 analysis of 
scientific knowledge is essential in science teaching, a general 
feeling appears to persist that teachers' interests are remote from 
such considerations. 
2. The assertion that teachers have philosophical and epistemological 
views does not mean that they fully subscribe to one of the "orthodox" 
philosophical systems. As shown in section VIII.5 a dominant pattern 
for the whole sample can be discerned. The elements of this pattern, 
which resembles the second version of contextualism, are as follows: 
-there are rational criteria regarding the choice of scientific 
methods and theories and a good guide for such choices is the consensus 
of the relevant community; 
-scientific knowledge is not special but it has some particular 
characteristics in that it is a systematic and useful pattern of 
thought. 
This result is, however, only an estimation of the "collective" view of 
many individuals and does not yet show whether or not teachers follow 
(in terms of any particular theme) any consistent system. 
For this reason, in addition to the above analysis of the data, 
the responses in terms of groups of statements (which correspond to 
distinct conceptual themes) of each individual were analysed (sections 
VIII.6.1 and VIII. .2). From this treatment of the data concerning the 
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themes of the philosophical-epistemological component, the following 
tendencies emerge: 
THEME 
	
MOST FAVOURED SYSTEM 	 LEAST FAVOURED SYSTEM 
Scientific Methodology 	 Contextualism B/A 	 Relativism 
Criteria of Demarcation 	 Context. B/Pragm. 	 Undecided Rationalists 
Pattern(s) of sc. change 	 Contextualism B 	 Hyp.-Deductiv. and Relativism 
The status of sc. knowledge Context. A/Relat. 	 Ind./Hyp.-Ded. 
The issue of Reality 
	 Realism/Sc. Realism 	 Scepticism/Log. Positivism 
TABLE T9.1 
As discussed earlier (section VIII.6.3), the table shows that the way 
in which contextualism is favoured and what positions are rejected 
depends on the theme under consideration. 
Comparing the findings of this study with previous research, there 
are two points which warrant some comment. Firstly, there is evidence 
that there has been a shift in teachers' views away from the 
traditionally prevailing empirico-inductive position, towards systems 
which emphasize more the historical and social dimensions of scientific 
knowledge. This shift however is not uniform, but depends on the theme 
under question. 
	 An extreme relativistic position seems to emerge with 
regard to the status of scientific knowledge, while insofar as the 
question of scientific methodology is concerned one can still detect a 
strong stream of inductivists (see section VIII.6.1). 
It should be made clear that, as stated in section VI.4.1, the 
orientation of previous studies generally tended to be different, in 
the sense of attempting to investigate the impact which complex systems 
in their totality have on teachers' thought. 
Thus, it may be that the dissection of the relevant philosophical 
-Epistemological issues into constituent themes in the present work is 
of some significance. For instance to define conceptual areas within 
which teachers have consistent views from a philosophical perspective 
can in principle permit one to draw a more satisfactory picture. The 
term satisfactory is employed here in two senses. This strategy means 
that there is a better chance of picturing teachers' views as they are, 
and not as "inconsistent" when viewed only in the frame of a given 
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total position. Furthermore, by facilitating reconstruction of 
meaningful patterns for a given theme one can study the interaction of 
other sets of opinions (e.g. curricular) with teachers' views 
concerning this theme. 
Clearly, this is not to say that the drive to reconstruct teachers' 
philosophical views in a more integrated form is to be dismissed. It is 
rather that such a task is perhaps more feasible if attention has been 
paid beforehand to narrower conceptual units. 
Admittedly, the sets of views under discussion here are by no means 
stable and well defined. Furthermore, given the complexity of the 
issues under consideration, and the fact that though generally 
recognised by educationists as essential, their application is not 
self-evident, a degree of simplification is not only inevitable but 
arguably necessary. The above conclusions should be seen in this light. 
B. Curricular views: Integration of the science curriculum. 
The questions about the science curriculum were confined to the area 
of the integration of the science curriculum, and to the meaning of 
content and process in science. 
I. With regard to the issue of whether to teach specialised 
scientific subjects or one integrated subject, more teachers seem to 
favour integration. The reasons chosen for such a reform were 
conceptual and methodological similarities (epistemic considerations) 
as well as the belief that integration can provide the basis for 
socially relevant curricula (see section VIII.6.2). 
This position of the majority appears to contradict the arguments put 
forward by Hirst 	 [2] and Phenix [3] concerning the distinct forms of 
knowledge (e.g. physics-chemistry as opposed to biology), being more in 
accord with a Kuhnian interpretation of Schwab's thesis (see chapter 
II), and with sociological considerations. 
Regarding previous findings Brown, Maclntyre, Dreyer and Davis 
reported that teachers "placed considerable importance on resource 
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constraints. The particular resource problem of a given school 
influenced the favour with which integration was viewed - evidence of 
such problems was readily available" C4l. Interestingly, this finding 
coincides with the view of the minority (who preferred specialisition) 
in the present study, their argument being based on their belief that 
differences in content were sufficient to warrant distinct subjects, in 
addition to considering integration difficult on practical grounds. 
2. It seems to be of interest to discuss how teachers understand the 
terms "content" and "process" in science in the light of their 
epistemological and philosophical beliefs. Most of the teachers 
appeared to think that content and process are related, and furthermore 
see the content mainly as experimental data, whilst to the term 
"process" the meaning attached is that of techniques of experimentation 
(see section VIII.6.2). 
This seems to suggest that the fact of the detected shift of 
allegiances away from an empirico-inductive image of science expressed 
in epistemological terms is not necessarily transferred to practical 
decisions. Thus, when it comes to concrete educational choices, it 
becomes clear that old beliefs die hard. Furthermore, at the 
ontological level, where scientific realism is the favoured system, 
this emphasis on experimentation resembles Hacking's [5] position, 
where he argues that "experimental work provides the strongest evidence 
for scientific realism". This pattern is consistent with the findings 
of the correlation study. Indeed, the interpretation of the correlation 
between views about the existence of theoretical and observational 
entities and the meaning of content and process in science 
education,resulted in a much more meaningful pattern (see table 
VIII.78) than the same attempt when the first element was teachers' 
epistemological views (see section VIII.7.2(13)). 
C. Pedagogical views: Across several dichotomies. 
The last component refers to general pedagogical principles i.e. 
assumptions about learning, instruction and classroom activities. 
1. The system termed in this thesis "cognitivism" (Piagetian 
orientation) was teachers' most favoured single choice in terms of 
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learning assumptions. 	 This choice however, was by no means made by a 
majority (only 27%). As stated in section VIII.6.2 this could be 
interpreted as either a genuine phenomenon, or, given the immediate 
relevance of the assumptions under consideration for teachers, 	 it may 
also indicate a weakness in the analysis which preceded the 
construction of the research instrument. 
Nevertheless one could discuss this outcome in the light of 	 "a more 
general dichotomy - oversimplified as it is between two distinctively 
different conceptions of learning" (Marton, [6]). According to Marton's 
distinction one could see learning either as "a qualitative change in 
one's way of understanding some aspect of reality" or to understand 
learning as "to memorise something, to be able to retell something one 
has read" [77. It can be argued that, of the systems distinguished in 
this study, cognitivism and constructivism are more akin to the first 
of the above versions while behaviourism fits more with the second. In 
this light, according to the evidence collected here, 	 teachers appear 
to understand learning primarily as a qualitative change in one's way 
of understanding. 
This however collapses the two conceptions of learning above (i.e. 
cognitivism and constructivism), which differ rather fundamentally in 
terms of their philosophical-epistemological foundations. 
The philosophical starting points of the Piagetian school of 	 thought 
as Piaget himself argues them, can be summarised as taking a position 
which is: 
-naturalist but not positivist; 
-one which stresses the activity of the subject without being 
idealist; 
-one that bases itself on the object which "it considers as a limit 
(therefore existing independently of us but never completely reached)" 
[8]. 
By contrast, the philosophical underpinnings of constructivism, as 
reflected for instance in the paradigm of investigating childrens' 
ideas in science education, are arguably a combination of 
methodological 	 inductivism 	 (scientific 
	 methodology) 
	 with 	 some 
relativistic influence (status of scientific knowledge) which in the 
view taken in this thesis is on the one hand, difficult to interpret in 
a realistic framework and on the other, consistent with idealistic 
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ontological tendencies (section 11.2.1). One might note that this set 
of positions, taken by a number of science educationalists, is in fact 
rather close to the broad picture of teachers' views found in the 
present study. 
If now we see teachers' assumptions about learning in relation to 
their views about reality, scientific methodology and the status of 
scientific knowledge, one can speculate that the sources of influence 
are divided (i.e. scientific realism was teachers' choice at the 
ontological level, while. scientific knowledge appears not to be treated 
as special). It may be therefore that the division between cognitivism 
and constructivism reflects after all some genuine situation. 
2. The evidence suggests somehow evenly distributed views as far as 
teachers' assumptions about instruction are concerned. As stated 
however in section VIII.6.2 (table 18.30), teachers and P.G.C.E. 
students appear to favour an approach which consists of: 
-a balanced orientation in terms of the teaching model to be 
adopted 	 (use of clearly defined objectives but in such as way as to 
leave the teacher the flexibility to intervene according to the needs 
of the moment); 
-active participation as the main motivational force and 
-occasional use of reinforcement. 
There is not the same unanimity about the pacing of knowledge. Thus, 
P.G.C.E. students tend to prefer the presentation of the whole idea 
initially while teachers' stance seems to be the presentation of 
knowledge in small steps. Interestingly, the same differentiation of 
opinions emerges if one looks at the results taking into account the 
subjects of specialisation. Physicists lean towards the first of the 
above positions while chemists and biologists tend to take the second 
one. 
Seeing the results across this dichotomy (i.e. presentation of the 
whole idea or proceeding gradually in small steps) the majority (75.37.) 
among the teachers and students who took a stance (who amount to 72.67.. 
of the whole sample) tend to prefer the presentation of knowledge in 
small 	 steps, while only 24.77.. advocate the initial presentation of the 
whole idea. It may be noted, then, that there is considerable support 
for a teaching approach which is consistent with a behaviourist 
philosophy. 
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The last theme of the pedagogical component concerns assumptions 
about classroom activities. In this theme teachers tend to choose clear 
explanations to which pupils should attend, and carefully guided 
"discovery" (as opposed to investigations by pupils of problems of 
their own choice), as being the essential activities which should take 
place during science lessons, in addition to considering knowledge of 
the subiect and of effective teaching techniques as vital features of a 
good science teacher. 	 In this, teachers do not seem so willing to 
accept that to understand pupils' thinking well, or to respect pupils' 
own decisions about their learning, are of primary importance. These 
views are consistent with their tendency not to accept constructivism, 
which emphasises these aspects of teaching. 
Bruner has distinguished two kinds of teaching: "that which takes 
place in the expository mode and that in the hypothetical mode. In the 
former the decisions concerning the mode the pace and style of 
exposition are principally determined by the teacher as expositor; 	 the 
student is the listener" [9] whereas "in the hypothetical mode the 
teacher and the student are in a more co-operative position with 
respect to what in linguistics would be called 'speakers decisions'. 
The student is not a bench-bound listener but is taking a part in the 
formulation and at times may play the principal role in it [10].. 
Looking at the results in terms of this distinction, it could be argued 
that the findings indicate that teachers appear to lean more towards 
the expository (vis-a-vis the hypothetical) mode. 
Given that the assumptions about classroom activities are the 
statements which most concern classroom interactions, the results 
regarding this theme may helpfully be seen in the light of studies 
which investigate directly (e.g. by observation) teachers' practice in 
classroom. It seems that teachers' preferences when asked directly, 
tend to coincide with their actual practice, since as 
	 Galton M. and 
Eggleston J. 	 [11], who apply STOS, found: the categories, teacher 
makes statements and teacher directs pupils were the most frequently 
observed indicating that pupil autonomy with respect to control of the 
learning activity was in little evidence" and the pupil initiated and 
maintained activity categories were much less than teacher-directed 
behaviour". Hacker R. J. [12], using the same instrument, reports 
similar conclusions for Canadian teachers. 
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D. Correlations: Towards exploring "educational theory". 
One of the initial aims of the study was to investigate links between 
the philosophical, curricular and pedagogical components as well as to 
find out the extent to which individuals follow consistently the same 
system within the philosophical-epistemological component. For this 
reason a study of correlations was carried out. 
1. As shown in table T8.38, which is also illustrated by figure F8.4 
(see section VIII.'), it is evident that teachers' views concerning the 
various themes are correlated significantly within and across 
components. Not surprisingly the curricular and pedagogical components 
ere "integrated", in the sense that all the themes belonging to each 
are correlated with the others belonging to the same component. In the 
philosophical component there is also correlation amongst its themes, 
with the exception of the theme referring to ontological 
	
issues which 
has no correlation with the other philosophical themes. Thus, it 
appears that it is not ontology which sustains teachers' 
epistemological beliefs, whatever philosophers may lead one to expect 
or hope. However, teachers' ontological views are of considerable 
educational significance, since there is evidence of strong correlation 
between them and their views regarding the science curriculum. 
2. A detailed study of the correlations between the themes of the 
epistemological part of the philosophical component (i.e. the themes of 
scientific methodology, criteria of demarcation, patterns of scientific 
change and the status of knowledge) corroborates the findings of the 
analysis of teachers' views about these themes (table T9.1). According 
to both analyses a gradual shift, away from philosophical systems in 
which science is conceived as a single rational entity, towards more 
relativistic positions, takes place as one looks successively at 
teachers' views moving from the theme of scientific methodology to 
criteria of demarcation and patterns of scientific change to end up 
with teachers' views concerning the status of scientific knowledge. 
Within this general framework one can discern two groups of teachers 
(in addition to a third group of people who appear to be consistently 
"eclectic"). The first croup seems to subscribe to inductivism (for 
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scientific methodology), contextualism B (for criteria of demarcation), 
contextualism B (for patterns of scientific change), contextualism 
A/relativism (status of scientific knowledge). The second group appears 
to follow contextualism B/A (scientific methodology), to advocate 
demarcation of scientific theories based on rational criteria, to 
subscribe to contextualism A (patterns of scientific change), and while 
accepting some special status for the scientific knowledge, are 
undecided as to the basis of such a claim. The only exception then, 
regarding the above mentioned general pattern about how teachers' views 
change as one moves from one theme to another, 	 is the views of the 
second group concerning the status of scientific knowledge (see table 
78.75 and figure F8.5). On the present evidence, this grouping can only 
be tentative. It could be tested by a multivariate analysis with an 
instrument better adapted to the purpose. 
It thus appears that the way in which teachers views about the 
epistemological part of the philosophical component are associated, 
seems to entail some kind of internal tension, if seen from a purely 
philosophical standpoint. It is not self-evident however, that teachers 
ought to have an absolutely coherent philosophical position. 
Furthermore, it has already been pointed out that teachers' 
philosophical beliefs tend to a large extent to resemble the. 
epistemological position which the recently growing body of research in 
science education concerning children's "pre-scientific" ideas seems to 
imply. This of course, does not cancel questions of the origins of such 
a formulation of beliefs, or of why teachers think (if they do think 
so) that this general philosophical orientation is conducive either to 
science teaching or to the image of science it projects to pupils. 
Another point related to teachers' philosophical-epistemological 
beliefs concerns the impact which the diversity of the philosophical 
systems held by teachers exerts on pupils. Again, this can seen either 
from the standpoint of whether or not it enhances pupils understanding 
of science, or in terms of attitudes such a proliferation helps to 
create. To elaborate, one can further ask: 
a. is this proliferation of views healthy, in that by exposing 
(even implicitly) pupils to different philosophies of science might one 
expect pupils to understand science better and to acquire a positive 
image of science? Or, is the fragmentation detrimental (especially when 
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not explicit) in the sense of frustrating pupils? 
b. Furthermore, how does it bear upon attempts to achieve 
educational 	 equality? If one believes that a prerequisite of such an 
attempt is to create equality in terms of conditions, should one extend 
the notion of conditions so as to include this set of beliefs? Is it 
justified? Is it feasible? If not, is there any course of action to 
mitigate these effects? 
3. For the curricular component the analysis could be seen as leading 
to the identification of two groups with a substantial following 
	 (see 
table T8.76). Both of these groups tend to favour the introduction of 
integrated science curricula as well as to support the view that 
scientifc content and process should be treated as conceptually 
related. What differentiates them is the meaning attached to the terms 
"content" and "process" in science education, and the arguments which 
the teachers seem to prefer for integration. Thus, the first group 
appears to advocate the integration of scientific curricula (as opposed 
to specialised subjects) mainly for practical reasons. Furthermore, 
they interpret scientific content as consisting of experimental and 
observational data, and scientific process as connected with 
methodological considerations. For the second group the justification 
of the introduction of integrated courses in science lies in epistemic-
considerations (similarities in content and methods), as well as in the 
belief that integration facilitates the attempt to make scientific 
curricula socially relevant. The term "content" is again taken to mean 
observational or experimental facts, while process is understood as 
generally dealing with experimentation techniques (see table T8.76). A 
third minority group will be discussed later. 
4. In as far as the pedagogical component is concerned two groups of 
teachers can be discerned. Teachers of the first group seem to 
subscribe to a Piagetian conception of learning 
	 ("cognitivism"); to 
envisage instruction 
	
(see section 11.2.2) in terms of (a) a balanced 
orientation which makes use of clearly defined objectives, but allows 
teachers to intervene if the circumstances call for it, (b) 
presentation of knowledge in small steps, 
	 (c) reinforcement as an 
integral part of teaching and (d) emotional involvement as the 
principal motivational force. Furthermore, they prefer the expository 
mode of teaching (teacher being in control of the knowledge 
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transactions in the classroom), while on the other hand, they accept 
that understanding of pupils' thinking and respect for pupils' own 
decisions about their learning should be included in the traits of a 
successful teacher. The second group of teachers tend to favour 
behaviourism (see section 11.2.1), to stress the value of active 
discussions between teachers and pupils and similarly of investigations 
by pupils of problems of their own choice (presumably a more inquiry 
oriented approach to teaching), and simultaneously to share with the 
first group concerns regarding the attention that should be paid to 
pupils thinking and self-perception of needs (see table 18.77). 
5. The final step (which might be seen in a way as reconstructing the 
body of "educational theory" of teachers), is to discuss the 
correlations across components, i.e. the correlations between the 
themes of: 
(a) philosophical - curricular components, 
(b) philosophical - pedagogical components and 
(c) curricular - pedagogical components. 
6. The evidence suggests that in terms of the first of the above 
pairs of Lomponents, the teachers' ontological position is the element 
which is associated with their curricular views. Specifically, as shown_ 
by tables T8.78 and T8.79 teachers who tend to lean towards scientific 
realism, also tend to take the minority view (the first of the 
discerned groups in the curricular component - see section VIII.7.1(7), 
table 18.76) that the teaching of specialised subjects is preferable 
because of differences in the content as well as for practical reasons. 
Furthermore, they hold that content and process in science are distinct 
conceptually, content having the meaning of experimental and 
observational data, while for process experimentation techniques are 
central. It should be noted that: 
(a) as already mentioned, this meaning of process tends to be 
consistent with Hacking's interpretation of scientific realism, 
(b) this view of content and process, which suggests some 
empirico-inductive leanings, 
	 is in accordance with the outcome of the 
correlational analysis, which indeed indicates that inductivists tend 
to view content and process in this way (see section VIII.7.2.(11)). 
As shown in table T9.26, the other main stream regarding the 
282 
ontological question is teachers who appear to espouse idealism. For 
these teachers content and process are conceptually related and the 
meaning attached to these terms are the same as in the above group (see 
table T8.78). However, unlike the realists, they tend to favour the 
introduction of "integrated" science 
	 (the second of the discerned 
groups in the curricular component - see table 18.76). 
7. In so far as the correlation between the themes of the 
philosophical and pedagogical components is concerned, as argued in 
section VIII.7.2(16) (see tables T8.80 and 18.31), a pattern can be 
established: there is a parallel shift of teachers' views at the levels 
both of epistemological and of pedagogical assumptions. Thus, teachers 
who conceive learning in behavioural terms (skills, ability to 
demonstrate knowledge) and follow more traditional approaches in terms 
of control of classroom activities (e.g. expository subject-centred 
approach), tend also to have more "rationality"-bound image of science. 
Teachers on the other hand who appear to emphasise the individual 
construction aspects of learning ("constructivists") see science in a 
more relativistic light, while the Piagetian-oriented stream of 
teachers occupy an in-between position in epistemological terms. 
6. Arguably the above discerned patterns have some significance_ 
because: 
a. they provide the basis for some hypotheses which, if further 
investigated, can enhance our understanding of the "educational theory" 
teachers hold. 
b. by underlining the association of philosophical considerations 
with pedagogical assumptions serves as a means to verify an initial 
hyphothesis of this study, that there is a significant interaction 
between 	 teachers' 	 beliefs 
	
concerning 	 on 	 the 	 one 	 hand 
philosophical-epistemological dimensions of scientific knowledge and 
curricular-pedagogical general principles on the other. 
9. Finally, correlations between teachers" curricular and pedagogical 
assumptions remain to be considered. As shown in table T8.38 there is 
evidence of correlations between the themes belonging to these two 
components (with the exception of the pair "integration in science" and 
"assumptions about learning", which do not correlate significantly). 
However, the pattern of associations presented in section VIII.7.2(17) 
is complex, and not easy to interpret. 
10. For an overall conclusion concerning the articulation of the 
philosophical, curricular and pedagogical components, the patterns 
detected seem to point towards a hypothesis that there exist two 
relatively autonomous regions, i.e. 	 epistemological and pedagogical 
interrelated elements on the one hand and ontological - curricular on 
the other, which constitute parts of the educational theory teachers 
hold. 
E. Differences between groups of teachers. 
1. 	 In this study, the views of the respondents were also analysed in 
terms of the subject of teachers' specialisation (physics, chemistry, 
biology), and the distinction between P.G.C.E. students and practising 
teachers (see sections VIII.6.1 and VIII.6.2). The salient points of 
the differentiation of the views in terms of these groupings will now 
be summarised for the themes where there was evidence of such a 
differentiation. 
1.1 Scientific methodology: biology teachers and practising 
teachers were more than any other group inclined towards inductivism,' 
while physics teachers tended to prefer contextualism B/A. 
1.2 Status of scientific knowledge: physics teachers were the only 
group for which there was evidence for a considerable following of the 
view that science has a special status, while biology teachers appear 
to adopt a relativistic view. 
1.3 Ontological question: physics and chemistry teachers favoured 
realism, while the preferences of biologists were evenly split between 
realism and idealism. 
1.4 Integration of scientific subjects: the differentiation of the 
views here lies not in the preference for the introduction of 
integrated curricula which teachers of all specialisations seem to 
favour, but in the reasons chosen for this preference. Thus, physicists 
tend to choose practical reasons, while for chemistry and biology 
teachers epistemic considerations (unity in methods as well as in the 
conceptual framework of scientific subjects) are important. 
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1.5 Scientific content and process: the majority of teachers see 
content and process in science as being conceptually related, but 
chemistry and biology teachers interpret content as observational and 
experimental data and process as experimentation techniques. Physics 
teachers constitute an exception to this trend, as this is the only 
group where one can detect a current which includes scientific laws in 
the content. 
1.6 Assumptions about instruction: a difference between physics 
teachers on the one hand, and chemistry and biology teachers on the 
other, is found in that physics teachers appear to prefer the 
presentation of the whole idea first and not the pacing of knowledge in 
small steps, as the other two groups tend to support. 
	 It is worth 
noting that P.6.C.E. students follow physics teachers in this 
preference, while the pattern emerging from the analysis of views of 
practising teachers seems to resemble that of chemists and biologists. 
1.7 Assumptions about classroom activities: the main point 
regarding this theme is that the only group to advocate to a 
considerable extent a comprehensive pupil-centred approach (both in 
terms of control of knowledge transactions and features which a teacher 
should have) was the F.G.C.E. students. 
F. Limitations. 
1. There are some specific methodological limitations (besides any 
more general objections one might have to the methodological 
solutions), which need to be noted in order to put the above 
conclusions into perspective: 
a. the construction of some categories is based on responses to a 
relatively small number of statements. 
b. strictly speaking, the terms "inductivism", "relativism" etc. 
mean that people answer the statements designed in a certain way, 
defined by the initial analysis. Therefore, one needs further work in 
detail to find out whether they mean what they appear to mean. 
c. The above limitations are a consequence of attempting to cover 
a large number of complex positions within a questionnaire (even a 
large one). 
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2. Nevertheless there exist meaningful patterns and correlations 
amongst the responses to the statements, of which there are a fairly 
large number. It seems reasonable therefore to hope that the outcome of 
the attempt to interpret the data and draw conclusions has some 
meaning. 
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IX.3 
	
Overview: The main findings and some suggestions 
for further research. 
In this section the main findings of this study and some suggestions 
for further research emanated from them will be presented. 
1. The evidence from this and previous studies suggests that teachers 
do have identifiable views about the philosophical -epistemological 
basis of science. 	 This study attempted to explore this set of views. 
Roughly speaking, it appears that teachers tend to value the procedures 
embodied in science, usually termed "scientific methods", though 
contextually situated. Furthermore, they tend to subscribe to a realist 
position i.e. the existence of various entities is independant of human 
thoughts and the theoretical/observational entities distinction does 
not necessarily bear upon the question of their existence. 
It is therefore interesting that they consider scientific knowledge -
the end product of activities which are closely related to the 
application of scientific methods - in a more relativistic light, that. 
is to say no different than any other body of knowledge which from a 
methodological standpoint is presumably less well developed. Thus, one 
can further study if this is a fair picture of teachers 	 views by 
presenting, 
	 for instance, this outcome and asking teachers whether it 
depicts accurately their views or not. Furthermore one can focus into 
the question about the reasons why teachers seem to take one view with 
regard to scientific methodology and another more relativist view as 
far as the status of scientific knowledge is concerned. 
At a different level the detected shift in teachers views (previous 
research suggests an adherence to empirico-inductive model of science) 
can be further studied in terms of different age groups of teachers 
(given that practising teachers whose views were studied in this thesis 
were young teachers), subject of specialisation, gender and types of 
school in which they teach (e.g. grammar - comprehensive). 
As far as the curricular and pedagogical assumptions are concerned 
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the data seem to suggest that: 
a. the introduction of integrated courses is favoured by teachers. 
b. teachers' "definitions" of the terms content and process rely on 
an empirical image of science. 
c. teachers' pedagogical positions are still rather traditional 
encompassing teachers' control of knowledge transactions, presentation 
of knowledge in small steps and emphasising the importance of pupils' 
abilities to think in abstract terms. 	 Interestingly, PGCE students 
appear to advocate a comprehensive "child-centred" approach. 
These results are "weaker" than the results concerning their 
philosophical views, at least in the sense that the initial analysis 
which preceded the construction of the instrument referring to the 
philosophical component, was better researched. A more in-depth 
examination then, of the curricular - pedagogical assumptions of 
teachers in relation to their philosophical views would be useful. 
3. The study of correlations suggests that teachers' epistemological 
beliefs tend to be correlated with their basic assumptions about 
learning, instruction and classroom activities. Furthermore, the way 
teachers conceive reality appear to be associated with their views 
about the integration of scientific curricula and the meanings attached -
to the terms content and process in science. Interestingly the ontology 
and epistemology are not perceived as being connected. 
An interpretation of these results could be that there exist two 
relatively autonomous regions of the educational theory teachers hold, 
i.e. epistemological and pedagogical interrelated elements on the one 
hand and ontological - curricular on the other. Thus, one can study why 
teachers - ontological views do not correlate with their philosophical 
views, as well as the reasons why teachers seem to think that 
curricular issues are connected with their position regarding the issue 
of reality. 
4. It has been already suggested that it may be useful to investigate 
the origin of differentiation of teachers' views in terms of the 
subject of their specialisation. One can further look at the extent to 
which the substantive and syntactical structures of every discipline 
(i.e. physics, chemistry, biology) are perceived differently by 
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teachers, as well as the effect that such differences (if any) have in 
shaping teachers' views. 
5. The problem of the origin and the factors which may have 
influenced teachers' views have not been addressed here. However, an 
indirect inference concerns the congruence of science teachers" views 
with current science education work (e.g. SSCR). 
In this context an interesting question (bearing in mind that 
correlation does not mean causation C13]) is to investigate their 
relationships in terms of causation, especially if one holds that 
action towards change should take place. 	 Carillo-Gamboa [14] in his 
thesis argues that it is pedagogy which takes precedence and shapes 
teachers' philosophical views. It would be interesting to find out 
whether this connection is more direct. On the other hand one may note 
that teachers receive scientific training (which implicitly carries a 
certain philosophy of science) prior to any educational studies. For 
teachers therefore who are committed intellectually to their subject 
as opposed to their role as teachers) the interaction between 
philosophical and pedagogical beliefs may be far more complex. 
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IX.4 	 Some personal reflections. 
In this final section, I would like to state briefly a personal view 
about the findings of this research. 
The more secure results are those referring to the mapping of 
teachers' philosophical-epistemological views, and indeed, I regard the 
conclusions based on them as potentially helpful in making explicit the 
often implicit assumptions and therefore by using them in training 
teachers, developing curricula and co-ordinating textbooks and other 
teaching material useful in enhancing pupils' understanding of science. 
However, it is the conclusions from the correlational study which I 
consider to be more interesting and challenging. Being an optimist, I 
believe that an attempt to reconstruct from a conceptually wide 
per.Ht,Ltive the educational theory which teachers hold, so as to avoid 
the otherwise inevitable fragmentation, is both helpful and in 
principle feasible, although the extensiveness for one thing, not to 
mention the complexity of the issues involved, clearly make such an 
enquiry extremely difficult. This, I consider to be one of the origins 
of the weaknesses which are undoubtedly reflected on the correlational 
results. 	 Thus, no claim is made that an integrated body of educational 
theory has been reconstructed. But, it would be a source of personal 
satisfaction, if this work is judged simply as pointing towards this 
direction. 
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APPENDI X 	 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
--------------- 
7 ---------------- 7 
------------------------------------ 
This questionnaire attempts to find out what teachers think about: 
(a)the nature of science 
(b)how science should be taught. 
(c)what kind of science should be taught. 
There are not "correct" answers.You may quite validly, from your own 
point of view, agree or disagree with any of the alternatives in 
question. 
All your responses are absolutely confidential. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
A. PRELIMINARY 	 SECTION 
Please, tick as appropriate: 
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2.Discipline of specialization: 
Physics 
	
Chemistry 
	 Biology 	 Mathematics 
	
Others(please,specify) 
/___
/ 	 \ 	
\ 
	
/ 	 \ 	
/___\ 
\ 	 / 	 \ 	 / 	 \ 	 / 
..Have you been taught Philosophy in the course of your previous 
studies? 
Yes 	 No 
4.Nationa1ity. 
	
British 	 Others(please specify) 
/___\ 
\ 	 / 
Z.Academic qualification. 
:B.Ed. 	 Others(please specify) 
- :B.Sc. 
: 
- 	
:M.Sc./M.A./M.Ed. 
- :M.Phil. 
: 
	
:Ph.D. 
6.Years of teaching experince. 
3 06 
D. MAIN SECTION 1 
Please (a)tick the alternative of your choice 
AND (b)circle S if you feel sure of your choice 
or U if you feel unsure of your choice. 
1.Science in schools would be best taught 
:a.as separate subjects. 
:b.as one subject. 
S---U 
?.The content and process of science 
:a.can be distinguished. 
• 
- 	
:b.are strongly related. 
S---U 
7.For the different kinds of scientific enquiry 
:a.there is basically one 
:scientific method. 
- :b.there are different ways of 
:___:being scientific in terms of method. 
S---U 
4.The scientific method is to 
:a.start from data about a 
:___:problem, basing hypotheses on the 
data. 
- :b.start by deducing consequences 
:___:of theories, checking them 
against the data. 
S---U 
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5.When the consequences of a theory are compared with data, sound 
conclusions can be drawn 
:a.if and only if theory and data 
:___:agree. 
- :b.if and only if theory and data 
:___:disagree. 
S---U 
6.1n choosing between different scientific methods for a given problem 
:a.there are standards enabling a 
:___:reasonable choice to be made. 
- :b.there is no rational way of 
:___:choosing, other than preference. 
S---U 
'.When there is a debate about whether a given theory is to be 
regarded as "scientific" 
- :a.there are rational and 
:___:defensible criteria for making the decision. 
- :b.there are no rational and 
:___:defensible criteria for making the decision. 
S---U 
8.When there are competing theories and scientists want to decide 
between them 
- :a.there are rational and 
:___:defensible ways of doing so. 
- :b.there are no rational and 
:___:defensible ways of doing so. 
S---U 
C. MAIN SECTION 2 
For each alternative below, please give TWO answers: 
(a)Do you agree or disagree with the statement? 
circle A (for agree) or D (for disagree) 
(b)How sure do you feel about your reply (a)? 
circle S (for sure) or U (for unsure). 
Please, reply to all the alternatives in each question, for example 
to all alternatives(9a, 9b and 9c) in question 9 below. 
9.In your view of science in schools, it is particularly important to 
teach 
9a.the content of science, as opposed to its process. 
S---U 
9b.the process of science, as opposed to its content. 
A---D 
	 S---U 
9c.both, as a connected entity. 
A---D 
	 S---U 
10.The science to be taught in schools should include 
10a.aspects which have historical importance. 
A---D 	 S---U 
10b.mainly science as it is currently understood. 
A---D 	 S---U 
11.In your view of science in schools, there should be emphasis on 
lla.the distinct nature of different scientific subjects. 
A---D S---U 
11b.the similarities of different scientific subjects. 
S---U 
12. In your view, if there are to be arguments for considering science 
in schools as separate subjects, they would best be based on 
12a.differences in content between subjects. 
--D S---U 
12b.differences in processes used by subjects. 
A---D S---U 
12c.reasons of practical convenience. 
A---D S---U 
12d.the need to maintain high academic standards. 
A---D S---U 
3 08 
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13.In your view, if there are to be arguments for considering science 
in schools as one subject, they would best be based on 
13a.its basic unity of concepts. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
13b.its basic unity of methods. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
13c.reasons of practical convenience. 
--D 	 S---U 
13d.the need to make school science relevant to the pupils. 
	
A---D 
	 S---U 
14.The giving of praise or blame, or of other forms of "reinforcement" 
14a.are an integral part of the process of teaching. 
A---D 
	 S---U 
14b.may or may not be needed, according to the circumstances. 
H---D 	 S---U 
14c.are strictly speaking irrelevant to the process of learning. 
A---D 
	
S---U 
15.It is essential to effective teaching that 
15a.it is directed by clearly defined objectives. 
A---D S---U 
15b.the teacher can respond or intervene according to the needs of 
the moment. 
A---D 
	 S---U 
16.The existence of various incompatible scientific methods 
16a.is a fruitful source of scientific progress. 
A---D 	 S---U 
16b.shows the pointlessness of discussions about scientific method. 
--D S---U 
1. In general the choice of the appropriate method to be used for a 
given problem 
17a.is guided by a consensus of the scientific community. 
--D S---U 
17b.itself belongs within the concept of science. 
A---D S---U 
17c.is made by individuals, using their own critical standards. 
A---D 	 S---U 
18.1n general the better of two competing theories 
18a.is the one which is nearer to the "truth". 
	
--D 	 S---U 
18b.is the one which gives the more useful results. 
	
A---D 	 8---U 
l8:.is a matter of consensus amongst scientists arising out of 
critical scrutiny. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
19. To be sure of approaching nearer to the "truth", one should follow 
the appropriate scientific method. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
20.The search for general rules for deciding either between competing 
scientific theories or which one of them deserves to be called 
scientific 
20a.is pointless because when theories change, so do our ideas 
about how to decide between theories. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
20b.is pointless because science merely persuades us to look at 
things in a certain way, which is no better than any other. 
	
A---D 
	 S---U 
20c.is not pointless at all. 
	
--D 	 S---U 
21.AE science changes or develops, new knowledge generally 
2la.replaces ignorance or lack of knowledge. 
	
--D 	 S---U 
21b.replaces knowledge of another sort. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
22.New scientific knowledge arises mainly through 
22a.an accumulation of new experiments and observations. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
22b.a succesion of more general and more complete theories. 
	
A---D 	 S---U 
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23.New scientific knowledge 
23a.either fits within the existing framework,or generates a new 
framework incompatible with the old one. 
A---D 	 S---U 
23b.follows no pattern of growth, beino purely the result of what 
scientists happen to have done. 
A---D 	 S---U 
24a.The world of nature exists independently of human thoughts. 
A---D 	 S---U 
24b.No objects exist independently of thought about them. 
A---D 	 S---U 
24c.There is a no sense in asking whether observable things (like 
mountains) or unobservable entities (like energy) exist or not. 
A---D 	 S---U 
25a.Only observable things e.g. rabbits, radios or chairs, exist. 
A---D 	 S---U 
25b.Genes, photons or chemical bonds exist, as do rabbits, radios ur 
chairs. 
A---D 
	 S---U 
26.The status of scientific knowledge 
26a.is different from other kinds of knowledge, having a 
characteristic value of its own. 
A---D 	 S---U 
26b.is not different from that of any other kind of knowledge, all 
kinds having equal validity. 
A---D 	 S---U 
27.Scientific knowledge 
27a.has particular characteristics in that it attempts to be an 
obiective account of Nature. 
S---U 
27b.has particular characteristics in that it is practically 
useful. 
A---D S---U 
27c.has particular characteristics in that it is a systematic 
pattern of thought. 
A---D 	 S---U 
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D. MAIN SECTION 3 
Please put the alternatives for each statement in order of priority, 
e.g. 
higher   lower 
priority: b : a : c :priority 
:___:___: 	 : 
If you feel that some are nearly equal in priority, please do your 
best to make the distinction. In addition, please circle D(if you 
think that there is difference) or E(if you feel that the alternatives 
are nearly equal in priority). 
28.The basic goal or aim of teaching should be that pupils 
a.develop a rational understanding of the subject. 
b.form their own individual view of the subject. 
c.acquire the inowledge and skills of the subject. 
higher   lower 
priority: 	 :priority 
D---E 
29.The content of science in schools should include 
a.theories and laws. 
b.e-perimental and/or observational data. 
c.technitles of experimentation. 
higher 
priority: 
 
lower 
:priority 
 
30.ln your view of science in schools,the teaching of scientific 
processes should include 
a.scientific methods how to be scientific). 
:,.host to handle experimental or observational data. 
c.how to devise experiments. 
higher  
 lower 
priority: 	 : 	 :prioritY 
D---E 
3 13 
31.To know whether pupils have learned or not, it is important 
a.to check what they can or can not be seen to do. 
b.to discover whether they have the expected concepts or not. 
c.to find out whether they themselves consider that they have 
learned or not. 
higher   lower 
priority: 	 :priority 
D---E 
32.In presenting knowledge to pupils, it is essential that 
a.each new step is small enough to be easy to make. 
b.the whole idea being taught is clear at the start. 
higher  
 lower 
priority: 	 :priority 
D---E 
33.1t is essential to effective learning that account has been taken 
of 
a.pupils perception of their own needs. 
b.pupils immediate prior knowledge. 
c.pupils ability to think at a sufficient level of abstraction. 
higher  
 lower 
priority: 	 : 	 :priority 
D---E 
3 14 
is essential in order to motivate pupils 
a.that the lesson involves their active participation. 
b. that they like or enjoy the subject. 
c.that they like the teacher. 
d.that they respect the teacher. 
e.that they know whether they are doing well or badly. 
higher 
 
lower 
:priority priority: 
D---E 
 
35.Essential activities in good science lessons are 
a.clear explanations to which pupils are attending. 
b.inyestigations by pupils of problems of their own choice. 
c.guided "discovery" by pupils of ideas to be learned. 
d.active discussion between teacher and pupils. 
higher   lower 
priority: 	 :priority 
D---E 
36.To become a good teacher, it is essential to 
a.know the subject well. 
b.understand pupils thinking well. 
c.to be equipped with effective teaching techniques. 
d.respect pupils own decisions about their learning. 
higher  
 lower 
priority: 
	 :priority 
D---E 
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y 
"CONTENT" AND "PROCESS" 
LEARNING ASSUMPTIONS 
COUNT 
	 I 
 
EXP VAL I 
ROW PCT I 
COL PCT I 
TOT PCT I 
RESIDUALIcoCnitiv behaviou phenomen 
o 	 , 	 sy 	 • 	 y 	 y 	 I 
BY 
ROW - 14  
LEARNING ASSUMPTIOr 
STD RES Ie 	 r. TOTAL 
ADJ RES I1.001 	 2.001 3.001 10.00! 
"CONTENT" AND "PROCESS" 	 + 	  + 	  . 	 . + 
1.00 	 I 	 1 	 I 	 0 	 I 3 	 I 0 	 I 	 4 
re1.-laws-exp 	 I 	 1.1 	 I 	 .5 	 I .7 	 I 1.8 	 I 	 4.2% 
I 	 25.07. 	 I 	 .0% 	 I 75.0% I .0% 1 
I 	 3.87. 	 I 	 .0% 	 I 18.87 	 I .07. 	 I 
I 	 1.17. 	 I 	 .0% 	 I 3.2% I .07 	 I 
I 	 -.1 	 I 	 I 2.3 	 I -1.8 	 I 
I 	 -.1 	 I 	 I 2.8 	 I -1.3 	 I 
I 	 -.1 	 I 	 I 3.2 	 I -1.8 	 I 
+ 	 + 	 + + + 
2.00 	 I 	 2 	 I 	 4 	 I 5 	 I 9 	 I 	 20 
ref-facts-meth 	 I 	 5.5 	 I 	 2.3 	 I 3.4 	 I 8.8 	 I 	 21.15: 
I 	 10.0% 	 I 	 20.07. 	 I 25.0% I 45.07% 	 I 
I 	 7.7% 	 I 	 36.47. 	 I 31.37. 	 I 21.47% 	 I 
I 	 2.1% 	 I 	 4.2% 	 I 5.37. 	 I 7.5% 	 I 
I 	 -3.5 	 I 	 1.7 	 I 1.6 	 I .2 	 I 
I 	 -1.5 	 I 	 1.1 	 I .9 	 I .1 	 I 
I 	 -2.0 	 I 	 1.3 	 I 1.1 	 I .1 	 I 
+ 	 + 	 + + + 
3.00 	 I 	 19 	 I 	 2 	 I 2 	 I 19 	 I 	 42 
rel-facts-exp 	 I 	 11.5 	 I 	 4.9 	 I 7.1 	 I 18.6 	 I 	 44.27. 
I 	 45.27. I 	 4.8% 	 I 4.87. 	 I 45.2% I 
I 	 73.1% 	 I 	 18.2% 	 I 12.5% I 45.2% I 
I 	 20.07.. 	 I 	 2.1% 	 I 2.1% 	 I 20.07.. 	 I 
I 	 7.5 	 I 	 -2.9 	 I -5.1 	 I .4 	 I 
I 	 2.2 	 I 	 -1.3 	 I -1.9 	 I .1 	 I 
I 	 3.5 	 I 	 -1.6 	 I -2.8 	 I .2 	 I 
+ 	 + 	 + + + 
4.00 	 I 	 3 	 I 	 0 	 I 3 	 I 2 	 I 	 7 
dist-facts-exp 	 I 	 1.9 	 I 	 .8 	 I 1.2 	 I 3.1 	 I 	 7.45: 
I 	 42.97.. 	 I 	 .0% 	 I 28.6% I 28.65: 	 I 
I 	 11.5% 	 I 	 .0% 	 I 12.5% I 4.8% 	 I. 
I 	 3.27. 	 I 	 .0% 	 I 2.17. 	 I 2.17 	 I 
I 	 1.1 	 I 	 I .8. 	 I -1.1 	 I 
I 	 .8 	 I 	 -.9 	 I .8 	 I I 
I 	 1.0 	 I 	 -1.0 	 I .9 	 I I 
+-- 	 + 	 + + + 
5.00 	 I 	 1 	 I 	 3 	 I 1 	 I 5 	 I 	 10 
dist-facts-meth 	 I 	 2.7 	 I 	 1.2 	 I 1.7 	 I 4.4 	 I 	 10.5% 
I 	 10.0% 	 I 	 30.07. 	 I 10.07. 	 I 50.05: 	 I 
I 	 3.87. 	 I 	 27.3% 	 I 6.3% I 11.97.. 	 I 
I 	 1.17. 	 I 	 3.2% 	 I 1.1% 	 I 5.3% 	 1 
I 	 -1.7 	 I 	 1.8 	 I -.7 	 I .6 	 I 
I 	 -1.0 	 I 	 1.7 	 I I .3 	 I 
I 	 -1.3 	 I 	 1.9 	 I I .4 	 I 
+ 	 + 	 + + + 
10.00 	 I 	 0 	 I 	 2 	 I 3 	 I 7 	 1 	 12 
I 	 3.3 	 I 	 1.4 	 I 2.0 	 I 5.3 	 I 	 12.6% 
I 	 .0% 	 I 	 16.75: 	 I 25.0% I 58.37. 	 I 
I 	 .0% 	 I 	 18.2% 	 I 18.87. 	 I 16.77. 	 I 
I 	 .0% 	 I 	 2.17. 	 I 3.27. 	 I 7.47. 	 I 
I 	 -3.3 	 I 	 .6 	 1 1.0 	 I 1.7 	 I 
I 	 -1.8 	 I 	 .5 	 I .7 	 I .7 	 I 
I 	 -2.3 	 I 	 .6 	 I .8 	 I 1.1 	 I 
+ 	 + 	 + + 	  + 
COLUMN 	 26 	 11 16 42 	 95  
TOTAL 
	
27.4%11.6% 16.6% 44.2% 	 100.0% 
CHI-SQUARE 	 D.F. 	 SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. 	 CELLS WITH S.F.( 	 5 
36.06837 	 15 	 0.0017 0.463 	 10 CF 24 	 ( 	 75.07.) 
WITH "CONTENT" AND "PROCESS" WITH LEARNING 4 
STATISTIC 	 VALUE 	 SIGNIFICANCE 
CRAMER'S V 	 0.35575 
CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT 	 0.524513 
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Appendix 3: Some aspects of the statistical basis of the 
interpretation of correlations. 
In this Appendix, the rationale and some of the more "technical" (in 
the statistical sense) aspects of the study of correlations will be 
briefly discussed. As already noted, in this analysis the detection and 
interpretation of correlations between the various themes of the 
research instrument are based on the size of both chi square and of 
standardised residuals. Thus, the size of chi square (taking into 
account the degrees of freedom of the particular table) serves as a 
means to detect the existence of a correlation. The strength of the 
correlation is measured in this study by Cramer's V coefficient, 	 for 
reasons which have been explained in the relevant section. 
The essential element of chi square measures and subsequent attempts 
to interpret the correlations (if any) is one based on the differences 
between the observed frequencies and those frequencies calculated if 
one assumes a no association model (expected frequencies). The expected 
frequency for each cell is the product of the margin totals (sum of 
column and row for the particular cell) divided by the sum of all 
frequencies (i.e. the number of subjects in the study). 
The square of the standardised residual for a cell in a contingency 
table can be obtained if one takes the square of the difference between 
the observed and the expected frequency for this cell divided by the 
2  expected frequency (formula A:srl(f° fe)) [1]. The standardised 
fe 
residual for a cell shows therefore the difference between observed and 
expected value for this cell, in terms of the standard error of the 
expected frequency. 
However, for counted data (as opposed to continuous variables), chi 
square equals to the sum (for every cell) of the quantity expressed as 
the square of the difference between the observed and the expected 
frequency 2for this cell divided by the expected frequency (formula B: 
2 (f0 —fe) 	 12). For a more precise definition one should add that the 
fe 
limit of chi square is equal to the limit of the above sum when the 
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limit of the expected frequency tends to the infinite. For this reason 
in the case of small expected frequencies - below 5 for tables with 
high degrees of freedom, as Blalock and others suggest, Yate's 
correction is usually recommended [Z]. 
It is clear then that the sum of the squares of standardised 
residuals provides a good approximation of the chi square for a 
contingency table. Furthermore, taking into account the above formulae 
(A) and 	 (B), it becomes evident that cells with large standardised 
residuals contribute most to the size of chi square, thus being 
responsible (that is to say the sources) for the existence of the 
correlation between the variables represented by the dimensions of the 
table. 	 Therefore, 	 if one establishes the existence of correlations on 
the basis of chi square, a very meaningful way to interpet these 
correlations is to look at the size of standardised residuals for each 
cell. 
If we now consider, as noted above, that the standardised residual 
for a cell shows the difference between observed and expected value for 
this cell, in terms of the standard error of the expected frequency it 
also becomes clear that standardised residuals with values between 1 
and 2 	 (or, -2 and -1) indicate a very considerable standard deviation 
of the observed from the expected frequency, while for values of 
standardised residuals higher than 2 (or lower than -2) the effect of 
such cells on the overall correlation is very significant. For this 
reason standardised residuals were categorised in the correlation 
tables studied here in terms of the above values (see section VIII.7). 
The last point to be discussed refers to Yate's correction. The 
statistical 
	 package used 	 in this study 	 (SPSSx) has not a built-in 
sub-routine for calculating chi square corrected according to Yate, if 
low expected frequencies occur. Apart from this Blalock does not 
recommend Yate's correction for tables which have many degrees of 
freedom EU. Almost all the contingency tables studied for correlations 
have more than 15 degrees of freedom. In such cases Blalock suggests 
that rows and columns should be omitted so as to construct smaller 
tables with no more than 2 or 3 cells having expected frequencies lower 
than 5. 	 Then one can carry out chi square tests for these smaller 
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tables so as to check again the existence of correlations indicated by 
similar tests for the complete tables. If the existence of correlations 
is verified one should return to the initial complete tables for the 
interpretation so as to avoid loss of information C5l. 	 This procedure 
was applied in this study. The outcome is as follows: 
-1st set of tests (complete tables - see Appendix 2): Out of 45 
tables for 75 tables a significant correlation at the level of at least 
0.05 was detected (see table T8.38). 
-2nd set of tests (tables with no more than 3 cells with expected 
frequencies lower than 5): Out of the 35 tables for which a significant 
correlation was detected only 3 tables failed at the 0.05 (or lower) 
level. However, even for these tables, namely 
	
those concerning the 
pair of themes: sc. methodology-integration of sc. curricula, sc. 
methodology-assumptions 	 about 	 instruction 	 and 	 finally 	 sc. 
methodology-assumptions about classroom activities) a correlation at 
the level of significance 0.12 (a weak indication for the existence of 
correlations) was found to exist. 
Since the second set of tests showed virtually no difference compared 
with the results of the first set of test the attempt to interpret 
correlations was conducted on the basis of the complete tables for 
which the first set of tests revealed a significant correlation. 
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